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This study examines organizational changes in state education agencies 
(SEAs) in the context of current standards-based accountability policies. It 
identifies the changing organizational characteristics of SEAs and depicts the 
organizational motivations and strategies adopted to bring about change. Based on 
institutional theory and empirical evidence from state departments of education, 
the study proposes a theoretical framework that explains the organizational 
change process. The organizational level analysis illustrates the impact of 
standards-based accountability policy on the structure and networks of SEAs and 
highlights the importance of organizational analysis in the policy design process.  
The study employs a mixed-methods design to investigation the changing 
experience of state departments of education in the past two decades with a focus 
on the post-No Child Left Behind era. Together with primary and secondary texts 
and documents, it draws data from interviews with state officials in ten state 
departments of education and national surveys of 50 states in 2003, 2004 and 
2007. The study identifies internal changes regarding organizational structure, 
 
staffing, and technology as well as external changes in terms of their functions 
and working relationships with other educational agencies. To understand the 
process of organizational change, the study examines the organizational 
motivations and strategies that state departments of education used to bring about 
these changes.  
The study finds that, since early 1990s, state departments of education 
have gradually changed their role in the U.S. education system from monitoring 
finance administration to compliance with federal requirements to provide 
technical assistance. The organizational structure is changed to increase internal 
efficiency accompanied by a decrease in administrative staff but an increase in the 
need for technical staff, particularly staff that can help with the increasing 
technology in the organizations‘ data systems. State departments of education 
developed new relationships with local educational agencies with unprecedented 
attention on student academic performance and school management. These 
changes were pushed by both state and federal reforms that highlight the positive 
role state agencies can play to improve school performance. To make these 
changes happen, state departments have used networking as a way to expand 
organizational capacity and pushed cross-level collaboration to improve 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The passing of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2002 ushered in 
a new era of education policy that not only directed more policy attention from 
inputs to outputs from public schools, but also intensified the debate on standards-
based accountability (SBA) as a means to meet the expectations for education 
outcomes. Historically, public education in the United States featured a tradition 
of local control where public schools aimed to serve the collective interests of 
local communities. NCLB‘s emphasis on standardized assessment of student 
achievement and centralized evaluation of school performance greatly reshaped 
the structure and the function of agencies in the education system. Consequently, 
it pushes forward the momentum of a power shift from local to state education 
agencies (SEAs) and makes the latter a driving force in implementing the federal 
law. SEAs are the government agency in each U.S. state to provide services to 
local education system. This study focuses particularly on the statutory offices, 
the state departments of education, under the supervision of chief state school 
officers, either titled as state superintendents or commissioners of education. State 
education initiatives by state departments of education are often determined by 
the support they gain from governors and state legislators (McDonnell & 
McLaughlin, 1982).  
This dissertation examines the changing experience of SEAs, as they are 
sandwiched between federal mandates and the expectations of local schools and 
districts, to illustrate the impact of policy changes on organizational function and 
capacity. The goal of the study is to construct a conceptual framework that 
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explains organizational change in the turbulent policy environment and to extend 
the scope of policy implementation studies to include organizational analysis as 
an essential component.  
Purpose of the Study 
Shifts in the policy environment toward SBA have led to major changes in 
SEAs. The tension between the country‘s tradition of local control and the 
resurgence of federal initiated SBA reform further intensify the debate regarding 
SEAs‘ role as intermediate governmental agencies that oversee the 
implementation of federal and state education policies in local schools. To inform 
this debate, this study illustrates how the institutional shift to SBA impacts SEAs 
as institutionalized organizations that constantly respond to the changing 
institutional environment for resources. 
The U.S. education system, with its complex social structures, has three 
major tiers of governance – federal, state and district. Each tier of governance has 
a particular range of authority that links closely to the country‘s politics and 
history. This study focuses on education agencies at the state level for two main 
reasons, namely, the increasing importance of SEAs in implementing the SBA 
policy and the lack of research that examines SEAs‘ functions in the U.S. 
education system.  
The current SBA movement has enabled SEAs to have more authority 
than merely supplying local schools with funding and a voluntary curriculum. 
SEAs are designated to evaluate schools and to apply rewards or sanctions based 
on state standards and student performance on state assessments. This entitled 
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power has, on one hand, boosted SEAs‘ political status and, on the other hand, 
challenged their capacities to implement the law without being too offensive to 
the tradition of local control. The American education system follows three 
fundamental principles – local control, federalism and professionalism (Chubb, 
2001). The local control principle posits that communities where students and 
their families live have the best knowledge of students‘ educational needs and, 
therefore, should make the decision about organizing schools. According to this 
principle, public schools in the United States are governed and administered by 
boards of education that are elected or appointed to represent interests of local 
communities.  
The principle of federalism refers to the shared power between the federal 
and the state governments. Regarding education issues, however, states 
traditionally reserve great autonomy and delegate major responsibilities to local 
districts. The local delegation of state power and the minimal federal mandates on 
education circumvent the potential conflicts between the principles of local 
control and federalism at schools. In current SBA reform, however, interests and 
administration of the state-level agencies are highlighted and increasingly 
influenced by the federal law that expresses clear expectations on school 
performance; local control is constantly under external scrutiny from the state. As 
the two principles show increasing conflicts, local districts in some cases become 
a central force against the top-down approach that undergirds the SBA policy.  
The last principle, professionalism, suggests that results in political 
campaigns should not result in appointed positions that influence the delivery of 
4 
 
education; instead, education ―should be delivered by professionals, individuals 
who have been certified as skillful and knowledgeable and who can be trusted to 
make decisions objectively, consistent with education policy and the best interest 
of children‖ (Chubb, 2001, p. 23). Chubb (2001) argued that a professional 
system needs both autonomy and accountability and particularly emphasized the 
importance of the latter that is often lacking in education. What have been 
troubling the SBA implementation are the discrepancies between the autonomic 
decision to be made by the professionals and the external standards to which they 
are held accountable.  
The standards-based reform movement has been prominent in education 
since the post-World War II era. Progressive reformers in the 1960s and 70s 
believed ―good ideas would travel of their own volition (to schools)‖ (Elmore, 
1995, p. 18), but these ideas failed to bring about changes on a larger scale. The 
federal government then started funding large-scale reform initiatives to form a 
pool of innovative ideas for organizing public schools (Fullan, 2007). The 
increasing public concerns about education quality and equality pushed political 
entities to address education issues as an important theme in their political agenda. 
The Education Consolidation and Improvement Act in 1981 consolidated federal 
grants and gave states greater control over spending. In the early 1990s, President 
George H. W. Bush initiated the standardization agenda with a call for a ―national 
crusade‖ (Bush, 1991, p. 648, adapted from Jennings, 1998) to measure progress 
toward national education goals and standards with a national test. Later, the 
Educate America Act: Goals 2000 in 1994, proposed by the Clinton 
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administration, continued pushing the agenda of standardization and required 
states to set standards and assessments before receiving federal education funds, 
and these standards had to be approved by the U.S. Department of Education 
(McGuinn, 2006). The NCLB Act proceeds with this policy theme of 
standardization with approval from both leading political parties despite their long 
history of disagreement on the federal government‘s role in public education 
(Jennings, 1998; McGuinn, 2006). 
Caught between the federal push for SBA and the tradition of local control, 
SEAs have become a battlefield filled with political tensions. An understanding of 
SEAs‘ function in relation to districts and other interest groups, therefore, seems 
particularly necessary before we search for an approach to address the competing 
ideas for the governance of education. Despite doubts about state capacity and 
concerns over the decay of local control, SEAs have employed a variety of 
strategies and approaches to address the requirements from the federal 
government and to respond to local schools. Sandwiched between the federal 
government and local districts and schools, SEAs serve as important intermediate 
organizations to translate education policy into school practice. A theoretical 
understanding of these organizational practices may provide meaningful insights 
for the future development of inter-governmental cooperation in the 
implementation of school reform policy. 
The second reason for this study is the scarcity of research on SEAs. 
Despite the role of SEAs being heavily debated in the policy arena, research has 
not addressed the development of SEAs as a social organization in a particular 
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context of institutional orientation, such as the current inclination to SBA. SEAs 
as social entities do not exist in a vacuum; as institutional theories suggest, their 
organizational structures and practices resemble their institutional environment. 
Institutional sociologists have contributed significantly to the understanding of 
educational organizations; they have analyzed schools, school districts, and 
community colleges, to illustrate institutional concepts (Bidwell, 1965; Brint & 
Karabel, 1991; Mayer & Scott, 1977; Powell, 1991). Rowan (1982), for example, 
examined the impact of policy changes in the California school system on the 
proportion of district administrative positions in health, psychological and 
curriculum services. He argued that the local school system changed its structures 
as the institutional endorsement fluctuated. Between 1930 and 1970, school 
districts in California reduced the personnel in health services as the institutional 
environment shifted its attention away from the delivery of health services at 
schools. In contrast, personnel in the psychological services grew in response to 
the consistent institutional emphasis. The orientation of institutional environments 
shifted through state mandates, the establishment of professional certification 
programs and professional organizations, programs available at higher education 
institutions, and the availability of external funding. The employment for 
curriculum services showed the most fluctuation because the institutional 
environment was most unstable. Findings of this study show that local schools 
tend to eliminate those structural elements that lack support from the institutional 
environment. This study is unique because it is one of the few institutional studies 
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that illustrate the dynamics between the larger institutional context and 
educational organizations.  
Two reasons may explain the lack of research that applies institutional 
theories to education. First, a disciplinary divide has prevented institutional 
theories in sociology from being widely acknowledged in the study of education. 
Burch (2007) argued that perceptions of institutional theory as overemphasizing 
macro-level social institutions disguised its applicability to organizational changes 
and educational issues.  
Institutional theories provide a rich theoretical basis for understanding 
education reform and policy implementation. For instance, it is widely 
acknowledged in organizational studies that organizations change themselves as 
they interact with the exogenous environment at their boundaries; they constantly 
face challenges and opportunities to change to make themselves more adaptable 
to institutional rules and partnerships (Meyer & Rowan, 1991). When the 
environment impedes organizational functioning and reproduction, organizations 
have to change in such a way that institutional contradiction and conflicts can be 
emolliated or mediated (Friedland & Alford, 1991). However, organizations are 
by no means passive in the change process. They actively shape the environment 
in which they are bounded so that the environmental change does not deviate too 
far from their goals and development. 
Another line of theories of change argues that organizations are part of the 
institutional environment; organizations tend to change their structure to reflect 
changes in the environment (Jepperson, 1991). Institutional theorists often use the 
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concept of isomorphism to capture the phenomenon that organizations imitate 
external environmental elements in their internal structure. Some argue that 
isomorphism is a result of interdependencies between organizations and their 
environment (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Hawley, 1968; Thompson, 1967). Others 
claim that it symbolizes organization leaders‘ learning and their behavioral 
adjustment to environment changes (Hanna & Freeman, 1977). Regardless of its 
nature, isomorphism promotes the success and survival of organizations, 
especially when their structural elements are subject to evaluation by other 
organizations in similar fields (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, isomorphic 
changes do not necessarily promote internal efficiency; rather, they are strategies 
for organizations to establish legitimacy and appraise productive performance of 
their internal units.  
The second reason why institutional theories are not widely used in 
education research is the difficulties of collecting appropriate data to effectively 
address issues in educational organizations. In addition to the complex structural 
and bureaucratic system that characterizes most educational organizations, the 
widespread fragmentation and decoupling make the structural relationship hard to 
depict and data that capture such dynamics hard to collect. The examination of 
SEAs in this study is situated in the current wave of standards-based reform 
symbolized by NCLB and benefits from multiple data sources collected from 
consistent contact with SEAs during this period. Though the data were collected 
without the intention to examine them through the lens of institutional theories, 
they were designed to capture the impact of SBA policy on SEAs (CEP, 2004, 
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2005, 2007a). These multiple data sources provide an opportunity to examine the 
general patterns of organizational responses to the institutional environment and 
to explore how organizational change takes place. 
Research Questions and Methods 
This study attempts to apply institutional theories to the analysis of 
educational organizations by answering two overarching questions: 
1. What changes did SEAs make during the first years of NCLB to fulfill its 
requirements? 
2. How did these changes take place? 
I chose to focus on SEAs as the organizational level of interest because 
they have been at the forefront of implementing recent policy changes in 
education. For instance, in the first year of NCLB, an increasing number of states 
focused efforts on assessment and the alignment of state assessments to state 
standards (American Federation of Teachers, 2001). States developed more 
instructional materials and incentives to help students, particularly the ones at risk 
of failing, to meet these standards. However, states seemed to lack the capacity 
and expertise to adequately provide these services. Consequently, they were 
constantly criticized for the poor quality of standardized tests, inadequate 
curriculum and ineffective assistance to districts. Sunderman and Orfield (2008) 
describe the state response to NCLB as massive responsibilities and limited 
resources. They argued that NCLB pushed states to a central role in implementing 
school reform efforts, but with limited resources from outside. Therefore, some 
states had to prioritize some schools and districts over others. Existing literature 
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has alluded to the phenomenon of organizational changes at SEAs but hardly 
examined the changes longitudinally or provided detailed analysis of the change 
processes. Additionally, as SEAs steered the design and implementation of 
accountability measures, their interaction and collaboration with local districts 
and schools intensified. A study of new organizational relationships and functions 
not only tests the institutional assumption that change in the institutional 
environment, such as policy inclination to SBA,  lead to changes in organizational 
role, structure and partnership, but also promises a new perspective to understand 
the impact of SBA policies.  
To study the process of change from a longitudinal perspective, the study 
will use a qualitative dominant mixed methods design that integrates case study 
and survey methods with two data streams: interview data with state officials in 
2007 and survey data with state leaders in 2003, 2004 and 2007.  
State level interviews were conducted between February and March 2007 
with ten state superintendents who had at least 5 years of experience in their 
current state departments to be able to speak to SEAs‘ organizational changes. 
Interview protocols were developed to explore SEAs‘ responsibility, structural 
change, partnership with districts and capacity to implement NCLB.  
The state surveys were sent to superintendents of all fifty states in 2003, 
2004 and 2007 and had a 100% response rate each year. The surveys inquired 
about state-district relationships, state capacity, and strategies to make 
organizational adjustments for the implementation of NCLB.  
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Data analysis will follow three steps, 1) interview data analysis, 2) survey 
data analysis, and 3) integration and triangulation to create a dialogue between the 
two forms of data.  
Rationale for the Study 
This organizational analysis of SEAs not only illustrates the experience of 
intermediate governmental organizations in a changing policy environment but 
also adds a new perspective to understand the impact of NCLB‘s approach to 
SBA policy. It contributes to the field of education research in four major ways. 
First, this study describes and analyzes the experience of SEAs in states with 
varied intensity of state activism associated with SBA. Such documentation 
demonstrates the wide spectrum of organizational changes in SEAs and leadership 
vision in terms of policy design, capacity building and intergovernmental 
cooperation.  
Second, this study demonstrates wide implications of institutional theories 
for a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between education 
reform and its implementing agencies. Policy research in education tends to focus 
on the evaluation of policy but overlooks the mechanism and the structure of 
organizations implementing the policies. By examining SEAs‘ change, this study 
proposes an expansion of research in education policy, taking account of more in-
depth understanding of implementing agencies. 
Third, this study constructs a theoretical model that illustrates the process 
of change in institutionalized organizations. This model is built on key concepts 
in institutional theories and tested by empirical evidence from SEAs.  It provides 
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a theoretical basis for replicate studies on SEAs or research on other 
institutionalized organizations. 
Last, the multiple sources of information used to address education 
policies add to the literature of state activism from a longitudinal perspective. 
Understanding organizational change requires evidence collected across a period 
of time and speaks to a situation at different time points. This study employs both 
kinds of evidence that not only compare the snapshots at each time stamp using 
survey data but also captures the process through multiple interview cases.  
Definitions of Terms 
Terms used in this study often have varied meanings in different contexts. 
It is necessary to define these terms so they can be used uniformly and serve the 
purpose of this study.  
Organization and institution are two key terms that need to be clearly 
differentiated. Organizations are social entities that actively apply institutional 
rules (North, 1990) and embody institutions through their structure and practice 
that are largely shaped by resources and power-dependency relationships in a 
particular field (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987; Williamson, 1985). The 
focus of this study is on SEAs as organizations.  When organizations are under 
the influence of multiple forces in the institutional environment or competing 
institutional objectives, two things tend to happen: (1) they tend to develop more 
administrative capacity and (2) organizations in the same field tend to become 
more differentiated (Meyer & Scott, 1983). 
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The term organizational field refers to a population of organizations 
holding similar goals, norms and social logics. Organizations in such aggregates 
constitute ―a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce 
similar services or products‖ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Organizational 
field has also been defined as policy domains, or disputes and issues of concern 
(Scott, 2008). It can be a battlefield where organizations are seeking to advance 
conflicting interests and impose their rules of the game on others (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). It can also be a community where organizations coordinate for 
collective survival (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). In this study, the field of SEAs 
consisted of 50 state departments of education and their collaborative 
organizations. SEAs are regulatory agencies that receive federal and state funding 
to oversee public education in their particular states. They work with other 
organizations, such as schools, districts and testing companies, to fulfill their 
public functions. Therefore, the organizational field for SEAs can be addressed 
through SEAs and their relationship with other organizations. Data for this study 
can only sufficiently address a few aspects of the organizational field for SEAs, 
specifically the internal organizational feature of SEAs as well as the relationship 
between SEAs and districts and among SEAs.  
While an organization field is made up of concrete social entities, an 
institution consists of unobservable social codes. Bearley and Tolbert (1997) 
describe an institution as ―shared rules and typifications that identify categories of 
social actors and their appropriate activities or relations‖ (p. 96). In other words, 
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an institution is a social perception that defines the role and activities of 
organizations and is a broad normative concept based on clusters of beliefs and 
values. Specifically, standards-based accountability is interpreted in this study as 
an institutional expectation for education that sets goals for institutional rules in 
education. Such an institutional expectation has not only become gradually 
accepted and shared by its constituents (e.g., schools, districts, states and federal 
government) as a normative practice in education, but also shapes each 
constituent‘s role, activities and relations with others.  
Some theorists also consider organization as a form of institution in the 
sense that one level of organization (e.g., the U.S. Department of Education) can 
operate as an institution to another level (e.g., SEAs) in an organizational 
hierarchy (Jepperson, 1991). In other words, a hierarchical relationship between 
organizations can be institutional. Different perspectives on how these rules and 
typifications are associated with individual behaviors, at either a personal or an 
organizational level, lead to different schools of thoughts regarding institutional 
theories. In this study, I examine one level of organization in the U.S. education 
system, namely SEAs; organizational hierarchy is not the major focus. Therefore, 
organizations are perceived as an embodiment of institutions, playing out and 
acting upon institutional rules by which they are bound.  
Last but not least, I describe the infiltration of institutional expectations 
into organizations as institutionalization. Institutionalization denotes the process 
through which the rules and typifications attain a certain state or property 
(Jepperson, 1991). It denotes how an institutional expectation, such as SBA in 
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education, becomes widely accepted and exerts its impact on individual 
perceptions and behaviors about schooling.  
 
Table 1. 
Summary of Terms 
 
Definition Example 
Organization Social entities that actively play 
the institutional rules and 
embody institutions through 
their structure and practice 
The SEA in each state 
Organizational 
Field 
A population of organizations 
holding similar goals, norms 
and social logics 
All SEAs and other 
organizations they work with 
to fulfill their functions 
Institution Shared rules and typifications 
that identify categories of social 
actors and their appropriate 









Legitimacy is another important concept in institutional theories that I use 
in this study to understand the organizational changes of SEAs. Suchman (1995) 
defined legitimacy as ―a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions‖ (p. 574). Legitimacy is a 
condition for social acceptance and credibility that does not directly produce 
anything but is oftentimes a prerequisite for organizations to have access to 
material resources and technical information (Scott et al., 2000). In this study, the 
concept of legitimacy is applied to reflect perceptions of SEAs‘ roles and 
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functions in the U.S. public school education system, which partly explains the 
motivation for organizational change. 
A key term in this study that connects organization and institution is 
accountability. Depending on the context in which it is used, accountability may 
have different meanings and can be used synonymously with responsibility, 
authority, evaluation and control. Richburg (1971) defined accountability in 
education as ―a construct describing the product of an educational process in 
which an instructional program is assessed as to its effectiveness and efficiency in 
achieving student learning, and educators are held responsible for the failures and 
successes of the instructional program‖ (p. 2). An accountability system also 
assigns its constituent organizations with specific relationships in a specific 
institutional environment. For example, SEAs are required by NCLB, a federal 
law that symbolizes the current SBA-oriented institutional environment in 
education, to develop rigorous standards and assessments to evaluate school 
performance. In the meantime, they are under pressure to provide technical and 
financial assistance particularly to under-performing schools and districts. 
Summary 
This study is a cross-disciplinary attempt to expand the understanding of 
institutionalism in education with a retrospective look at the policy shift toward 
standards-based accountability. Findings of this study may elicit more in-depth 
conversation crossing the borders between education and other disciplines in 
social sciences. The changes taking place in state education agencies provide a 
small window into the world of educational bureaucracy, but open the door to 
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invite multiple lines of social inquiry in search for more effective designs and 
approaches to the implementation of education policy. I learned from my previous 
work on education accountability and policy implementation that the lack of 
knowledge about education organizations could be a major drawback for 
translating policy from paper to action. When a policy is designed without fully 
anticipating its impact on the implementing organizations, it creates a potential 
contradiction between the institutional environment and the organizations‘ 
functioning. As organizations shape the environment for adaptation, policy can be 
easily diluted and deflected in the process. Recent research on street-level 
bureaucracy and policy implementation has illustrated this phenomenon (Honig, 
2006a). This dissertation advocates for a more extensive application of cross-
disciplinary perspectives to draw attention to organizational analysis as a 
necessary but overlooked step toward a thorough understanding of policy 
implementation. The use of institutional theories in this study is an attempt to 
show how such a multi-disciplinary approach may provide new insights about 
education policy.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework for Organizational Change 
Different schools of institutional theories have varied interpretations of 
institutionalization. Some portray an institutional system as a class of elements 
that account for organizational structure; some define it as a distinct societal 
sphere (Scott, 1987). Despite their varied emphases, institutional theories of 
organizations share some recurring themes. For the purpose of this study, I rely on 
the set of institutional theories that highlights the difference and specialization of 
institutional logic and activities in a particular organizational field. Research in 
this orientation not only explains the connection between organizational 
characteristics and practices, but also explores the rationales and the social 
conditions for the connection.  
Organizations vary along a continuum of environmental influence and 
managerial power. At one end of the continuum are production organizations, 
such as factories, with emphasis on output and managerial power, while at the 
other end are institutionalized organizations, such as public schools, with 
emphasis on environmental influence and isomorphism with institutional rules, 
such as policy mandates and professional standards (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Different from production organizations, the impact of institutionalized 
organizations cannot be easily measured through their productivity. Institutional 
rules, to some extent, function as myths to depict ―various formal structures as 




This review mainly focuses on the institutionalized organizations for two 
reasons. Firstly, SEAs resemble institutionalized organizations and their changes 
are situated in an institutional environment that is dominated by top-down policy 
mandates. The outcome and the influence of SEAs cannot be easily quantified. 
The legitimacy of SEAs as indispensable intergovernmental agencies is an 
entitlement and not the result of its productivity. However, the entitled legitimacy 
of existence does not promise that SEAs are competent to meet the expectations 
of its institutional environment, for example, the current SBA oriented policies. 
The dynamic of change between the policy environment and SEAs is best 
captured by research on institutionalized organizations.   
Second, the study of institutionalized organizations has wider implications 
beyond institutionalized organizations and may shed light on the understanding of 
production-oriented organizations as well. The institutional mechanism is the 
basis for both conformity and competition that all organizations face. For instance, 
even production-oriented organizations incorporate elements that are legitimated 
externally at the expense of efficiency. We can define the criteria for quality and 
efficiency because institutional rules, norms and beliefs provide templates for the 
competition mechanism (Clemens, 1997; Orru et al., 1991). Orru and colleague 
(1991), for example, compared the operation of large business groups in South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan and suggested that the difference among business 
organizations in each of the three economies is associated with the varied 
normative perceptions of what constitutes appropriate economic activities.  
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The connection between educational and institutional theories dates back 
to Meyer‘s groundbreaking 1977 article that explores education as ―a system of 
institutionalized rites transforming social roles through powerful initiation 
ceremonies and … transforming society by creating new classes of personnel with 
new types of authoritative knowledge‖ (p. 61). He argued that the effects of 
schools on students are subject more to ―external institutional authority derived 
from the rules of educational allocation‖ (p. 61) than to the internal structure and 
network of schools. His education legitimization theory brought a new 
perspective for examining education as an institutionalized system whose function 
is to legitimize the structure of modern society. 
Since then, educational organizations, such as schools, school districts, 
and community colleges, are often used as examples to illustrate an organization‘s 
priority of order-affirming over task-performing in a fragmented but centralized 
field (Brint & Karabel, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Meyer & Scott, 1983; Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 1987). Teaching is evaluated 
according to criteria of certification; a curriculum is implemented though it might 
depart from the immediate needs of the students in a class; a department is 
maintained to validate the legitimacy of a university regardless of its enrollment 
and graduation rate. The phenomenon of fragmented centralization in education is, 
for the most part, a result of the dependence of the education system on diverse 
organizations and social actors with uncoordinated or even conflicting interests. 
In this study I look particularly at the partnership of SEAs with LEAs to examine 
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how organizations across levels in the bureaucratic system develop new 
relationships to respond to changes in the institutional environment. 
Drawing from concepts and constructs in institutional theories, this review 
proposes a theoretic framework to explain changes in institutionalized 
organizations. This framework helps identify gaps in the literature and guides data 
analysis in later chapters to address these gaps with evidence from the study of 
SEAs. The review starts with the background of a paradigm shift in institutional 
theories and proceeds to explain a selection of institutional constructs that are 
applied in this study to explain the motivation, process and results of 
organizational changes in SEAs. A theoretical model is proposed based on these 
constructs at the end of the review. 
Paradigm Shift in Institutional Theories 
Classical institutional theories have been cited widely in different fields, 
but have received the most consistent attention from sociology. Weber‘s (1947) 
work on bureaucracy, for example, inspired a later generation of institutional 
theorists to focus on organizations as units of analysis. Efficiency, calculability, 
substantive rationality, and technical competency are Weber‘s essential qualities 
of an ideal bureaucratic administration. From the Weberian perspective, 
organizational analysis is a hierarchical sum of its parts with unchanging rules 
that control human actions.  
The rationality and predictability described by the Weber‘s classical 
institutional theories, however, often failed to explain the organizational realities. 
For example, the notion of rationality gives rise to the perception of an 
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organization as a goal-achieving entity. However, it is often not articulated about 
―whose goal,‖ ―which goal,‖ and the distinction between official goals and 
operational goals. Weber recognized that the assumption of rationality conflicts 
with reality and recommended that social scientists examine, instead of making 
assumptions of, such rationality (Swedberg, 1998). 
Classical institutional theories are mainly concerned about systematic 
stability and maintenance of organizations but overlook the dynamics of 
individual and environmental factors as well as the necessity of organizational 
change. Expanding upon these classical models, the neo-institutional paradigm 
examines the logic and logic-in-use and turns increasing attention to practitioners. 
Neo-institutional theorists argue that institutions are the result of human activities 
but not necessarily the product of conscious design. Efforts for rationality in 
organizations often yield unexpected consequences beyond individual control. 
There is less to rationality than meets the evaluator‘s eye because the conditions 
under which rationality works best are relatively rare in organizations (Weick, 
1985). Nevertheless, organizations still need goals to legitimize themselves, 
deflect criticism and gain resources from the external environment. Benson (1983) 
uses educational organizations to illustrate such irrationality: 
An educational organization, for example, must go through the rituals 
approved in the environment for assuring legitimacy: hiring a ritually 
approved staff, offering a conventionally established curriculum and 
granting the usual range of credentials, that is, degrees. None of these 
performances assure that a meaningful or substantively integrated 
educational experience will ensue. In fact, the organization takes 
pains to insulate its core teaching-learning activity from external 




Some theorists highlight the cognitive and normative dimensions of 
individual behaviors and argue that individual actions are learned and cultivated 
by institutionalized role expectations and, therefore, are value-laden (Parsons & 
Shils, 1951). Drawing from cognitive theory, culture theory, phenomenology and 
ethnomethodology, neo-institutional theories introduce greater complexity to the 
field of organizational studies and open inquiries into external constraints and 
influences on critical individual (both person or organization) variables, such as 
cognition in decision-making (March, 1994), social contexts for learning (Donald, 
1991), and symbols as a reflection of internal beliefs and a framework for external 
interactions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).  
The era of neo-institutionalism often divides the old institutionalism and 
the new, hallmarked by DiMaggio and Powell‘s (1991) book, The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. While the ―old‖ institutionalism, as 
represented by Selznick (1948) highlights organizational adaptation, change and 
uniqueness (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), the new institutionalism focuses on inertia, 
persistence, and conformity of organizational structures and homogeneity of 
practices and arrangement. Its unit of analysis is persistent organizational 
practices and its interest is in the quality and reproduction of these practices. The 
new institutionalism argues that institutionalization tends to reduce diversity in 
the local environment in its search for homogeneity and stability among its 
components (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  
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Theoretical Concepts in Organizational Change 
Research on changes within and among organizations reflects a break with 
the rational, bureaucratic tradition and hallmarks a paradigm shift from orthodox 
to neo-institutional theories. The classical institutional theories are mainly derived 
from Weber‘s discussion of bureaucracy as a consequence of economic markets 
and centralized states and his calculable institutional rules. They perceive 
organizational change as the sum of individual actions striving for organizational 
rationality.  
Neo-institutionalism, on the other hand, rejects such intentionality of 
efficiency-driven organizational behaviors and highlights the conflicts between 
institutional rules and efficiency. Not only does maintaining institutional rules 
create ceremonial expenditure, but more cumbersome is that the institutional rules 
formed at the higher levels of organizations are often inappropriate to specific 
situations at the lower levels. This argument captures the gist of a major criticism 
to the top-down approach in education reform and explains why policy 
implementation oftentimes is loosely coupled to the original intentions of the 
policy (Coburn, 2004). For example, a recent study on the Texas accountability 
system shows that changes in school practices may well misinterpret the 
institutional expectation on education accountability and result in an ―educational 
triage‖ where students with the greatest needs are left behind (Booher-Jennings, 
2005). To resolve the inconsistency between institutional rules and efficiency, 
educational organizations often promise reform in both organizational structure 
and activities. This partial solution pushes educational organizations further away 
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from being efficient because it brings increasing numbers of participants with 
competing interests to shape the institutional environment and fuels the criticism 
of inconsistency among institutional rules and elements in the system. The public 
school system is a powerful example of multiple actors involved in decision-
making across hierarchical levels. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) illustrated, ―if one 
inquires who decides what curricula will be taught in schools, any number of 
parties from the various governments down to individual teachers may say that 
they decide‖ (p. 356).  
Organizations may change for both internal and external reasons. Research 
on self-initiated, internal change is mostly built on the notion of organizational 
inertia, which posits that organizations tend not to change as their structure and 
practices become established over time (Hanna & Freeman, 1984). For market-
oriented organizations, organization death rates increase as they make structural 
changes. Research has provided conflicting evidence about the connection 
between organizational size and the tendency to change (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; 
Halliday et al., 1993; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Huber et al., 1993). For example, 
Hanna and Freeman (1984) found that larger organizations tend to select their 
changes. They hierarchically listed four core structural changes in market-oriented 
organizations, including the organization‘s mission, its authority structure, its 
technology and its market strategy.  
Research on external changes mainly emphasizes the impact on 
organizations from the resourceful, multi-faceted and constantly changing 
environment (Miner et al., 1990; Singh, 1991). Organizations face both 
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legitimization and competition challenges from external sources although these 
challenges vary in composition across organizational fields (Scott & Meyer 1983, 
1991). From the neo-institutional perspective, organizational change is a strategy 
to adapt to the environment that may require learning new rules as well as 
adopting and creating alternatives to resolve emerging conflicts (March, 1991). 
Changes can also result from exogenous impediments to organizational 
functioning and reproduction (Jepperson, 1991). A good example is the 
desegregation of public schools as the result of the Supreme Court‘s 1954 Brown 
v. Board of Education decision that declared school segregation unconstitutional. 
The institutional rules, as stated in the federal law, make school segregation an 
illegal practice; public schools that used to have selective enrollment had to 
redefine their functions as public services to all students regardless of their race 
and ethnicity and make development plans that address the needs of all students. 
Early neo-institutional research posits a monolithic argument that institutional 
effects are top-down and organizations are obliged to passively conform to the 
environment (DiMaggio, 1983; Powell, 1988; Rowan, 1982). Important features 
of organizational change were identified, but the rationale for why some changes 
happen and others do not was hardly discussed.  
More recent neo-institutional studies recognize that competing 
institutional rules may help explain why certain changes happen. They extend the 
theories to address the influence of the institutional environment on organizations 
from an interactive perspective. Changes in the institutional environment, 
including changes in governmental regulations, are not simply perceived as 
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coercive and imposing conformity; instead, they are examined through 
organizations‘ interpretation, manipulation and elaboration of the rules (Scott, 
2008). 
The counter force of passive adaptation to environments provides a new 
perspective to understand the discrepancy between organizational behaviors and 
the intention of institutions. This discrepancy resonates with findings in 
implementation studies that policy implementation is oftentimes loosely coupled 
with the original intentions of the policy (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978; Coburn, 
2004). Weatherley and Lipsky‘s (1977) classic studies of street-level bureaucrats 
argue that decision-making is constrained by the rich and diverse knowledge base 
of individuals. Implementing agents may have very different interpretations of the 
same message due to gaps in the agents‘ prior knowledge, their interpretations of 
their professional responsibilities and their capabilities to perform, which may 
lead to different outcomes of policy implementation (Spillane et al., 2002). 
Adaptation research in policy implementation also raises concerns that new ideas 
can be assimilated into the existing framework of knowledge and practices; 
implementation may focus on superficial policy features while underpinning 
rationales are overlooked (Cohen, 1990). What the implementation research does 
not address is that individual choice of action is not free from organizational 
influences, such as socialization, on-the-job training and acquisition of 
conventions that individuals may have been exposed to in their organizations. 
Individuals are obliged to practices that are perceived as standard because 
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expectations associated with their roles in the organization are based on the 
practice of others in comparable situations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
More recent research expanded the earlier conclusions about passive 
adaptation at the expense of efficiency and decoupling as a result of conformity. 
Instead of dichotomizing organizational productivity and institutionalization, 
researchers examined how concepts in institutional theories, such as isomorphism, 
adaptation and loose coupling, are associated with organizational responsiveness 
to survive environmental change (Westphal & Zajac, 1994). The rest of the 
chapter is situated in the multiple perspectives of institutional theories and focuses 
on a selection of institutional concepts that are commonly associated with 
organizational change. Specifically, these concepts address four aspects of 
organizational change in literature, 1) process of change, 2) forms of change, 3) 
motives for change and 4) consequences of change. A theoretical model will be 
proposed based on these key concepts to guide data analysis and interpretation in 
this study.  
Process of Change 
Change implies process. Institutional theories provide a few important 
constructs to address phenomena during this process. I discuss two that are 
particularly relevant to understanding SEAs: loose coupling and adaptation.  
Loose coupling. Weber (1947) describes a well-functioning bureaucratic 
organization as a system of rational, authoritarian hierarchy. However, this 
Weberian tightly coupled organizational structure is hard to find in reality. In the 
organizational reality, it is often difficult to pinpoint a single person or procedure 
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in an organization to blame for a specific mistake. Authority oftentimes does not 
correspond with responsibility for the daily operation of an organization. The 
formal organizational structure assumes that ―coordination is routine, rules and 
procedures are followed, and actual activities conform to the prescription of 
formal structure‖ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 342). Empirical studies suggest, 
however, that these assumptions are rarely true. A CEO may not know the office 
operation as fully as his or her assistant depending on the nature of the matter. 
The daily production procedure and technical demand are often accomplished 
following the informal structures; the formal structure, on the other hand, serves 
the purpose of gaining legitimacy through commonly accepted structural features 
(March & Olsen, 1976; Scott, 2008; Weick, 1976).  
Loose coupling refers to the independent system within an organization 
where different work units, while belonging to a connected network, retain their 
own professional autonomy (Weick, 1976). Weick (1976) identified the lack of 
coordination and slow feedback loop as common features of a loosely coupled 
system. Oftentimes informal organizational structures exist that are independent 
of technical tasks as described in the formal organizational structure, so there are 
alternative means to produce the same results.  The formal and informal 
organizational structure is an example of loose coupling that reflects 
independence of technical tasks inside organizations and the organizational 
unresponsiveness to institutional environments.  
In Orton and Weick‘s (1990) theoretical framework, loose coupling is a 
result of unclear connections between means and ends, or a fragmented external 
30 
 
environment. It tends to happen when external environments have diverse 
demands from the organization or show competing or even conflicting 
expectations. Institutional theorists developed two levels of understanding of 
loosely coupled systems. Early neo-institutionalism interprets loose coupling as 
―ceremonial conformity‖ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) that allows organizations to 
adapt to changes in their environment, avoid catastrophic organization-wide 
failure and give more room for self-determination to the actors (Weick, 1976). For 
example, state standards and assessments are often loosely coupled with school 
curriculum and teaching. This loosely coupled system allows schools and districts 
to maintain a certain level of local control, so schools may have different 
approaches to improve student performance on state tests. The variety of school 
approaches reduces the risk of system-wide failure if the SEA mandates one 
approach for all schools. This strategic choice approach underscores the 
organizational leaders‘ influence on changing structure and technology to 
circumvent environmental changes. Therefore, loose coupling often brings about 
symbolic changes to achieve a social consensus on the meaning of activities, 
either through interpretation, rituals, evaluation or even in creating physical space.  
On a second level, loose coupling may encourage substantive changes in 
the sense that it develops doubt about the logic of the system. Thornton (2004) 
defined institutional logics as ―axial principles of organization and action based 
on cultural discourses and material practices prevalent in different institutional or 
societal sectors‖ (p. 2). Standards-based accountability is a typical example of an 
institutional logic that shapes the practices of key institutional sectors, such as 
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government, communities, and businesses. The loose coupling between state 
accountability and classroom instruction or between state standards and school 
context has triggered heated discussion about the effectiveness and the 
underpinning rationale of the accountability system. When the logic is questioned, 
consensus can be easily broken down and leave organizations receptive to change 
(Weick, 1982). A breakdown in consensus gives rise to alternatives that can 
supplement or replace the existing system; the questioning of the institutional 
logic also makes these alternatives attractive and promising. Additionally, 
ceremonial conformity may have significant impact on structural change in the 
long run. The new offices created and the new personnel hired in the decoupling 
process inevitably shape the function and the culture of the organization, which in 
turn results in long-term impact on organizational change (Edelman, 1992; 
Hoffman, 1997) 
For institutionalized organizations, loose coupling in organizational 
structure and forms may lead an organization to thrive, though it may not be 
efficient. Formal structures in institutionalized organizations come into being not 
only through the prevalent rationalized instructional elements but also through the 
unformulated, taken-for-granted structural elements that are elaborated by the 
complex network among organizations involved in economic exchange and 
political management. The elements in the latter are particularly subject to change 
as the exogenous environment changes. The environment change can be an 
expanded use of new structural elements in organizations in the field, a new legal 
mandate or a grassroots reform effort.  
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While earlier neo-institutional theorists interpret decoupling as a result of 
superficial changes under environmental pressure, later research studied focused 
more on why some organizations choose to decouple structures instead of truly 
implementing changes in practice. Westphal and Zajac (1994, 1998) explored an 
incentive to reform executive performance pay and found that early adoption of 
structural reform tends to increase the opportunity of implementation instead of 
ceremonial conformity through decoupling. The decoupling of policy and practice 
in education has been commonly observed (Coburn, 2004; Cohen, 1990; 
Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977). In Coburn‘s (2004) study of how changes in state 
policy impact classroom instruction, she suggested that the school practice and 
policy are less likely to decouple and teachers are more likely to respond to 
change if the policy has a higher level of congruence with teachers‘ pre-existing 
beliefs, sustained and pervasive exposure to teachers, and a normative connotation 
of what teachers should do.  
Adaptation. Compared to loose coupling, adaptation is a change process 
with less opposition between organization and its institutional environment.  
Through the adaptation process, organizations imitate and assimilate 
environmental elements in their structure, and make modifications and alterations 
to adjust to changes in the external environment (Cameron, 1984). Adaptive 
changes are different from planned developmental changes initiated by an 
organization to address its needs; they are the result of institutional pressures that 
force organizations to conform. This line of research follows DiMaggio and 
Powell‘s (1983, 1991) concept of ―iron cage‖ that emphasizes the constraints 
33 
 
institutional environments put on their constituents so that organizational changes 
are mostly passive response. On the other hand, adaptation is oftentimes mutual. 
Organizations not only predict environmental changes to better prepare 
themselves for survival but also continuously interact with and exert influence on 
the environment to negotiate a balance between their goals and interests and the 
institution‘s (Cameron, 1984; Goodman & Kurke, 1982).  
Organizations often play an active role in shaping the context by 
contracting with collective authorities. Organizations rarely do what they are told 
to do; the changes they actually make can be hardly controlled (March 1991). In a 
highly institutionalized organizational field, organizations shape their 
environment in such ways that the demands for them to change decrease 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This is because institutionalized organizations tend 
to have shared behaviors and beliefs that any institutional change may disrupt the 
routine of operation and change the organization‘s power structure (George & 
Jones, 2008). Nevertheless, organizations constantly adapt to their institutional 
environment for the reward of increased legitimacy, resources and 
competitiveness (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Manipulating the environment is a common adaptive strategy that 
individual organizations use to respond to institutional pressure (Oliver, 1991). 
Compared to other types of strategic responses (e.g., acquiescence, compromise, 
avoidance, and defiance), manipulation relies on collective bargaining through a 
networking process involving different powers. It carries a bonus that the 
networking process may improve the organization‘s public image and legitimacy 
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(Scott, 2008). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that organizations shape their 
environment to achieve legitimacy either by forcing their immediate relational 
networks to adapt to their structures and relations, or by building their goals and 
procedures directly into society as institutional rules. 
To explain why different strategies are employed, researchers took 
different conceptual approaches to examine adaptation. These approaches include 
population ecology, life cycles, strategic choice, and symbolic action (Cameron, 
1984). These four approaches spread across a continuum of power balance 
between environmental and managerial influence. Of the four approaches, the 
population ecology approach emphasizes the importance of environment the most. 
It projects organizational changes as immediate results of a changing 
organizational field, and the surviving organizations are selected to be compatible 
with the changes in the field. For example, if the organizational field is updated 
structurally, organizations have a better chance to survive if they expand the range 
of activities to make themselves more flexible. If resources run short in a field, 
organizations need to develop more focused specialization to survive. 
The life cycle approach (Mintzburg, 1984) depicts organizational 
adaptation as a predictable sequence of events, from forming an ecological niche, 
creating a collective commitment, institutionalizing the ideology, to expanding 
the structure based on the new ideology. The adaptation takes place as each step is 
shaped by problems arising from the previous one. Compared with the population 
ecology approach, organizational leaders have more influence on the adaptation 
process because they are accountable for initiating each step.  
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The other two approaches cite organizational leaders‘ decisions and 
actions as major causes of adaptive change. In contrast to the first two approaches, 
this line of research emphasizes inertia and resistance to change; organizational 
leaders play the role of middlemen to reduce the impact of environmental changes 
on their organizations. For example, the strategic choice approach suggests that, 
to adapt to a changing environment, organization leaders use strategies to enhance 
the legitimacy of their organization to cushion the impact of a changing 
institutional environment. Alternatively, they expand the areas of expertise or 
create new areas to increase their competitiveness in response to environmental 
changes. To a great extent, these two approaches resemble loose coupling as 
discussed previously. 
The literature on loose coupling and adaptation provided two distinct 
processes of change as organizations respond to their institutional environment. 
Earlier neo-institutional research portrays loose coupling as ceremonial and 
symbolic. More recent research uses loose coupling as a measure of 
organizational responsiveness to environmental changes. Adaptation, by 
comparison, shows a more conforming and responsive organizational change. 
This line of research has extended from the description of passive adaptation to 
the discussion of active organizational involvement in shaping the environment. 
Forms of Change 
Theorists in the early 1980s had a major dispute over organizational 
inertia and organizational change. On the one hand, some scholars posited that 
market-driven competition leads organizations to diversify and diffuse (Barnett & 
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Carroll, 1995; Child & Kieser, 1981; March, 1991); changes in organizational 
structure take place when new organizations replace the old (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). On the other hand, the new institutional theorists argue that organizations 
have constraints and tend to change toward conformity and uniformity (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1991). Organizational theorists use the concept of isomorphism to 
capture organizational homogenization. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) define 
isomorphism as ―a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions‖ (p. 66). 
Some scholars used isomorphism to emphasize market competition and niche 
change (Hannan & Freeman, 1977); some perceive it as a byproduct of pursuing 
organizational legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
The connection between competitive and institutional isomorphism is well 
illustrated in Deephouse‘s (1996) study of isomorphism in commercial banks. He 
found that organizational legitimacy as defined by regulatory and public 
acceptance tends to increase as competitive isomorphism increases. Though 
isomorphism can be observed in all organizational fields, it is more important for 
institutionalized organizations for reasons at both the organizational and field 
levels (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). At the organizational level, institutionalized 
organizations tend to develop great interdependency to distribute and share 
resources (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Hawley, 1968; Thompson, 1967). School 
districts, for example, maintained administrative systems similar to the federal 
system to increase competence in seeking federal funding and to be more adaptive 
to potential changes in funding policies (Meyer et al., 1987). Such 
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interdependence helps them survive the uncertainty in the institutional 
environment and encourages organizational homogeneity. At the organizational 
field level, a power and status hierarchy dominates the bureaucratic system of 
institutionalized organizations. The rule-bounded power relationship in the fields 
provides limited alternative organizational models and, therefore, tends to result 
in uniformity in organizational structure, culture and practice. 
The new institutional theories provide a different set of rationales for the 
trend toward conformity. The notion of institutional contradiction, for instance, 
argues that organizations conform to mediate conflicts that occur when material 
practices and symbolic constructions or other organizing principles are in 
contradiction (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Others claim organizational conformity 
is a result of organization leaders learning to appropriate and adjust their 
behaviors as the institutional environment changes (Hanna & Freeman, 1977). For 
example, Huff (1985) reviewed a number of school administrations and found that 
school administrators rely on informal sources across levels within and outside 
schools to understand their schools and the school environment. Such knowledge 
from informal sources shapes and appropriates school administrators‘ leadership 
role in handling the unpredictable environment. To cope with the unpredictability, 
school administrators play with possibilities and think through responses to events 
that may not occur. They tend to manage the premises to shape others‘ decision-
making rather than make decisions themselves.  
Huff also observed the discrepancy between administrators‘ thinking and 
actions. Sometimes administrators act on more than they know because of the 
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ambiguities and unpredictability in the organization. Sometimes they are content 
with partial solutions because, even though they are able to understand an issue in 
its larger context, they can only act upon a small part of the whole. Oftentimes, a 
specific action calls for compatibility with several other concurrent issues.   
Isomorphism reveals itself in different forms in the organizational change 
process and each offers a different approach to claim legitimacy. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991) proposed a typology that describes three kinds of isomorphism – 
coercive, normative and mimetic.  Scott (2008) elaborated with a similar but 
clearer set of terms – regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. A typical 
coercive or regulative isomorphism can be observed when organizations change 
under the pressure of government mandates, imposition of standards and 
legitimated rules. The pressure to change may also come from collective 
bargaining from grassroots advocacy communities. The pressure in either case 
can be so intense that change becomes less of a choice than a requirement.  
Organizations in the public sector tend to be more responsive to legal and 
regulatory requirements (Scott, 2008). Coercive change is more visible and can be 
easily manipulated by organizations as a gaming strategy to deal with regulative 
pressure. Take Kentucky‘s state assessment Kentucky Instructional Results 
Information Systems (KIRIS) for example. The state department administered the 
state assessment as a response to the policy shift to state standards and 
accountability. However, between 1992 and 1994, the scale scores of KIRIS in 
reading increased by 18 points while the state‘s NAEP reading score decreased by 
1 point. The test framework was supposed to test similar knowledge and skills, 
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but the wide difference in test results showcased how states can game the testing 
system (Koretz, 2008). The discrepancy between student performance on state 
and national assessment suggests that states may inflate test results by using 
repetitively similar test items, excluding students, and changing cut scores and 
testing programs (Catterall et al., 1998; Fuller, 2004; Fuller et al., 2006; Klein, 
Hamilton, McCaffrey & Stecher, 2000; McDonnell, 2005).  
Normative pressure for organizational change stems from 
professionalization defined either by formal education or by professional 
associations. Perrow (1974) observed that professionals who make it through the 
professional career tracks not only occupy similar positions and exercise similar 
functions across organizations but also possess similar orientations and 
dispositions. Driven by status competition, organizations employ professional 
personnel to prove they are comparable to their peers and, therefore, become more 
homogeneous in their structure and function.  
Organizations also make changes to model themselves on other 
organizations that are perceived as more legitimate or successful. This mimetic 
isomorphism highlights culturally and cognitively shared conceptions. 
Organizations use it to deal with ambiguous goals and uncertain environments or 
to make up for a limited understanding of organizational technology. Compared to 
coercive or regulative change, culturally and cognitively embedded organizational 
change through mimetic isomorphism is less visible but more consequential and 
profound. Scott (2008) summarizes that market-oriented organizations often 
choose their reference groups based on geographic proximity, perceived similarity, 
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social status, shared connections regarding resources, information, and board 
interlock. The imitations, however, often generate new hybrids of organizational 
routines and forms, which Powell (1991) calls partial diffusion, as a result of local 
modifications made in the imitation process. 
Organizational isomorphism is believed to promote the success and 
survival of organizations when their structural elements are defined and evaluated 
based on externally fixed institutions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Although the 
elements do not necessarily promote internal efficiency, the values of these 
elements may well be defined in other ways, such as legitimacy. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) argue that isomorphic changes can be predicted based on an 
organization‘s dependence on others, the centralization of its resource supply, the 
relationship between its means and ends, the ambiguity of its goals, and its 
reliance on academic credentials. Within an organizational field, changes tend to 
take place in units that are least subject to isomorphic arrangements, namely the 
periphery of organization fields (Powell, 1991).  
More recent studies question the neo-institutional assumption about 
institutional pressure to conformity. Kraatz and Zajac (1996) studied longitudinal 
change of liberal arts colleges and found that strong institutional pressure does not 
increase homogeneity of organizational changes as prescribed by neo-institutional 
theories. Neither do the low-status colleges make changes to resemble higher-
status colleges. Washington and Ventresca (2004) studied three fields of 
intercollegiate athletics and found that a strategy used by other organizations in 
each of the three athletics fields does not predict an increasing likelihood that an 
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organization adopts the same strategy to make a change. This finding challenges 
the proposition of mimetic isomorphism as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991). 
Motives for Change 
Institutional literature suggests two main sources of motives for 
organizations to change: to consolidate their legitimate membership in the field 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967), and to 
boost efficiency and competitiveness for limited resources among organizations 
with similar forms (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). For the 
purpose of this study, special attention is paid to the motivation for legitimacy 
because it tends to be the main concern of institutionalized organizations. The two 
change processes, loose coupling and adaptation, serve the purpose of achieving 
legitimacy more than efficiency although competition also leads to adaptive 
changes. To a great extent, legitimacy not only entitles institutionalized 
organizations with resources but also defines their competency.  
Classical theories and neo-institutional theories have different 
interpretations of legitimacy. From the perspective of the classical theories, 
organizations can achieve legitimacy through conformity to legal frameworks and 
rational prescriptions supported by scientific evidence (Weber, 1968). Neo-
institutional theorists interpret legitimacy with an emphasis on the congruity in 
goals, structure and procedures between an organization and its environment 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Parsons, 1960; Pfeffer & Slancik, 1978). As Dowling 
and Pfeffer (1975) put it, 
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Legitimacy is a constraint … on organizational behavior, but it is a 
dynamic constraint which changes as organizations adapt, and as the 
social values which define legitimacy change and are changed. (p. 
126) 
 
Ruef and Scott (1998) argued that, in highly institutionalized organizations, 
managerial legitimacy is more important in an environment where organizations 
are highly interdependent. Technical legitimacy is more important for survival in 
an environment featured by centralized regulatory and funding control. This 
argument implies that different environments may result in varied needs for 
legitimacy. It also highlights the difference between classical and neo-institutional 
theories. While classical theorists perceive legitimacy as a state that can be 
measured by quantity, neo-institutional theorists interpret legitimacy as an 
evolving relationship between organizations and their environment. It is 
indispensable for both production and institutionalized organizations. For the 
former, legitimacy may outweigh the organizational stride for economic outcomes 
to make changes in the field (Dacin, 1997); for the latter, legitimacy is often so 
merged with the organizations‘ structures and practices that it becomes part of 
their function. 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) argued that organizations achieve legitimacy 
by adapting their goals and operations to conform to what prevails as legitimate. 
Legitimacy can also be achieved through altering the prevailing definition of 
legitimacy through communication, or establishing a public image of legitimacy 
through symbols, values or institutions. Suchman (1995) named the symbolic 
approach to legitimacy a strategic approach where legitimacy is perceived as 
symbolic operational resources that organization leaders manipulate to help 
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achieve organizational goals. As opposed to the strategic approach that aims at 
achieving ceremonial legitimacy, an institutional approach achieves legitimacy by 
shaping constitutional beliefs about the institutionalized environment. It shifts the 
focus of legitimacy from managerial gaming to the compatibility between 
organizations and the institutionalized environment. Suchman (1995) argued that 
organizations achieve legitimacy through conforming, selecting or manipulating 
the existing institutional environment, and that they maintain legitimacy by 
forecasting future changes and protecting past accomplishments.  
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) proposed a similar typology for the means by 
which organizations seek legitimacy: substantive and symbolic management. The 
substantive management approach includes changes in productive performance, 
isomorphic behaviors, and resource dependencies. Symbolic management, on the 
other hand, does not result in changes beyond creating an impression and 
ceremonial conformity. As organizations make efforts to extend, maintain and 
defend their legitimacy, the tension increases between the legitimation attempts of 
the organization and the perceived legitimacy of the organization by the 
constituents. The authors argued that organizations with low perceived legitimacy 
have greater need and put greater effort to gain legitimacy. The lower the 
perceived legitimacy, the more the skepticism regarding the legitimating attempts. 
Organizations with low perceived legitimacy, therefore, tend to make dramatic 
legitimation attempts, but the more dramatic the attempts are, the less the 
perceived legitimacy. This theory of problematic legitimacy illustrates the 
challenges in pursuing legitimacy. Its propositions focus on challenges faced by 
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organizations with low perceived legitimacy, but similar to many early 
institutional studies, the propositions are seldom supported by empirical evidence. 
The authors did not explain how to measure these comparative terms and to what 
extent established organizations face these challenges.  
The question of how to measure legitimacy has not been well addressed in 
the institutional literature. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) recommended that 
legitimacy could be presented in the writing and other formats of communication 
that capture values and norms prevalent in the society. They suggested that 
legitimacy could be examined as a constraint on organizational behavior or as a 
co-optation in the relationship between organizations and social values. In the 
context of organizational change, legitimacy conveys what is expected of the 
organization and sets the boundary of what to change and how.  
When examining motivation to change, tenets of classical theories of 
organizational interests and goals and neo-institutional theories of environmental 
influence are often intertwined. Brint and Karabel (1991), for example, illustrate 
how changes in two community colleges are driven by external power and 
organizational goals. They argue that four-year colleges, the business community, 
and governmental bodies shape the interests of community colleges. Bounded by 
the three centers of power, community colleges find niches in their social 
environment to reduce competition and survive through adaptation. The interests 
of community colleges are also influenced by their competitive advantage, such as 
low cost and easy access, and organizational leaders‘ ideology and status pressure. 
Brint and Karabel conclude that the institutional interest of the community college 
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is framed by labor market and managerial capacity as well as status group conflict, 
demographic changes and new organizational competitors. The authors also point 
out that ―during widely perceived national crisis periods, educational emphases 
tend to shift from training and allocation to socializing efforts, with a renewed 
emphasis on ‗common national values‘‖ (p. 354). This point is in line with the 
classical theories argument that, when social networks either within or among 
organizations become complex, standardization is called for by both political 
centers, such as the federal government, and peripheral units, such as the state 
department of education (Bendix, 1968). 
Consequences of Change: Changes in Organizational Field 
Changes in organizational field are the consequences of collective changes 
in organizations. When changes in organizations spread to a larger scale and 
become a field phenomenon, standard practices in the organizational field change.  
The organizational field of SEAs is characterized by a somewhat 
distinctive governance system. SEAs are intermediate governmental bodies that 
connect local school communities and the department of education at the federal 
level. As other state agencies, they enjoy sovereignty to a great extent but heavily 
rely on local and federal resources. They rely on school systems to deliver 
services, provide expertise and report student progress. In the meantime, they are 
constrained by federal laws and funding streams. For example, the enactment of 
NCLB led states to focus on assessment and the alignment of state tests to state 
standards (American Federation of Teachers, 2001). As individual SEAs become 
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more involved in school and develop stronger partnerships with LEAs in the new 
institutional environment, the field of SEAs has also changed. 
Organizational field is a fresh concept to education research; however, it 
promises a new lens to expand our understanding of educational issues. For 
instance, Burch (2007) used the concept of organizational field to examine the 
district implementation of literacy and mathematics instruction reform. She 
perceived subject areas as fields with different culture and institutional 
environment that leads to diverse views among district staff of their involvement 
in the two subject areas. More district staff perceived themselves involved in 
literacy reform than in mathematics reform but such involvement is practiced in a 
more indirect way in literacy than in mathematics. In other words, fewer staff 
perceived themselves as involved in the mathematics reform but those who did 
participated in the reform effort more directly.  
The concept of organizational field broadens the impact of institutional 
rules from particular organizations to a cluster of organizations. It helps illustrate 
the adoption of new functions and expertise as standard practices and the 
development of new relationships across organization (DiMaggio, 1983; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As organizations change, the organizational field 
inevitably changes as well. Scott (1994) proposed a model to explain the 
interaction between organizations and organizational fields. In his model, change 
in organizational field is one of the reasons for organizational change. He argued 
that, as the field imposes norms on organizations, changes and innovations at the 
organizational level initiate negotiation with the dominant structures in the fields 
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and push the field to change. Additionally, the institutional imprint on his model 
suggests that organizational fields resemble their institutional environment and 
may become part of the institutional rules that directly exert influence on 
organizations. In the field of SEAs, organizational changes as responses to the 
federal law are initiated mainly at the organizational level as a result of state 
sovereignty and the lack of a governing structure. As SEAs have had different 
organizational structures and practices, the change in the SEA field reflects a 
changing expectation of standard practices and functions of SEAs. 
Institutional rules are supposed to be sources of stability and order in 
organizational change, but with changes in organizational fields, they can be 
destructured as well. As organizations change structures and practices to adapt to 
the environment, change in organizational fields often pushes for new institutional 
forms to meet their needs. Destructuration refers to the process by which 
organizational changes weaken the beliefs in certain institutions and abandon 
practices under the influence of these institutions. One example of destructuring is 
Sine and Tolbert‘s (2006) study of tenure systems in American institutions of 
higher education. They found that, between 1965 and 1995, many higher 
education institutions increased the proportion of non-tenure track faculty and 
limited the use of tenure in search of a new balance between labor and legitimacy 
costs. This field change results in a new institutional environment and leads 
higher education institutions to find new ways other than tenured faculties to 
defend their legitimacy. Scott et al. (2000) studied the health care delivery system 
in the United States and identified three variables that may change as the 
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organizational field changes over time: the types and the numbers of 
organizations, the institutional logics and the governance structures that guide 
organizational activities.  
Conclusion 
Literature in institutional theories provides important concepts to 
understand organizational change in terms of its processes, forms, motives and 
consequences. The focus of organizational studies shifted away from behavioral 
rationality as neo-institutional scholars highlighted the resemblance of 
organizations to their institutional environment and the importance of 
relationships between an organization and its external environment. Changes in 
the environment may result in changes in organizations as well as in logic and 
standard practice in the organizational field.  
Legitimacy and competitiveness are two major sources of motivation for 
organizational change. In this review I focused mainly on legitimacy because it is 
more salient in institutionalized organizations. Literature reviewed in this chapter 
shows that organizations may achieve legitimacy either strategically or 
institutionally. They may also target achieving different kinds of legitimacy: 
managerial or technical. The decision on using which approach to achieve which 
kind of legitimacy is shaped by the environment with which organizations interact. 
The decision is also driven by the interests of actors involved in the decision-
making process.  
Neo-institutional theorists emphasize the homogenous pattern across 
organizations in an organizational field. They tend to characterize the response of 
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organizations to environmental change as conforming or isomorphic. They argue 
that isomorphism helps organizations reduce the conflicts in organizing principles 
and is inevitable as interdependence on resources and technology increases. To 
conform, organizations may either decouple formal structure and practice for a 
symbolic change or assimilate environmental elements into their practice for a 
more substantial adaptive change. Last but not least, I discussed the concept of 
organizational field and its relation to organizations and institutional environment.  
Despite the great contributions institutional theories have made to the 
understanding of organizations, there has been limited research to build a 
framework to theorize the process of change in institutionalized organizations. 
Institutional theories provided important concepts that describe organizational 
behaviors and their motivations. Drawing from constructs reviewed in this chapter, 
I propose a framework that depicts the general process and logic of organizational 
change (Figure 1). Following a neo-institutional perspective where organizational 
change is examined as responses to changes in institutional environment, the 
framework addresses organizational change in four aspects – motivation to 
change, nature of change, process of change and consequences of change. To 
defend or establish legitimacy in a new environment, organizations tend to 
conform to the new environment through either loose coupling or adaptation. The 
adaptive change often leads to more substantive changes in organizations and in 
the meantime shapes the institutional environment. The mutual adaptive process 
creates a dynamic relationship between an organization and its institutional 
environment. As organizations change to adapt to the environment, they negotiate 
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and manipulate the environment to reach an agreement between environment and 
organizational goals. The loose coupling mechanism, on the other hand, shields 
the change initiatives from interfering with the substantive work at the 
organizational units and, therefore, tends to result in symbolic changes.   
In addition to legitimacy, competitiveness can drive organizational change 
to increase productivity and efficiency. As a contrast to isomorphism for 
legitimacy, organizations tend to innovate and diffuse to find their unique niche 
when the motivation for organizational change is to enhance competitiveness. The 
pursuit of productivity and efficiency requires organizations to adapt to the 
environment, but this line of research is not explored in-depth in this review 
because it is mostly applied to production organizations to which resources are 
not given but closely tied to organizational performance.  
As changes spread, organizations collectively shape social values and 
redefine their field in terms of function and inter-organizational relations. 
Changes in the field elevate the unit of analysis from individual organizations to a 
collection of organizations in a specific network that shares goals, resources and 
partnerships. Field-level changes in turn result in changes in the environment 
through destructuring institutional rules, which may initiate a new cycle of 
organizational change.  
This model provides a preliminary structure to study organizational 
changes in SEAs. It will be used as a framework for data analysis in this study 
and be tested with historical documents and empirical evidence. In the next 
chapter, I will describe the changing institutional environment of SEAs as federal 
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policy put increasing emphasis on standards-based accountability (SBA). I will 
then synthesize research on SEAs‘ roles in implementing SBA in five domains: 
standards, assessment, accountability, capacity and relation to local education 
agencies. Chapter three provides an empirical foundation that supports the neo-
institutional argument about institutional impact on the functioning and the 
relation of organizations. It also sets up the institutional context for the analysis of 




























































Chapter 3: State Activism in Standards-based Accountability Reform 
The federal push for standardized reforms has led to many changes in the 
functions of state education agencies (SEAs) as intermediate organizations 
sandwiched among local schools, districts and the federal government. The 
institutionalization of standards-based accountability (SBA) and the emphasis on 
the role of SEAs in education reform rests on the rational bureaucratic form and 
the assumed isomorphism of school practices for efficiency. It follows Weber‘s 
description of ideal bureaucracy where organizations are goal-achieving entities. 
Once the institutional goals are defined by the states, school change will follow 
and effective practices to reach these goals will be implemented, which leads to a 
general fulfillment of the goals. SEAs are the linchpins that bring the SBA 
initiative to local districts and schools by designing and implementing 
accountability measures for which schools are held accountable. The federal-
mandated accountability system also requires SEAs to increase contact and 
collaboration with local districts and schools, which may eventually lead to a new 
organizational relationship.  
To examine changes of SEAs‘ internal structure and external partnership, 
this chapter first describes the background of the institutional environment shifts 
to a standards-based accountability (SBA). Drawing from recommendations in 
education literature (Finn et al., 2001), it then depicts the roles of SEAs in the 
SBA system with a focus on four issues: state standards, state accountability, state 
assessments, and SEA‘s capacity. Lastly, it synthesizes literature to understand 
the relationship SEAs have developed with districts and other education entities. 
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Institutional Shift to SBA 
First introduced from business and government arenas in the late 1960s 
and early 70s, the current SBA movement draws from past experience in systemic 
reform, standards-based reforms, national standards and accountability. Systemic 
reform in the early 1990s, for example, called for student outcomes, alignment of 
policy and policy implementation, and governance system restructuring (Smith & 
O‘Day, 1991). The state education agency (SEA) was proposed to lead the reform 
to decrease the fragmentation that prevented educational change because it was 
assumed that SEAs could influence policies related to curriculum, teacher 
preparation and professional development as well as student assessment. State 
leadership in systemic reform starts with state standards as a basis for a consistent 
and supportive policy structure for school improvement.  A study by the Council 
of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) showed that, by 1995, systemic reform in 
47 of the surveyed 50 states included the development of content standards; 38 
states were constructing or had already developed student-performance standards 
(Lindsay, 1995). Goertz and colleagues (1996) studied systemic reform in three 
states, California, Michigan and Vermont. They found that the Michigan and 
Vermont Departments of Education had intensified their collaboration with 
professional and business communities to develop standards and build capacity in 
schools and districts. This centralized state control over standards and curricular 




The accountability movement is sometimes interpreted as a shift of focus 
in education policy from input to output. From the Brown v. Board of Education 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1954 to desegregation in the 1960s and 1970s, 
equalizing education opportunities drove education reform efforts. It gave rise to 
the attention to equity and adequacy in the distribution of education services and 
resources. Regardless of the emphasis on education input, NAEP results and 
research such as the ―Coleman Report‖ (Coleman, 1966) revealed achievement 
gaps by race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status that continue as a social concern. 
Some research indicated that the school tracking system assigns a disproportional 
number of minority students to classes where high cognitive demand subjects 
were hardly taught (Oakes, 1985). A series of legal cases in the 1980s brought up 
the issues beyond equalization of expenditures, but also the adequacy of 
opportunity to learn and the adequacy of support.  
Title I, Part A, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
has been used as a major lever for education equity. It is designed to provide 
financial assistance to schools and districts with a high proportion of students 
from low-income families. In its early years, SEAs played a central role to 
oversee Title I programs as the conduit for the federal money. However, little 
evidence showed that federal input had any significant impact on closing 
achievement gaps (Borman, Stringfield & Slavin, 2001). The lack of evidence 
drew federal attention to the operation of Title I programs and the evidence of 
output. In the 1980s, the pressure from international competition and the release 
of A Nation at Risk (1983) drew increasing attention to the measurable output of 
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schooling. During the 1989 Charlottesville Summit, national goals were first 
proposed, but the essential issues of how to achieve them were not followed 
through. In 1991, the America 2000 education reform plan was introduced that 
called for a system of voluntary exams called ―American Achievement Tests.‖ 
Although the bill did not pass in Congress, America 2000 made standards and 
assessment catch phrases in education policy and further promoted the reform 
idea that emphasizes education output as measured by student achievement. In 
1991, the National Science Foundation announced its $75 million award, the 
largest award  to individual states until then, to promote state-initiated systemic 
reform of mathematics and science education programs (West, 1991). Goals 2000 
proposed during the Clinton administration revived the national goals at the 
Charlottesville Summit, asked states to voluntarily develop standards for specific 
grades, and provided federal funds for state-level SBA reform. This federal 
reform initiative located its focus at the state level to circumvent the perception of 
federal intervention to local control of education. This strategic approach to top-
down education reform is evidenced in the subsequent reauthorizations of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and fundamentally changed the 
role of SEAs as it expands its function as an administrative venue that channels 
federal funds to schools.  
The SBA reform at the state level was further pushed by the Improving 
America‘s Schools Act (IASA) of 1994 that required states to establish 
challenging content standards in core subject areas in order to receive federal 
funds. As McGuinn (2006) explains, ―(b)ecause all fifty states already accepted 
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federal ESEA funds and because these funds (unlike the monies in Goal 2000) 
were sizable, these changes meant that the states would essentially be forced to 
adopt standards-based school reform‖ (p. 92). It also required states to develop 
assessments and benchmarks to measure schools‘ adequate yearly progress (AYP).  
Reforms in IASA, however, brought neither expected change at the state 
level nor improvement in student achievement on national tests. By Spring 2002, 
only 16 states met its requirements (McGuinn, 2006). On one hand, the federal 
law only encouraged states to make changes without enforcement. On the other 
hand, many SEAs lacked the institutional capacity in setting standards and 
developing assessments (Billig et al., 1999). The design of NCLB was largely to 
address the inefficiency of the statewide reform by adding teeth through its 
prescriptive accountability mandates. It required states to set standards and begin 
administering and reporting annual statewide assessments in reading and 
mathematics for grades 3 to 8 by the 2005-06 school year and science by 2007-08. 
States were also responsible for overseeing their districts‘ identification of needs 
for improvement and taking corrective actions when necessary. 
The focus on state-level SBA reform has been reinforced by the Obama 
administration. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA), the Race to the Top Fund is designed to reward states that ―are creating 
the conditions for education innovation and reform; achieving significant 
improvement in student outcomes, including making substantial gains in student 
achievement, closing achievement gaps, improving high school graduation rates, 
and ensuring student preparation for success in college and careers‖ (U.S. 
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Department of Education, 2009). This $4.35 billion federal fund also tends to help 
states adopt standards and assessments, build data systems and restructure low-
achieving schools. The federal financial incentive allows SEAs to take bolder 
actions in orchestrating education reform to meet the institutional expectations on 
accountability and school performance.  
SBA received increasing attention in the policy arena partly because it is 
expected to be able to connect multiple policy mechanisms and align them to 
common instructional goals. It proposes a system of organizational 
responsibilities that may answer the calls from both the excellence movement and 
the school restructuring movement. The emphasis on state standards also seems to 
convey the promise of equal education opportunities for all students (Fuhrman, 
2001). 
Standards-based accountability follows an institutional logic that states‘ 
expectations for school and student performance would set directions for school 
practice and student opportunities to learn. The more coherent curriculum 
frameworks, instructional materials, professional development, student 
assessments and school accountability are, the better the chances of schools 
producing desirable levels of student achievement.  
Clune (2001) proposes a causal relationship of education policy, 
curriculum, student performance and reform activities. His analysis of nine 
Statewide Systemic Initiative case studies shows that ―standards-based reform, 
through its purposeful activities, leads to standards-based policy, which leads to a 
rigorous, implemented standards-based curriculum for all students, leading to 
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measured high student achievement in the curriculum as taught‖ (p. 15). This 
conclusion, however, is derived from data collected from a particular model that 
only resembles features of standards-based reform. It emphasizes strategies that 
promote systemic reform at both school and regional levels.  
At schools, the statewide systemic reform was translated into supporting 
teacher professional development, developing, disseminating, or adopting 
instructional materials and supporting model schools. At the regional level, the 
reform was accompanied by aligning state policy, creating an infrastructure for 
capacity building, funding local systemic initiatives, reforming higher education 
and the preparation of teachers, and mobilizing public and professional opinion.  
Many features of this systemic reform model are arguably weak in the 
current accountability system under NCLB, such as professional development and 
infrastructure building for capacity development. Besides, the model was also 
implemented simultaneously when other standards-based reforms were in effect; 
therefore, the causal relationship is best understood as partial for the complex 
factors that contribute to the curriculum change and student performance.  
McDermott (2007a) uses the implementation of standards-based 
accountability in four states to illustrate SBA as an expansion of the moral 
community in educational governance and a public policy tactic to blame victims 
of the education system for being ―low-performing‖ and ―failing‖. Although 
schools are believed to be responsible for educating all children and helping them 
overcome social inequality, educators and educational researchers caution that 
accountability does not guarantee expected results; some argue that schools, 
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teachers, and students are at one end of the accountability continuum and not the 
only ones who should be held accountable (Hansen, 1974; McCombs & Carroll, 
2005; Sirotnik, 2005). Local and state education agencies need to carry their share 
of the responsibilities as well. 
State Activism 
Literature often traces state authority to compulsory schooling laws and 
district consolidation during the Progressive Era. State education policies were 
not to oversee school operation but to establish administrative structures to 
support ―the growing professionalization and bureaucratization of local districts‖ 
(McDonnell, 2008, p. 2).   In the context of increased emphasis on SBA, the rest 
of the chapter synthesizes research on the role of SEAs in setting standards, 
establishing accountability systems, developing assessment and building 
capacities. State activism in these areas reflects SEAs‘ struggle for legitimacy and 
provides the context for understanding organizational changes in SEAs.  
Standards 
NCLB is not the beginning of the nation‘s struggle with standardized 
reform; rather, it symbolizes a continued, expanded and intensified policy effort 
that emphasizes standards and consequences tied to assessments. The 1988 
reauthorization of Title I included, for the first time, a rudimentary accountability 
system that required states to set standards for the achievement of their Title I 
children and to take action if Title I didn't produce results. Later, the Goal 2000: 
Educate America Act in 1994 pushed states further to establish standards and 
assessment systems and set the stage for the accountability systems in the 
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Improving America‘s Schools Act (IASA) in 1994 and the No Child Left Behind 
Act in 2001. IASA required states to develop mechanisms to calculate school‘s 
adequate yearly progress (AYP) and to establish a ―statewide system of intensive 
and sustained support and improvement‖ (Sec. 1117) for high-poverty and low-
performing schools. However, the alignment of state standards and accountability 
policies with Title I programs challenged many state and local educational 
agencies (Goertz, 2001; Sunderman, 2001), and the standards were often so 
general that staff of local districts and schools could not translate them into 
curriculum (Massell, 1998).  
States set varied standards and followed different processes to create 
standards (Hamilton et al., 2008; Musick, 1996). McDermott (2007a) illustrates 
how a similar reform in standards-based accountability in Connecticut and 
Massachusetts in the 1990s elicited distinct local responses and resulted in 
diverging state education policies. Focusing on the link between state financial 
reform and school accountability, Massachusetts was able to push through its 
reform bill which expanded its SEA‘s role in school oversight and intervention; 
Standards-based reform in Connecticut, on the other hand, collapsed after reform 
advocates were not able to convince the public of the necessity of state testing and 
accountability to the tradition of local control. McDermott‘s analysis of the two 
states highlights the influence of state politics on the standards-based 
accountability in education as well as the diverse paths of state activism. In line 
with the loose coupling argument, Finn and Kanstoroom (2001) pointed out that 
many states intentionally set ambiguous or ambitious standards to avoid 
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difficulties in reaching a consensus about what to prioritize. Goertz and 
colleagues (2001) identified three ways states defined goals: 
1. the expected level of student performance (e.g., basic or proficient), 
2. the percentage of students that must meet the standards, and  
3. the length of time schools have to meet state goals. (p. 19) 
The first goal definition emphasizes the expected minimum competency 
while the second highlights the norm performance level. The third is more of an 
administrative mandate than a reference to students‘ performance. The different 
ways of defining goals may bring different consequences to schools and lead 
schools to follow varied paths to respond to state policy. For example, the first 
goal often leads to the argument of what should be considered the ―expected 
minimum‖ while the second type of goal tends to encourage competition among 
schools and put schools with disproportional low-achieving students at a 
disadvantage. The third type of goal is hard to set because student performance 
rarely progresses in a predictable way. If the goal does not match school reality, it 
will not serve the function of the administrative incentive as it was expected. 
Some states leave the messy issues of how to align to standards and meet specific 
goals for districts and schools to decide. Lastly, it is often not clear how states 
determine if curriculum, instruction or assessment is aligned to state standards. 
Oftentimes the determination simply relies on ―matching each element from one 
source (e.g., the test) to a similar representation in another source (e.g., the 




From the minimum competency tests in the early 1970s to standards-based 
tests, assessment plays an essential role in expanding state role in education.  
Mazzeo (2001) identified three evolving frameworks for state testing policy – 
examination, guidance and accountability. The examination framework was used 
at the beginning of this century mainly to select and admit students to high school 
education when the high school diploma was much less accessible particularly to 
minority students. The theory of action for this framework is to use tests to 
motivate students, to provide opportunities for advanced education and to shape 
teaching and learning in elementary schools. States, therefore, played the role of a 
change agent that enforced standards and created well-educated citizens.  
The examination framework was criticized for bringing resentment to low-
achieving students as well as the meager reliability of the test scores. As high 
school graduation lost its entitlement to elite institutions by the end of 1880s, state 
assessment policy shifted focus to a guidance framework between the 1920s and 
the 1960s where states used tests to diagnose and differentiate students. Tests, 
therefore, serve as detectors of education problems and student capacities. They 
provide guidance to teaching and learning by informing teachers of data and 
expect school personnel to act on test results to ―correct deficiencies.‖ States 
retreat from the active role in public education by limiting activities to providing 
voluntary assessments, defraying costs and facilitating decision-making at the 
local level.  
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The accountability model of state testing emerged in the early 1970s as 
state legislators and governors began to show interest in the state education 
systems.  Minimum competency tests, for instance, became a popular form of 
state testing used as a requirement for high school graduation, and the number of 
states implementing such tests increased from a handful in 1975 to thirty-three in 
1985
1
. It emphasized the evaluation of schools with rewards and sanctions and the 
provision of information to both schools and policymakers about student learning. 
The state assessments are policy mechanisms to motivate students and teachers, 
mobilize citizens and prioritize certain subject matters. Under this accountability 
framework, states go back to the role of strong change agents who take actions to 
intervene in local school practices based on the test results. States expand their 
facilitative roles as input providers and exert more authority to demand specific 
education outcomes from schools. Mazzeo (2001) argues that states‘ 
accountability testing policy serves as a highly visible symbol of action that 
leverages their control over instruction and the organization of school systems 
such as prioritizing the teaching of tested subject areas over untested (CEP, 2007). 
In the 2001-2002 school year, all fifty states had implemented statewide 
testing programs and 17 states used tests with high stakes for schools, such as 
school closure or reconstruction (Meyer, Orlofsky, Skinner & Spicer, 2002). In 
the following year, NCLB imposed stakes on schools and districts in all states for 
student assessments and required schools and districts to show progress, measured 
by test scores, toward the federally-defined achievement goal. All fifty states are 
                                                 




required to report test results of grades 3-8 at the elementary level and one grade 
at the high school level. Based on these results, states tie rewards such as public 
recognition and sanctions for schools and turn the high-stakes assessments into 
political tools of public accountability.  
State assessments have become an important part of the administrative 
system that entitles SEAs with new powers to oversee local districts and schools, 
particularly in evaluating local school performance and shaping school curriculum. 
The changing policy environment toward SBA also redefines the legitimate role 
of SEAs in organizing state assessments aligned to state standards. The new role 
creates new challenges for SEAs to expand their capacity to function as expected, 
such as maintaining and reporting data, providing assistance and making data-
informed policy decisions. 
Accountability 
For the past two decades, state accountability systems have shifted from 
holding school districts accountable for educational inputs to holding schools 
accountable for student outcomes. The rationale for this shift is twofold: school 
systems influence student performance, and collective accountability encourages 
collaboration among school staff (Goertz, 2005). The state accountability system 
often features the centralization of outcome evaluation and the decentralization of 
implementation. The decentralization may arise from multiple grounds, for 
instance, the tradition of local control. The autonomy of local action to achieve 
state standards helps states circumvent the overwhelming details and diversity of 
site management, and helps appease the criticism of an increasing federal and 
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state intervention. The loosely coupled evaluation and implementation system 
also saves states from taking on tasks beyond their capacities and allows for 
multiple parties to be involved in the accountability implementation and decision-
making process. 
The state accountability system represents a fragmented centralization 
(Meyer & Scott, 1983) where SEAs are not the only power to evaluate and 
intervene; they rely on the local knowledge and system of LEAs (local education 
agencies) and schools to sustain their functionality. In the state-defined 
accountability systems, SEAs rely on schools and districts to provide input, make 
instructional decisions and attend to the details of site-based management. 
Centralization of state accountability systems, together with SEAs‘ lack of 
capacity, has triggered some criticism on the lack of requirements for states to 
provide necessary support to enable local schools and districts to meet state 
standards and expectations (Lee, 2007). 
State accountability systems emphasize not only the evaluation of schools 
with rewards and sanctions but also the provision of information to both schools 
and policymakers about student learning. By 2001, thirty-three states had state 
accountability systems and forty-eight states used state assessments as the 
principal indicator of school performance (Goertz, Duffy, & Le Floch, 2001). 
These assessments, however, varied greatly in terms of measures of student 
performance and results reporting. States also had different goals for schools and 
districts and different types of accountability systems to measure their 
performances. To reach these goals, states require schools and districts to show 
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progress in meeting an absolute target, relative growth target or narrowing the 
achievement gaps. Of the thirty-three states that had state-defined accountability 
systems in 2001, 24 of them used only state test scores to measure school and 
district performance. Low performance schools faced state sanctions with 
different intensity, ranging from mandatory public hearings, developing school 
improvement plans, mandatory technical assistance to optional transfer of 
students, state takeover and school closure. The diversity in state accountability 
suggests that conformity is not the only choice for institutionalized organizations 
under institutional pressures.  
As intermediate governmental agencies, SEAs not only have diverse 
designs of accountability systems to oversee local schools and districts but also 
show a spectrum of means to meet federal accountability requirements. Forty-nine 
states use state assessments to measure student performance; Nebraska requires 
districts to test in certain grades to measure student performance on state 
standards. Many states that established accountability systems before NCLB 
employ dual accountability systems to maintain the state system while complying 
with federal requirements. Sunderman and colleagues (2005) described the dual 
accountability system in six states: Arizona, California, Illinois, New York, 
Georgia and Virginia. They found that, while federal accountability relies on the 
average test scores, these state accountability measures credit schools for growth 
in student achievement. For this reason, schools and districts often prefer 




Institutional theorists rarely talked about organizations‘ capacity when 
discussing the dynamic between environment and organizations. Literature in 
education policy suggests, however, SEAs‘ capacity is a key component in SBA 
reform, particularly when such capacity is considered as resources aligned with 
needs for action, and deserves more attention in organizational analysis.  
Although districts had the major responsibility for assisting schools, states 
were required to develop statewide systems for supporting the improvement of 
schools, particularly Title I schools. The system provided schools with assistance 
including support in school improvement or corrective action planning, financial 
assistance, expert assistance in planning and instruction, and professional 
development. According to a report by the American Federation of Teachers 
(2001), for the first year of NCLB, an increasing number of states focused efforts 
on assessment and aligning tests to standards. States developed more instructional 
materials and incentives to encourage teachers and students, particularly the ones 
at risk of failing, to meet standards.  
The expansion of assessment programs increases SEA costs and the 
demand for increased capacity. As federal reforms push forward the momentum 
of states‘ involvement with accountability, SEAs do not seem to have the 
institutional memory of building accountability systems and the capacity in 
tracking student progress over time. Since the 1980s, education researchers have 
cautioned about the lack of assessment capacity to reliably track students‘ 
learning progress over time (Congressional Budget Office, 1986). Regardless of 
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IASA‘s efforts to streamline federal education reform efforts, the application of 
standards-based accountability systems remained limited in practice partly 
because states did not have sufficient human, technical and financial resources for 
infrastructure and school assistance (Goertz et al., 2001). NCLB continued 
pushing states to play a central role in leading school reform efforts, but with 
limited resources from outside, states had to prioritize certain schools and districts 
over others (Sunderman & Orfield, 2008). In the beginning years, states did not 
seem to have developed the capacity and expertise to provide these services; they 
were constantly criticized for the poor quality of standardized tests, inadequate 
curriculum and ineffective assistance to districts. 
Massell (1998) interviewed SEA staff in eight states and described four 
strategies to build capacities: 
1. establish, support, or rely on an infrastructure for professional 
development and technical assistance outside the state department of 
education; 
2. adopt standards for professional development; 
3. develop more specific curriculum frameworks or pool of resources with 
examples of how the standards could be applied in instructional practice, 
and 
4. require school improvement planning. (p. iv – vi). 
These strategies signified the shifted role of SEAs as regulation monitor to 
improvement facilitator. Research on the state‘s role in supporting comprehensive 
school reform suggests that SEAs have changed their traditional role as 
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compliance enforcers to more active facilitators of school and district capacity 
building (Le Floch & Boyle, 2006; Little & Houston, 2003; Lusi, 1997; Massell, 
1998).  
The shift of roles, however, does not mean SEAs‘ capacity increases 
accordingly; instead, a common strategy SEAs use is to turn to external 
infrastructures to provide direct assistance to schools. The decentralization 
approach not only helps SEAs ease their tight staffing situations but also allows 
SEAs to take advantage of street-level bureaucracy by depending on regional 
institutions and local networks to deliver assistance. The challenge of this strategy 
is that SEAs have to be able to determine the capacity of the external 
infrastructure in assisting schools and have effective measures for results.  
Research on NCLB shows that these strategies remain vital to SEAs under 
NCLB. For example, Laguarda (2003) uses interview data to describe the ways in 
which nine states organize, fund and deliver assistance to low-performing schools. 
She finds that states deliver the assistance mainly through 1) SEA-based 
consultants, liaisons, or brokers, 2) school assistance teams, 3) special grants to 
support school improvement, and 4) special access to the services of regional 
educational agencies and statewide professional development resources, such as 
the Statewide System of School Support Centers in California and the Regional 
Area Centers for Educational Enhancement in Florida. These local education 
agencies provide training opportunities and workshops that are particularly 
helpful to low-performing schools. States have similar initial activities to provide 
assistance, such as ensuring school buy-in, assessing school needs and developing 
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improvement plans, and providing professional development services. SEAs have 
different criteria for identifying schools in need of improvement and the intensity 
of state assistance varies greatly since the reception of state assistance in most 
states is voluntary. Many states extend assistance to schools that are not identified 
as in need of improvement, but sustaining support for school capacity building is 
often challenging for SEAs. 
As the stakes for the state accountability increase under NCLB, SEAs are 
challenged to expand their school assistance to a larger scale, tailor services to the 
needs of particular schools, and measure the effectiveness of state assistance. At 
the same time, the lack of funding and staffing for technical assistance provision 
has loomed large. State data in 2003 indicated that many states did not have the 
capacity to handle technical assessment issues such as determining AYP and 
building reliable and valid accountability systems (Sunderman et al., 2005). This 
study also suggested that few states had a final policy regarding accountability 
systems that included rewards and sanctions or held schools and local districts 
accountable for the progress of student subgroups. States did not have the 
technical capacity to establish test validity for students in special education and 
English language learners; nor did they have sufficient financial capacity to 
address school reform issues. Sunderman and Orfield (2008) argued that NCLB 
has pushed states to a central role in implementing school reform efforts, but with 
limited federal investment, states are constrained by their capability and forced to 
prioritize some schools and districts over others. As Goertz (2005) put it, NCLB 
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exposes disparities in student achievement but does not provide sufficient support 
for states to address the problem.  
Relations with Local Education Agencies 
As SBA continued to gain momentum, the relationship between SEAs and 
LEAs changed, which is an important aspect of organizational change in SEAs. 
The local control system started to change as states enacted large-scale school 
restructuring programs that districts could not afford with local tax money. Since 
the late 1980s, states across the country started increasing funding to education 
and taking over controls on K-12 education decision-making (Evers, 2001). As 
shown in Figure 2, in the 1920s states provided 16.9% of funding to K-12 
education while the local government provided 82.7%; in the 1970s, the 
proportion of funding from states increased to 46.9% and that from local 
government, dropped to 44.0% (Digest of Education Statistics 2007, Table 162). 
The change in sources of school funding foreshadows the power shifts between 




Figure 2. Changes in funding sources for public schools from 1919-1920 to 2005-
2006 school year. 
 
SBA is not the only force pushing states‘ active roles in education. Chubb 
(2001) argues that the shrinkage of local control over the public school system is 
partly a result of states‘ efforts on the massive consolidation of local school 
districts between the 1930s and the 1960s. During this period of time, the number 
of school districts plunged from 80,000 in 1950 to less than 15,000 today (Digest 
of Education Statistics 2007, Table 83). Evers (2001) argues that the 
consolidation set the stage for states to implement consistent models of 
governance and administration.  
Malen (2003) describes two contrasting views of state activism‘s impact 
on local schools (i.e., low- and high-impact view) and suggests that states may 
influence schools in powerful ways. The low-impact view emphasizes the 
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have strong impact on schools because the loosely coupled bureaucratic system 
creates a space for incoherence in state agencies and local school systems in terms 
of organizational cultures and structures. The impact of state activism may also be 
limited because local implementation agencies find ways to free themselves from 
state directives and bureaucratic control. Lastly, ineffectively implementing 
strategies may further lessen the influence of state policies.  
The high-impact view highlights the multiple ways states exert policy to 
influence schools by first relinquishing state control through decentralizing and 
deregulating policies in the early 1980s and then reclaiming state control through 
performance standards, testing requirements and accountability provisions in the 
1980s and 1990s. Malen (2003) synthesizes seven of the most influential features 
of state policy on schools: curriculum content, use of school time, personnel 
allocation, professional development resources, educator‘s workloads, school 
improvement decisions, normative conceptions of the purposes of schooling, and 
the legitimacy of governance arrangements. Cohen and Spillane (1992) argue that 
the relation between policy and practice comes down to ―the collisions 
between … governance and the consequences in educational institutions‖ (p. 8). 
Malen‘s high/low impact perspective illustrates that the relationship between 
SEAs and LEAs has been intensified as SBA draws state policies closer to local 
school administration which poses increasing threats to local control. Both the 
low- and the high-impact view of the state impact on local schools indicate an 
increasing power of SEAs and the intensified interaction between state and local 
education entities.  
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Despite the constitutional authority states have over the public school 
system, states are constrained to fully exercise accountability because they lack 
the critical information from the school and classroom level, such as students‘ 
long-term progress and family background (Moe, 2003). Information asymmetries 
may result in unintended consequences introduced by state assessments, such as 
decreased student motivation (Betts & Costrell, 2001), increased grade retention 
rate (Carnoy & Loeb, 2001; Lorence et al., 2002), misidentification or 
misclassification of student achievement levels (Argetsinger, 2001; Bowman, 
2000; Henriques & Steinberg, 2001), and narrowed curriculum (Goldhaber & 
Hannaway, 2004; Stecher & Barron, 1999). 
Limited capacity and gaps in information make partnerships with local 
government and schools a natural option for SEAs in order to fully play the 
entitled leadership role.  Armstrong and colleagues (2008) observed that many 
states have developed student data systems to allow LEAs to share student 
information with SEAs such as student identifiers, program participation, 
assessment results, and course completion. While LEAs use the information to 
report to parents and students, SEAs analyze data for state and federal 
accountability purposes. Many states also developed their own systems to collect 
student-level graduation and dropout data. SEAs and their LEAs often contract 
with different vendors to build data systems and to make their data systems 
transferable. 
The expanding impact of SEAs on school curriculum and classroom 
instruction also requires support from other interest groups. Cusick and Borman 
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(2002) described how the SEA worked with professional communities to create 
and revise state standards during Michigan‘s effort to create a language arts 
curriculum in the 1990s. This study portrays Michigan‘s SEA as a mediator of 
different political and social entities with varied interests and beliefs in public 
education. The authors argue that state reform efforts rely on collaboration among 
universities, professional associations, districts and teachers to establish a 
legitimate policy stand on language arts. The elaborative relationship enhances 
the SEA‘s ability to act on legislative mandates particularly when facing external 
challenges.  
Conclusion 
This chapter depicts institutional changes that show increasing favor to 
standards-based accountability. This trend has pushed SEAs to be more actively 
involved in setting state standards, establishing state accountability systems, 
developing state assessments and building their capacities to fulfill requirements 
mandated by the federal policies. From an institutional perspective, state activism 
discussed in this chapter shows SEAs‘ struggle for legitimacy in a changing 
policy environment; it also precipitates organizational changes in internal 
infrastructures and external networks as SEAs fulfill the federal requirements for 
standards, assessment, and accountability. A historic review of SBA policy 
development confirms the neo-institutional perspective on the relationship 
between organizations and institutional environment. The observation of state 
activism in the SBA-inclined institutional environment suggests that 
institutionalized state organizations not only take isomorphic actions but also 
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develop diffused practices to meet the legitimation demand. Lastly, the 
development of state capacity and relationship with LEAs implies changes in 
SEAs‘ external relationships with other organizations in the field. 
Education literature provides a rich resource to understand state policies 
and their impact on schools and students. However, little has been discussed about 
how SEAs as implementing agencies adjust for the changing institutional 
environment. This study intends to fill in this gap in the literature by looking at 
organizational changes of SEAs from an institutional perspective. In particular, I 
am interesting in addressing two overarching questions: 
1. What changes have SEAs made to play increasingly active roles in the 
education system? 
1.1 What changes have SEAs made in their internal structural, staffing 
and technology? 
1.2 What changes have SEAs made in their external relations? 
2. How did these changes take place? 
2.1 What factors influenced the changes? 
2.2 What strategies were used? 
The first set of questions focuses on the content of change while the second 
emphasizes the process of change. The theoretical framework proposed in the 
previous chapter and state activism reviewed in this chapter provide the 
background for this study and will guide the development of an analytic plan in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter describes the data structure, analysis scheme and methods 
used to address the research questions raised in chapter three. It starts with an 
overview of research design that explains the purpose of the study and the 
rationale for using mixed methods design. I then describe the sources of data and 
the analytic procedures. I conclude the chapter with a discussion on standards of 
quality and limitations. 
Research Design 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to understand organizational changes in state 
educational agencies (SEAs) as responses to the shifting educational environment 
toward standards-based accountability (SBA). It focuses on both the content and 
the process of change to test the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter two.  
Research in education policy has intensively examined SBA‘s design 
elements and effects at the school level as discussed in Chapter three. A recent 
surge of implementation studies has drawn increasing attention to the process of 
translating policy to actions in local schools and districts (Honig, 2004, 2006b; 
Honig & Hatch, 2004; Valli et al., 2008). Relatively little empirical research, 
however, has been conducted to understand SEAs‘ experience in the changing 
institutional environment, which may well be a missing piece to the puzzle of how 
education policies are relayed across levels in the bureaucratic system and why 
policy implementation deviates from the original design.  
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Based on the context introduced in Chapter three, this study uses SEAs as 
an example to illustrate the impact of institutional changes on policy constituents 
through institutional perspectives.  A number of studies have investigated the 
implementation practices of educational agencies. However, little is known about 
how these implementation agencies, especially SEAs, adjust themselves 
structurally to bring forth these practices and be accustomed to the changing 
institutional environment. This understanding is particularly important for 
institutionalized organizations, such as SEAs, because they tend to respond more 
actively and predictably, compared to production-oriented organizations, to 
changes in the institutional environment. SEAs‘ changing experience will shed 
new light on our understanding of implementing top-down education reforms and 
what can be done to improve the effectiveness of policy implementation. 
This study also tends to reconstruct and theorize the process of change in 
institutionalized organizations. Institutional theorists have recognized important 
concepts in explaining organizational behaviors that relate to change but a theory 
of organizational change that explains the experience of SEAs is hard to find. This 
study builds on constructs in institutional theories and proposes a theoretical 
framework to be tested by SEAs‘ changing experience in this study as well as that 
of institutionalized organizations in other fields in future studies.  
To address both the content and the process of change, this study conducts 
a qualitative-dominant mix-methods inquiry that draws data from multiple 
sources including interviews with state officials, surveys in multiple years and 
relevant documents in public domains. This mixed-methods design helps make 
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sense of the organizational changes from multiple perspectives and overcome the 
shortcomings of using either qualitative or quantitative inquiry exclusively. The 
interview and survey data were originally collected by Center on Education 
Policy (CEP) for its study on the impact of SBA on SEAs. This study takes 
advantage of CEP‘s rich resources on SEAs and asks a new set of research 
questions about organizational changes in SEAs that are independent of CEP‘s 
studies. 
Rationale for a Mixed Methods Study 
Mixed methods studies involve analysis of quantitative and qualitative 
data in a single study using both qualitative and quantitative methods (Creswell et 
al., 2003). A mixed methods approach prioritizes the consequences of research 
and the importance of the research questions over commitment to the dualistic 
argument of quantitative versus qualitative methods. It is an application of 
pragmatism to overcome the paradigm divide that separates qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Departing from the pursuit of metaphysical truths, 
pragmatism values ―what works‖ and advocates for the integration of different 
research paradigms and methods to contribute to the understanding of reality as 
captured in multiple forms of data. The pluralistic, pragmatic and real-world 
practice orientation makes mixed methods an ideal fit for the purpose of this study. 
It allows me to examine the change in SEAs from multiple perspectives and 
incorporate data from different sources to triangulate, complement, and expand 
research findings (Greene & Caracelli, 1997).  
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To examine the change process from a longitudinal perspective, the study 
integrates interview cases and survey methods with two data streams: interview 
data with state officials in 2006-07 and survey data with state leaders in 2003, 
2004 and 2007. The rationale for using two strands of data is threefold. First and 
foremost, one type of data is insufficient to fully address the complexity of 
organizational changes. The survey data include all SEAs but do not provide 
contextual and procedural information about organizational change. The interview 
data provide context for the organizational changes of the ten SEAs but results 
based on the particular context may not be easily generalized to explain changes 
in other SEAs. The two strands of data accommodate each other to consolidate the 
empirical basis of this study with increased breadth and depth. Second, the survey 
data will be used to validate themes that emerged from the interviews with the ten 
SEA officials and to test the ability to generalize the organizational phenomenon 
with the interviewed SEAs. Last but not least, the issues raised in the interview 
data may help critically examine survey responses, identify overlooked areas that 
call for additional documentation, and raise new questions for future survey 
studies.  
Mixed methods take qualitative research beyond its critical, interpretive 
framework. In combination of quantitative methods, mixed methods are able to 
build on exploratory and confirmatory approaches simultaneously to construct a 
more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
The qualitative and quantitative data to be analyzed primarily follow an 
embedded triangulation design (Figure 3), where quantitative data in the surveys 
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play a supplemental role, and the interview data and responses to open-ended 
questions in the surveys will be the dominant source to draw conclusions. 
Triangulation refers to ―the combination of methodologies in the study of the 
same phenomenon‖ (Denzin, 1978). The between-methods (between interview 
cases and survey study) triangulation design in this study mainly serves the 
purpose of cross validation with comparable documents, interviews and survey 
data (Denzin, 2009). The integration of data is already evidenced in the data 
collection stage where all surveys include open-ended questions. The main part of 
integration for this analysis takes place at the interpretation stage where 
qualitative and quantitative findings are connected. Data are analyzed 




Figure 3.Embedded design using qualitative and quantitative data sources to draw 
conclusions about organizational change. Interpretations will be mainly based on 
qualitative analysis with complementary information from quantitative analysis. 
 
Multiple interview cases 
The leading source of information comes from interviews with ten SEAs. 
The interview cases follow the constructivist paradigm with the attempt to 
















A constructivist perspective posits that realities are multi-faceted and constructed 
by both researchers and informants. Emic perspectives from the participants form 
the basis of local knowledge while the etic perspective from me, the researcher, 
transforms it with professional knowledge. Therefore, the research is value-laden, 
dependent on the worldviews and experiences of the interviewees through data 
generating and my perspectives through data interpretation. I approach 
participants‘ input from particulars in the context of each interview case (within-
case analysis) and then make connections of these cases (across-case analysis) 
before making generalizations to the population of SEAs, which is further 
facilitated by document analysis and multiple year surveys. 
Gall and colleagues (1996) distinguish phenomenon and case by defining 
phenomenon as ―the processes, events, persons, or things of interest to the 
researcher‖ while a case is ―a particular instance of the phenomenon‖ researchers 
focus on to understand some aspects of the phenomenon (p. 545). In this study, 
the phenomenon is organizational changes of SEAs. Ten cases will be studied 
with a focus on the content and the process of their organizational changes. The 
cases are bounded by the geographic location of the SEAs and the context of K-12 
public school education. In particular, the focus of the interviews is embedded in 
the policy dynamics five years after the enactment of NCLB when the federal 
government is expected to reauthorize the law.  
Interview cases contribute to this investigation because they address both 
descriptive questions (i.e., what happened), and explanatory questions (i.e., how it 
happened). It illustrates a particular phenomenon with in-depth examination (Yin, 
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2006). The cases are instruments to gain an in-depth understanding of contexts 
and activities to illustrate a particular phenomenon (Yin, 2006). Together with the 
analysis of survey data and documents, knowledge about organizational changes 
is then constructed based on the multiple cases to make the experience of the ten 
states more transferable to other SEAs. 
Survey study 
The use of multiple cases in this qualitative-dominant mixed-methods 
design also guides the exploration of the survey data. Interviews contribute to 
understanding and theorizing organizational changes through complex and 
contextually embedded cases. The uniqueness of these cases, however, may lose 
sight of the bigger picture of the phenomenon and limit the transferability of 
implications. To make up for this limitation of the interviews, I look into CEP‘s 
surveys of SEAs on their experience of implementing NCLB in 2003, 2004 and 
2007. Cross year comparison of survey responses may provide direct insights on 
SEAs‘ changes when questions are consistently asked throughout the years, but 
more importantly they provide the national context and trends which 
interpretations of interview data need to consider.  
Data Gathering 
This study benefits from having multiple sources of evidence. The analytic 
framework (Table 2) shows how the theoretical framework is linked to data 
collection and analysis methods and how different data streams converge to 
answer the research questions. 
Table 2. 




Research Questions Theoretical Concepts 
Data Collection 
Tools 
Process of Change 




Process of Change 
Motive for change 
(Legitimacy or Competition) 
Interview 
Process and Content of 
Change 
Process of change 
(Isomorphism or Diffusion) 
Interview 
Document Analysis 
Process and Content of 
Change 
Form of change 
(symbolic in loose coupling or 
substantive in adaptation) 
Interview 
Survey 
Content of Change 
Consequences of change 





Qualitative Data Collection 
This study relies on two sources of qualitative data – interviews with state 
officials and documents. In this section, I describe the rationale for state selection, 
the background of informants and my approach to collect information from 
documents.  
State Selection 
The selection of participating states is based on conceptual grounds 
assuming that commonalities exist in organizational changes of SEAs despite 
their varied characteristics. The sampling scheme purposively selects states with 
different characteristics to acknowledge patterns of organization changes in SEAs 
regardless of these contextual differences. These characteristics include 
geographic location, school enrollment, the SES of student population, education 
86 
 
expenditure, state budget for education, student achievement and the status of 
districts making AYP (Appendix A).  
The first three characteristics are physical conditions (e.g., location, 
enrollment, and social economic status) that are irrelevant to the institutional 
environment but may impact SEAs‘ decision on organizational changes. The 
interviewed states spread throughout the country geographically and the numbers 
of public school enrollment vary greatly. The ratio of Title I to non-Title I schools 
shows that the average economic status of student population is also uneven 
across states.  
The other five state characteristics are potential institutional factors that 
may provide contexts for the study of SEAs‘ changes. Low per-pupil expenditure 
and a smaller proportion of state budget for education may well limit SEAs 
capacity to undertake large scale internal restructuring. Low achievement ranking 
and a relatively large percentage of districts in needs of improvement may tell the 
urgency of SEAs‘ need to develop technical capacity to provide assistance to 
LEAs.  
Cases are bounded systems with internal and external features (Stake, 
2005). Boundaries of this study specify that the phenomenon of interest is 
changes, instead of origins and the current status, within SEAs. Many important 
but less relevant state characteristics were not considered when selecting 




In addition to state characteristics, the study is also bounded by the time 
when the interviews were conducted and the time periods the interviewees 
worked at their SEAs. The interviews were conducted between February and 
March 2007 with ten state officials who had years of experience in their current 
state departments to be able to speak to the changes. Table 3 gives an overview of 





Informant Background Information 
 
 
Current Position Starting at 
Current Position 
Prior Positions Additional 






State Superintendent of 
Education in State1 
July, 2004 Interim State1 Superintendent (6 
months), Deputy State1 
Superintendent (8 years), Local 
superintendent in State1(21.5 years) 
No Appointed 
State2 Secretary of Education July 1999 NA
2



















for the Division of 
School Improvements 






1994 State6 Deputy (2 years) 







1992 School Superintendent (6 years) No Appointed 
State8 
State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction 





2003 20 years of work in State9 







NA No Appointed 
                                                 




Interview protocols were developed to explore SEA‘s responsibility, 
structural change, partnership with districts and capacity to implement NCLB 
(Appendix B). The protocols were sent to interviewees beforehand so they could 
prepare themselves in answering the questions. All interviews were conducted 
over the phone and protocols were closely followed during the interviews. Some 
interviews are longer than others, but most lasted for approximately 45 minutes. 
Document Analysis 
Documents were collected to confirm findings drawn from the interview 
and survey data. Triangulation with interview and documents informs the study 
with different interpretations of SEAs‘ functioning from multiple parties that are 
not involved in the study. The diverse views illustrate the different realities of 
SEAs and also inform my interpretations of SEAs‘ changes.  
The documents for this study include government documents, records 
released on SEAs‘ websites, and news reports (e.g., Education Week). I also used 
academic databases, such as JSTOR, and the Google search engine to snowball 
news entries about SEAs that were relevant to themes identified in the case 
analysis. All cited documents were organized by topics and stored electronically 
or in a binder.  
Quantitative Data Collection: Surveys 
The state surveys were sent to SEA officials of all fifty states in 2003, 
2004 and 2007 and had a 100% response rate. Each year‘s survey focuses on the 
SEA‘s role in developing assessment and accountability systems, and assisting 
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and monitoring schools, as well as their resources and capacities. Unfortunately, 
the survey questions in each section vary from year to year to different extents, 
which limits their use as direct sources to gauge changes. Nevertheless, some 
overlapping questions serve as good indicators of organizational changes across 
years on a national level. The questions that are not consistent across years were 
used to provide national context as needed by the interview cases and the 
document analysis.  
The survey also contains quite a few open-ended questions to provide 
detailed explanations to survey responses. These open-ended responses were 
examined carefully as part of the survey analysis. In the 2007 survey, specific 
questions are asked about SEAs‘ changes. These responses provided great 
resources to triangulate with the interview data. 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis in this study is shaped by the mixed methods design 
discussed previously. Because the rationale for using an embedded design in this 
study is to triangulate and complement different data strands, I chose to analyze 
qualitative and quantitative data concurrently before merging findings from the 
















Figure 4. Concurrent Data Analysis Procedure. 
 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
The unit of analysis is state departments where interviewees hold positions.  
Interview data were analyzed using an interpretive approach (Gall et al., 1996) 
that examines ―constructs, themes, and patterns that can be used to describe and 
explain the phenomenon being studied‖ (p. 562). The first step is coding interview 
data. 
Initial Coding of Data 
Interview transcripts were imported to N-Vivo, software that helps 
organize and analyze qualitative data. The software assigns numbers to each line 
of the transcript and then breaks the text into segments. The segment was defined 
mostly by the interview protocols so each transcript was mechanically truncated 
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into segments by interview questions. These segments made transcripts easier to 
organize and analyze. I used a general scheme for initial within-case coding to 
identify categories where codes could be further developed inductively. Building 
on Bogdan and Biklen‘s (1992) framework, I selected to use the following coding 
categories in the within-case analysis (Table C in Appendix): 
1. Setting/context: the larger context of the case (e.g., federal/state policy 
change) 
2. Definition of the situation: informants‘ perception of SEAs‘ changes (e.g., 
SEA‘s role) 
3. Process: sequence of events, flow, transitions and turning points (e.g., 
before NCLB vs. after NCLB) 
4. Strategies: tactics, methods, techniques to accomplish things or meet their 
needs (e.g., staffing, technology, organizational structure) 
5. Relationships and social structure (e.g. SEA-LEA relation, contracting 
supplemental education services, testing companies) 
This scheme helps organize the data more analytically by categories that can be 
linked to the theoretic framework. Gall and colleagues (1996) define category as 
―a construct that refers to a certain type of phenomenon‖ (p. 564). Sometimes 
subcategories are needed in order to represent different levels of the construct. 
These categories show patterns of actions or perceptions that may give rise to 
concepts that help explain the phenomenon. For example, the setting/context 
category includes the interviewees‘ observation of changes in the policy 
environment; the definition of situation category takes account of the interviewees‘ 
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interpretation of SEAs‘ changes. The categorical coding is continuously 
interpreted as codes reoccur in different contexts. The thematic codes were 
explicitly defined in N-Vivo so they can be applied consistently.  
It is likely that organizational changes take place episodically and 
interviewees may talk about changes in different time frames and policy contexts. 
For this reason, it is necessary to set links between the setting/context and the 
definition of situation categories, so the categorical coding is not interpreted in 
isolation but in connection with other codes. This iterative process not only helps 
with identification of themes in the cross-case analysis but also informs my 
reflection and interpretation of the themes. Appendix E shows the N-Vivo 
interface for the within-case analysis. 
Development of Themes and Patterns 
The cross-case analysis aims at building connections across categories to 
develop themes. In the process of constructing themes, categories from different 
cases were constantly compared and revised from domain-centered to a more 
thematic-oriented, conceptual structure. Miles and Huberman (1994) emphasized 
that codes should relate in a coherent manner under a governing structure that 
reflects the theoretical framework of the study. As they put it, ―(an) operative 
coding scheme is not a catalogue of disjointed descriptors or a set of logically 
related units and subunits, but rather a conceptual web, including larger meanings 
and their constitutive characteristics‖ (p. 63). The thematic codes developed in 
cross-case analysis, therefore, aim to capture salient features of each case and 
display the underpinning structure and logic of issues raised across all cases.  
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Miles and Huberman (1996) suggested that cross-case analysis gives rise 
to key variables that may not be identifiable in single case analysis. Based on the 
thematic codes in each case I took a variable-oriented approach to look for the 
patterns of themes across cases. I developed the following codes for the cross-
case analysis to connect them more directly to the theoretical framework (Table D 
in Appendix): 
1. Institutional setting (within-case analysis code 1) 
2. Motivation for change (within-case analysis code 1, 2) 
3. Content of change (within-case analysis code 2,3,5) 
4. Strategy of change (within-case analysis code 3,4) 
Cross-case analysis looks at both the content of change in terms of internal 
structure, external relationship as well as organizational functions, and the process 
of change in terms of motivation, strategy and challenges. Cross-referencing was 
used as a way to connect the thematic codes in the cross-case analysis. For 
example, cross-referencing the institutional and organizational changes reveals 
the motivation for change. It reflects neo-institutional perspectives on 
organizations as open systems and provides context for understanding 
organizational change in SEAs.  
Code numbers from the within-case analysis are listed next to the cross-
case analysis codes to show how the two coding systems are closely related. For 
example, built on the ―strategy‖ code in the within-case analysis, the cross-case 
analysis analyzes these identified strategies based on all interviewed SEAs. In the 
meantime, I use pattern matching as a specific technique to link the identified 
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organizational strategies and corresponding content changes. Together with the 
analysis of motives, the strategy analysis addresses the second research question: 
how SEAs change. Appendix F shows the N-Vivo interface for cross-case 
analysis. 
Analysis of Quantitative Data and Documents 
Survey analysis is descriptive in nature. Responses to close-ended 
questions were entered to separate Excel files by year while open-ended questions 
were entered into N-Vivo and analyzed as qualitative data. Close-ended questions 
that are consistently asked across years were identified and tabulated for reporting 
purposes. Close-ended questions that are unique in each year‘s survey were 
connected with themes in the interviews and cited to complement and expand 
research findings. 
Documents were accumulated along with the analysis of interview data to 
address issues and themes discussed by the interviewees. I summarized the 
documents to inform the issues from multiple perspectives. Interviewees‘ 
accounts were then interpreted and discussed with consideration of perspectives 
expressed in the documents. Documents were directly cited to provide context for 
interview case analysis.    
Standards of Quality and Verification 
Standards of quality for both qualitative and quantitative studies hold true 
for mixed-methods study. My approach to this qualitative-dominant embedded 
design adheres to a constructivist perspective where knowledge is constructed 
from multiple sources and constantly reconstructed.  
96 
 
To minimize research biases, I describe study methods and procedures in 
great detail in this chapter to clarify data collection and transformation. All 
informants in this study have considerable years of institutional memory that 
allows them to speak to organizational changes. Analytic constructs are specified 
to match the theoretical framework. In the interview case analysis section, I 
displayed how my interpretations will be linked with specific data and analytical 
methods.  
This study employs multiple sources to provide evidence in different 
forms so SEAs‘ change experience can be validated and generalized. Survey 
responses from many states were based on internal consensus instead of one 
person‘s view. Interview transcripts were sent back to interviewees so they could 
reflect on the questions and revise their answers. The survey responses and 
interview transcripts were all verified and confirmed by state staff. Documents 
collected from media, research institutions and academic publications represent 
outsiders‘ observations. The insiders‘ accounts and the outsiders‘ observation not 
only triangulate data to check the trustworthiness and the credibility of research 
findings but also reveal diverse views on SEAs‘ change.  
Limitations 
Despite the effort to ensure its quality, this study is subjected to several 
limitations. First and foremost, the interview protocols were originally 
constructed to address research questions that did not specifically target 
organizational changes in SEAs. Additionally, organizational change can be a 
slow evolving process and the time period reported by the interviewees may not 
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capture all the features of organizational change. Interviewees may also lose sight 
of some changes that are constantly in the making as they become accustomed to 
them in the long process. The protocols would have captured more details if the 
questions had been formulated and organized following a specific timeline that 
signifies milestone events that might lead to change. This would have allowed me 
to examine change strategies through multiple perspectives, such as population 
ecology and life cycles approaches in understanding adaptive strategies. 
This study relies heavily on information provided by the interviewees and 
survey respondents and lacks direct observation to validate their account. This 
lack of observational data reduces the power of the study to reveal detailed site-
based contexts that may greatly inform the interpretation of SEAs‘ changes.  
The interviews were conducted as part of collaboration between CEP and 
SEAs. Interviewers might be selected not only based on their years of working 
experience with SEAs but also for their good relationship with CEP. This 
relationship may impact the set of issues they addressed and the ways they 
addressed it. A different group of state officials may not describe and interpret 
their SEAs‘ change in the same way.  
The survey study also has limitations. As mentioned previously, most of 
the survey questions of interest had been changed from year to year. Even with 
questions that were consistent, changes in other questions may impact the 
responses for these questions as well.  
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Ethical Issues and Political Considerations 
The pragmatic nature of mixed methods has caused ethical concerns about 
―the-ends-justify-the-means‖ approach. The attempt to gain knowledge in the 
pursuit of desired ends continues to haunt the axiological argument of pragmatism. 
This study uses data that were collected for purposes other than this study, and the 
research topic was inspired by the data not my intention to build such an argument 
about SEAs‘ change. Nevertheless, my choice of the topic reflects my beliefs in 
the importance of intermediate governmental involvement in school reform. Such 
beliefs may well influence my interpretation of the data. As Morgan (2007) put it, 
―a pragmatic approach reminds us that our values and our politics are always a 
part of who we are and how we act… (it) would redirect our attention to 
investigating the factors that have the most impact on what we choose to study 
and how we choose to do so‖ (p. 57).  
This study‘s primary interest is on SEAs, not SEA officials. Interviewed 
state officials are research instruments for data collection and will remain 
anonymous and receive pseudonyms. Because they held positions that are highly 
public and can be easily identified, the names of the participating states will also 
be anonymous. This will prevent distracting audience‘s attention from the generic 




Chapter 5: Content, Motives and Strategies of Organizational Change 
This study examines organizational changes of SEAs to understand how 
intermediate educational agencies respond to the institutional inclination toward 
standards-based accountability (SBA) and how they bring about changes in their 
function, structure and relationship with other organizations. The SEAs‘ changing 
role not only illustrates, from a unique angle, the impact of standards-based 
accountability on the structure of the U.S. education system but also reveals the 
obstacles to effective implementation of a SBA with a top-down approach. 
Findings reported in this chapter not only show evidence of organizational change 
in SEAs as a response to the shifting institutional environment, but also analyze 
the institutional environment in which organizational changes take place as well 
as the motivation and strategies. 
Findings reported in this section are derived from three sources of data: 
interviews with state officials in 2007, national surveys of SEAs in 2003, 2004 
and 2006, and documents collected from media and SEA websites. The latter two 
sources mainly serve as supplemental portals to validate themes emerging from 
the interview data.  
The chapter is organized in six parts. The first section describes the 
changed institutional environment as perceived by SEAs. Then, I analyze SEAs‘ 
new roles in the context of standards-based accountability. The third part of the 
chapter looks at SEAs‘ change in terms of their internal structure, staffing and 
information system. Next, I discuss SEAs‘ external relationship with other entities. 
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I also examine SEAs‘ motivation to change and, lastly, strategies they used to 
bring about organizational changes.  
SEAs’ Perceptions of the Changing Institutional Environment 
Organizational changes of SEAs are situated in a changing institutional 
environment. The development of SBA policy in the United States, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, gives a general background for changes in education policy. This 
section focuses on SEAs‘ interpretations of the changing environment at both 
state and national levels and how they impact the way SEAs position themselves 
in the education system.  
At the state level, sensitivity to standards-based accountability has been 
building among SEAs. In the 1980s, state lawmakers already put accountability 
under scrutiny (Education Week, 1982; Mathis, 1988) and gradually recognized 
the incoherence in the state accountability system (Johnston, 1998). Under the 
influence of state laws and reform initiatives in the 1990s, many states had set up 
and institutionalized integrated accountability systems (Education Week, 1996 
&1999). State5, for example, started its School Improvement Program in the early 
1990s to deliver a comprehensive review of schools and provide accreditation and 
technical assistance for school districts. By the time of the interview, State5 SEA 
was going into the fourth cycle of the program. As the policy environment 
became increasingly performance-driven under SBA, the department consolidated 
its federal applications so they all were directed toward the purpose of school 
improvement. California, for instance, passed its reform bills in 1999 raising the 
stakes for teachers, administrators and students. It followed the example of 
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Florida that created an outcome-based education system a few years earlier with 
goals and timelines for schools to implement the school-improvement process and 
assessment methods (Diegmueller, 1993; Johnston, 1999).  
State-wide initiatives are often constrained by the availability and 
sustainability of resources. When Washington state moved to the outcome-based 
system in the early 1990s, the state was not able to afford the $98 million reform, 
though it gained support from a collection of education groups (Richardson, 1993). 
Similar scenarios were also witnessed in other states, such as Massachusetts, Ohio, 
New York, California, Tennessee and Mississippi (Harp, 1991; Newman, 1990). 
Tight state budgets made school-reform projects expendable as states struggled to 
keep paying for basic classroom services. Various reasons accounted for the 
short-lived program funding from states. The fluctuation of state budget is a 
commonly reported factor. For example, a State7 official gave the following 
account of a state funding change: 
They had an agreement legislatively probably five years before I got 
here that … the legislature would fund the [plan] incrementally more 
each year until the whole bill of the state was 60% state. … That 
last[ed] until the special education regulations; they realized that‘s 
expensive, and they didn‘t pay for it. So they started backing off on 
the state, and they never completed the second round of inspection on 
the [plan]…because once they started backing off on the state aid, 
there was a hesitancy to go out and hold [schools and districts] to 
something that was not paid for. 
 
The significance and urgency of programs also influence the priority of 
state funding. For example, State5 funded tutoring programs when they first 
mandated their new state assessments. As the test results improved and the fear of 
a greater than expected number of students failing receded, state funds for the 
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tutoring program went away as well. Some SEA officials expressed their concerns 
about the unsustainable support to state reforms that not only restrained SEAs 
from pushing reform agendas at full speed but also weakened the conviction that 
state reform could bring substantial changes to schools. In this context, the 
enactment of NCLB was encouraging for some states that had tried to push 
forward the accountability agenda but did not have the means. They were hoping 
that the federal funds for NCLB would fill the resource gaps for school reform. 
Unfortunately, they soon became disappointed by the insufficiency of funds from 
the federal level. 
Regulatory changes at the national level are mostly symbolized by the 
enactment of NCLB in 2002. Before the enactment of NCLB, federal funding and 
resources to the states were mostly available in special grant programs, such as 
vocational or special education, instead of in general education programs where 
mainstream teaching and learning take place (Kaagan & Usdan, 1993). These 
discretionary resources inevitably required systematic management and oversight 
at the state level. Although states initiated their reform efforts to provide school-
wide programs with local flexibility and increased distribution of resources under 
the influence of IASA in 1994, NCLB specified a wider range of requirements for 
SEAs to implement accountability with the goal of bringing about improvement 
in student achievement at a faster pace. These requirements are reinforced on top 
of other federal programs that had been in place previously. State2 officials 
elaborated: 
It is frustrating for us to look at No Child Left Behind and not to be 
able to look at our responsibilities under IDEA, our responsibilities 
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under Perkins and have it coordinated in a way that makes it more 
effective with our resources. … Because those responsibilities go on 
but they‘re pretty much separate, they‘re not at all informing what 
we‘re doing at the federal level. 
 
As NCLB becomes institutionalized, SEAs‘ workload continues to grow 
particularly as a result of more schools and districts being identified as under-
performing over time. For example, about 70% of middle schools in State4 are in 
need of improvement even though State4 is one of the states with top performance 
on the national achievement test, National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP). The increasing number of identified districts and schools in need of 
interventions requires a more significant amount of resources from SEAs. 
However, many SEAs experienced no corresponding increase in resources to 
match the increasing monitoring and compliance responsibilities. For instance, the 
2004 national survey showed that inadequate federal funds had become a source 
of challenge for the majority of SEAs to develop (32 states) or implement (36 
states) their state assessment systems as NCLB requires.  
The imbalance between responsibility and funding results in serious 
consequences for SEA decision-making. It becomes a top priority for SEAs to 
strategize their use of money to meet the expectations of state and federal laws. 
Some spread out the money evenly over grades; others concentrate the funding on 
the improvement of certain grades, most likely the lower grades. Besides, SEAs 
have to fund schools with different needs. With limited funding, it is often a 
challenging policy decision whether to focus resources on schools with the most 
urgent needs or on the ones that could be in need later if something is not done 
immediately. The financial pressure of implementing NCLB on both districts and 
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states was so intense that lawsuits were filed, and a U.S. Court of Appeals in 
Cincinnati ruled in 2008 that the states and districts need not use their own money 
to pay for obligations under NCLB, restricting the unfunded-mandates provision 
of the federal law (Walsh, 2008).   
In addition to the increasing workload, SEA officials also found that 
federal monitoring under NCLB was scripted and did not allow SEAs to be 
flexible in making adjustments. SEAs enjoyed more discretion under the 1994 
IASA and the earlier authorizations of ESEA that were less prescriptive and 
stringent. Under NCLB, however, SEAs had more requirements to fulfill, less 
discretion and greater accountability for results. The scripted federal law 
constrained SEAs to the compliance framework and stifled innovation and 
creativity that many SEAs consider important for effective school improvement. 
NCLB‘s 2014 goal may be a necessary public policy strategy, but many SEA 
officials do not think it is achievable within the NCLB logic. A State7 official 
expressed his disappointment with NCLB as follows,  
…if you believe standards and testing, it‘s fine; but if you don‘t know 
how to do it – you don‘t get up in the morning and say I‘m gonna do 
it. … the development part, best practice, infrastructure development, 
feedback loops, looking at student work, changing instructional 
strategies, that part of this equation was never provided. 
 
Compared to states with a history of state assessment and accountability, the 
impact of NCLB has been even more significant for states with a tradition of 
strong local control. 
The lack of financial and technical support to meet the increasing 
expectations of the federal law sabotages SEAs‘ conviction of their capacities to 
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lead school improvement. However, interviewed officials embraced the leadership 
role SEAs are entitled to in the SBA policy. While some informants believed that 
their SEAs would have done what they are doing without NCLB, many 
questioned the necessity of the federal mandate. As one State3 superintendent put 
it: 
We don‘t need a new law in this, we need quality implementation. 
We need to focus more on making sure that every classroom has an 
effective teacher, that they‘re working as teams, that they‘re aligning 
their curriculum within the school and across the grade ranges, that 
they have embedded professional development that is effective for 
them. 
 
Despite the increased workload and stretched resources, SEAs recognize 
some positive effects that NCLB has created to enable them to become leading 
agencies in education reform. The federal intervention shifts the locus of 
confrontation with local districts. For instance, states that had pushed the 
accountability agenda before NCLB often experienced resistance and pushback 
from local districts and schools. The compliance role under NCLB redirected the 
power confrontation to the federal level and made SEAs more aligned with the 
interests of schools and districts. The entitled role for SEAs to provide assistance 
also elevated the significance of SEAs in the education system. The institutional 
changes at both the state and the national levels led SEAs to redefine their 
function, structure and relationship with other entities. 
SEA’s New Role 
The examination of organizational change of SEAs in this study is 
bounded by the context of standards-based accountability (SBA) in public 
education, but the range of SEAs‘ responsibilities may well go beyond SBA in 
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public schools to include early childhood and child nutrition programs, 
professional licensure (such as nursing, architecture, etc.), adult education 
services, vocational rehabilitation, and disability determination for social security 
purposes. SEAs‘ responsibilities vary greatly across states as the structure of the 
state governance systems differ. For example, State10 has a large intermediate 
unit system for special education, vocational rehabilitation and school 
improvement while State2 does not have any intermediary units so that the SEA 
provides more direct technical assistance and professional development to schools 
and districts. In this diverse context, I discuss the changing role of SEAs and 
define the term ―role‖ as the characteristic and expected social behavior of SEAs. 
I differentiate role from function to emphasize its social subjectivity and 
perceivedness.  
The role of SEAs has changed from what it used to be when SEAs would 
simply monitor and distribute funds. A State9 official explained that the question 
that would have been asked twenty years ago was, ―Did you spend the money?‖ 
Today the question is more probing in terms of how the money was spent to make 
sure it is directed effectively. One example of such an adjustment is how SEAs 
changed their way of distributing funding. States changed their funding formulas 
to tie the money closer to school accountability. A State10 official explained the 
rationale behind the state funding formula this way, 
We analyzed schools that were meeting the standards as measured by 
the exams, so we know what success costs, and we adjusted that per 
pupil foundation cost for differences in wealth, really relative 
concentration of poverty. We made a second adjustment for 





The changes in the funding formula expanded SEAs‘ role to examining schools 
more closely to understand student composition and performance. To determine 
resource allocation, SEAs have had to be more knowledgeable about what is 
taking place in the local school systems. 
Under the influence of SBA, particularly NCLB, the locus of SEAs‘ 
attention has gradually shifted from monitoring financial administration to 
ensuring compliance with federal requirements and providing technical assistance. 
The 2006 survey shows that 39 SEAs reported that they had experienced an 
increase in this federal program compliance requirement since NCLB was enacted. 
One state noted in the survey that, prior to NCLB, accountability and assessment 
activities were mainly the responsibility of Title I staff with support from other 
units. Since the enactment of NCLB, the responsibility has been decentralized 
within the SEA with more focus on academic achievement of all students. 
Twenty-eight states reported that they moderately monitor the activities of school 
districts that had schools in improvement, corrective action, or restructuring status, 
and 14 reported that they monitor to a greater extent.  
Part of the organizational change experience lies in the process through 
which SEAs balance their compliance role while providing technical assistance. 
CEP‘s 2003 survey shows that the 42 states offered professional development 
programs and 46 states provided technical assistance to schools identified as low-
performing in the first year of implementing NCLB. In addition, 36 states 
established school support teams. The two roles, assistance and compliance, can 
be so conflicting at times that State4 created a separate unit to specifically handle 
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the accountability and compliance work. The unit, though independent of the 
Department of Education, reported to the department whether a district ought to 
be declared as underperforming or not. The rationale behind the establishment of 
the new unit was that the accountability and the technical assistance roles were in 
conflict and had to be performed by two different agencies. The compliance unit 
was eventually eliminated as it became increasingly unpopular after NCLB, as 
many more schools were being identified.  
To a great extent, SEAs‘ compliance function is fostered by the increasing 
federal and state mandates, and NCLB is often considered as the hallmark that 
signifies SEA‘s change from being regulatory to predominantly compliant. In 
CEP‘s 2006 survey, 39 states reported a moderate or great increase in federal 
program compliance requirements and the same number of states had experienced 
increasing federal reporting requirements since NCLB was enacted. Take the 
requirement of adequate yearly progress (AYP) for example. Some SEAs went 
through a philosophy change from ―don‘t compare an urban school with a 
suburban school; they need time to catch up‖ to holding all schools to the same 
performance outcomes. In the 2002-2003 school year, the second year of NCLB, 
26 states reported that they identified school districts that did not make adequate 
yearly progress, and the number increased to 36 in 2004 and 42 in 2006. The 
number of identified districts in a state ranged from 1 to 176. In 2004, 19 states 
also applied NCLB sanctions, such as public school choice, supplemental services, 
corrective actions and school restructuring to non-Title I schools that were 
identified as needing improvement.  
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SEAs‘ compliance is also highlighted in meeting the requirements of 
supplemental education services. Figure 5 shows the composition of supplemental 
education services providers for nine of the interviewed states in 2004. On one 
hand, it illustrates the organizational network SEAs worked with to turn around 
identified schools. Private organizations are major partners while a couple of 
states also work with districts to deliver services. On the other hand, the large 
number of supplemental education service (SES) providers suggests the scope of 
monitoring that SEAs had to carry out in order to fulfill the federal law‘s 




Note: Information for State5 is missing in the survey. 
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On top of all the monitoring and regulatory work, the compliance role 
greatly challenged SEA‘s capacity. Between 2003 and 2004, an increasing 
number of SEAs reported challenges in monitoring the supplemental services 
requirement, especially in terms of determining whether provider applicants' 
instructional strategies were of high quality and effective in raising student 
achievement. The fast-growing concerns for SEAs included determining if the 
provider was financially sound as well as giving guidance about pricing or 
location of services. By 2006, only 10 states reported that they monitored SES 
providers to a great extent. Insufficient staff and inadequate federal funds were 
rated the top two reasons for inadequate monitoring. Not only was monitoring 
SES a time-consuming process that added additional burdens to SEA staff, but it 
also was challenging to ensure effective communication with so many relevant 
entities. Unable to fully comply, 48 SEAs made suggestions to the U.S. 
Department of Education on revising the law‘s requirements. Forty-seven states 
successfully negotiated to make some changes to the requirements. 
If the impetus for standards, assessment, and accountability has reinforced 
SEAs‘ regulatory and compliance roles, it is the institutionalization of these 
systems that led SEAs to provide more technical assistance to ensure compliance 
at the local level. In the beginning years of NCLB, lack of state assistance was the 
biggest issue facing schools. With the increasing number of identified schools, the 
public expectations have also changed in terms of what the SEA can do and how. 
The local backlash for evaluation without assistance gradually led SEAs to 
participate in SBA reform not only as an external evaluator but also as a 
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contributive change agent to give more substantive assistance to districts and 
schools. The expansion of SEAs‘ role has been a contrast to years past when 
SEAs were defined by a small government philosophy.  
As discussed earlier, the policy momentum at both state and national 
levels has reinforced SEAs‘ oversight for accountability purposes; soon SEAs 
took the primary monitoring and regulatory function with participation and input 
from local school districts. All the interviewed officials expressed their belief that 
their SEAs had attempted to develop regulations in a collaborative way to make 
their SEAs more service oriented and client centered. A State5 superintendent, for 
example, recognized that the transition from a compliance agency to a service 
provider agency was one of the biggest changes State5 SEA had achieved:  
…we‘ve been getting results with sticks. Now we have to start 
looking at carrots, because our results except for the 10
th
 grade have 
leveled off. Our work with under-performing schools and districts 
hasn‘t yielded many results. We‘re not going to get it there just by 
making them give us plans and kicking them, telling them they‘ve got 
to do this and that. I think there‘s a shift that‘s going to go on here at 
the department, where we‘re going to shift from compliance … to 
more technical assistance and cooperative, collaborative work. 
 
Thirty-seven SEAs reported in 2006 that they put greater emphasis on 
technical assistance since the implementation of NCLB. A State3 official noted 
that the addition of the assistance program was the biggest function change in the 
department. Another state noted in the survey that its department had moved from 
a compliance mode to providing more expertise and technical assistance as well 
as leveraging resources with groups that also worked on school improvement. In 
2004, 35 SEAs provided professional development or other assistance to help 
teachers meet the requirements, increasing from 25 in 2003. Forty-two SEAs 
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reported in 2006 that they were able to provide technical assistance to districts 
with schools in improvement, corrective action or restructuring to a moderate or 
great extent. State2 officials pointed out that their SEA has been increasingly 
perceived as a source of help and support for districts and schools after NCLB, 
What NCLB has done… is to create a need for us to be a bit more 
focused than we were in the past…because of NCLB, we have had to 
insist that our staff maintain a very strong focus on the supports that 
are important for our districts and charter schools, as opposed to what 
would be nice to do, but not necessarily have to do, and certainly not 
necessarily something that‘s going to give you as much pay off as we 
need. 
 
Similar to the compliance role, the technical assistance role challenged 
SEAs‘ capacity to meet federal requirements because of insufficient staff and 
funding from both federal and state governments. Twenty-five states attributed 
their inadequacy to the increasing number of schools identified for improvement. 
Figure 6 shows the sufficiency of federal funding for major NCLB requirements 
reported by SEAs in 2004. Providing technical assistance is the area with the 





Figure 6. Number of states reporting funding sufficiency under NCLB in 2004. 
 
In summary, SEAs have gone through a role change from being 
predominantly administrative to being increasingly involved with school practices 
and student performance, from regulatory to compliance oriented, and from 
tough-handed oversight and monitoring to actively seeking collaborative 
partnership. These changes in SEA functions and capacity have grown out of 
necessity. The following sections take a closer look at the features of change 
inside SEAs and the relationship with other organizations. Based on these features, 




























Changes in Internal Structure, Staffing and Technology Structure 
Structure 
Structural change was almost inevitable in order for SEAs to 
accommodate new policies and fulfill the expectations of their new roles. In 1995, 
a survey by CCSSO (Lindsay, 1995) reported that 41 states were already creating 
or implementing plans to reorganize the state education agency, and systemic-
improvement plans in 47 states included the development of content standards. 
However, public reports or documents do not detail how the internal structure of 
SEAs had changed over time. In CEP‘s 2006 survey, a state official described its 
SEA‘s structural change using the federal programs as an example: 
Prior to the passage of NCLB… the state superintendent led the 
development of curriculum frameworks. Title I
3
 [federal program] 
was a unit in the Office of Technical Assistance whose program 
administrators worked in isolation from other title programs. … In 
1998, the General Assembly passed a sweeping piece of legislation 
that changed the rating of schools solely to student test scores on 
standards-based assessments in grades 3-8 and in high school… The 
administration of federal funds was in the Division of Curriculum 
Services and Assessment. [Because] the focus on technical assistance 
increased for federal programs as schools were in need of instruction 
support…  
 
The unit for federal program administration continued to float in the SEA 
until the internal structure took a dramatic turn after NCLB:  
In 2001… the work of implementing [NCLB] crossed three divisions 
– Title IV was in one division, Title II in another, and Title I, III, V 
and VI in another. … In early 2005, the Office of Federal Programs 
broke into a separate office to ensure that aspects of NCLB were 
administered. 
 
The restructuring of SEAs to manage or administer federal programs showcases 
how SEAs reorganized their existing structure to meet their needs in the ever-
                                                 
3 Prior to NCLB, federal accountability requirements were only applicable to Title I schools. 
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changing policy environment. SEAs also created new branches to respond to the 
education momentum toward SBA, such as the professional development unit for 
the institutionalization of teacher tests and certification (State4), or assessment 
and accountability branches for student tests and performance (State7).  
Since the passage of ESEA in 1965, the internal structure of many SEAs 
has increasingly resembled the U.S. Department of Education because the federal 
government has become a most important source of funding to Title I schools 
(McDonnell, 2008; McDonnell & McLaughlin, 1982).  The traditional funding 
centered structure fit the function of channeling federal and state funding to 
schools but could hardly keep up with the expansion of SEAs‘ involvement with 
school practices. In particular, the funding-centered programs often performed 
overlapping functions, which were not an efficient way to use resources. A State1 
superintendent gave the following example: 
…after No Child Left Behind came about, our federal program 
[was]… going and helping Title I schools and then our Classroom 
Improvement section, which is all state funded, they were trying to 
go and help in their way. And we were kind of stumbling over each 
other and it was very awkward … the federal program people may go 
on Monday and then the Classroom Improvement people go on 
Thursday and they‘d say, ―Well, you know, so-and-so was just here 
Monday,‖ and it was just awkward… 
 
These programs also made the staff tied to a particular funding source hard to 
redeploy. SEAs had to stay faithful to the funding source and meld all of the 
resources together so they did not have audit exceptions. The internal 
reorganization consolidated funding, expanded the SEA role in providing 
assistance, and shifted its function from funding-centered to task-centered. As 
Kaagan and Usdan (1993) argued, SEAs in the 80s were organized ―too much 
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around federal-funding streams, rather than around carefully identified and 
legitimated functions necessary for improvement of schooling within their 
jurisdictions‖. In State4, divisions in the SEA were created to manage specific 
funding streams, such as vocational education and teacher certification. After the 
state‘s Education Reform Act in 1993, the department redefined the focus and the 
scope of work with four new branches: 1) administration, 2) standards and 
assessment, 3) teacher quality, and 4) school and district accountability. The new 
organizational structure matched well with the SBA framework and allowed for 
more flexibility for the department to accomplish goals across units. The current 
organizational chart on the State4‘s website shows three divisions under the 
commissioner‘s office, 1) administration and finance, 2) learning, leadership and 
information, and 3) accountability, partnerships and assistance. The structural 
change reflects not only the spirit of state initiatives but also collaborative 
networks between the SEA and other constituents in the education system. 
Internal reorganization also helped SEAs stretch their capacities and 
enhance their administrative efficiency to meet the increasing needs from both 
state and federal accountability systems. The Noah‘s Ark approach, as the State1 
official described it, covers too much of everything, and SEAs are not able to 
meet the needs of accountability anymore. One state noted in the 2006 survey that, 
during the last ten years, the administration of grant programs had been 
consolidated to one central grant administrative area for more efficient 
coordination and grant processing. In State6, the department trimmed down its 
middle management and revamped its organizational hierarchy, reducing its 
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layers of operation from 30 to 6. The goal of the restructuring was to achieve 
better and faster internal communication as well as distributed leadership. As its 
structure became flatter, the SEA enjoyed the benefits of flexibility in 
maneuvering resources to address the needs of state and federal mandates.  
Last but not least, SEA restructuring was an effort to increase 
collaboration across departments and to reduce single strands of work by a 
particular individual or work group. In State10, for example, the K-12 structure 
was changed from a stand-alone operation with silo programs, such as vocational 
rehabilitation, special education and higher education, to a P16 strategy where the 
SEA builds connection among programs through a series of regional meetings and 
an education summit. A State6 Superintendent commented that the federal 
pressure to implement NCLB had produced a culture of teamwork within his SEA. 
So it was too easy to abdicate to that person to say, well, it‘s your job; 
it‘s not mine. So No Child Left Behind became everybody‘s job. And 
that‘s the way we do things as things like that come along. We do 
cross-group work teams and the work gets done in a group. And we 
use an adaptive work process, if you want to call it something, where 
we create the solutions in cross-group teams. 
 
The effects of restructuring internal collaboration have been most significant for 
the federal programs unit that used to be operated mostly autonomously and in 
isolation from other units in the SEA. Under NCLB, the federal requirements 
have expanded and the unit had to collaborate to a much greater degree with other 
units such as teacher licensure, assessment, English language learners, and both 





The reorganization of SEAs has inevitably led to changes in staffing to 
satisfy the needs emerging with the new structures, shifting resources and the 
remaking of politics. The political push to decrease government size has 
influenced the resources and the number of personnel at SEAs. An Education 
Week survey found that 27 SEAs had fewer employees in 1998 than in 1980 
(Education Week, 1999). ―Every new governor that comes in has wanted to be 
able to say that they reduced the number of state employees,‖ says the State3 
superintendent who witnessed the number of staff in his department decrease 
from 920 to 660 over the past 16 years, including the elimination of regional 
service centers. State4 underwent a departmental reorganization in the late ‗80s 
during which all the regional centers were closed down and SEA staff was cut in 
half. Since the Education Reform Act, the SEA has slowly grown, but it has not 
been commensurate with SEA‘s increasing responsibilities. The number of SEAs 
reporting an insufficient number of staff to carry out the legislative requirements 
of NCLB increased from 38 in 2003 to 44 in 2006.  
The 2006 survey also showed that 46 SEAs reported an insufficient 
number of staff to provide technical assistance to identified schools and districts. 
The number of SEAs reporting inadequate in-house expertise increased from 25 
in 2003 to 32 in 2004 and 2006. One state official noted in the 2006 survey that, 
as the result of decentralization of personnel and service in the department, the 
number of personnel at the state level to provide technical and content expertise 
for core curricula decreased considerably. The limited state administrative budget 
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had not been able to fund the positions required to carry out its responsibilities. 
The professional staff for the statewide testing program decreased by 50% while 
the number of tests tripled after NCLB. 
The economic condition of states also contributed to the downsizing. 
Many SEAs experienced flat funding before and after NCLB while there were 
increasing loads of responsibilities from state and federal mandates. One SEA 
noted in the 2004 survey that since 1998, state budget cuts and other realignment 
actions had reduced its staff from about 2,000 to 284. Another SEA reported that 
the department had less capacity than in the 1990s. There was a 39% staff 
reduction between 1991 and 1996 and an additional 4% reduction between 1996 
and 2006. Individuals had to be responsible for implementing multiple state and 
federal programs. As most of the federal funding went to districts and schools, it 
was common for SEAs to report insufficient state funds to provide for the 
necessary monitoring and professional development to fully implement the law. 
On the positive side, the reduction in full-time employees forced SEAs to 
be more effective and efficient. One state noted in the 2006 survey that the caliber 
of state-level employees had improved with training and experience. In certain 
positions, however, the staff at times could be overwhelmed with their 
assignments that used to be handled by more employees. In State7, for example, 
less than 100 state-funded positions, which are 3% of all state employees, 
administer over 40% of the state budget. A State5 official described staff burnout 
as particularly significant in curriculum work, which is time consuming and labor 
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intensive. The curriculum unit was expected to conduct the same amount of work 
with fewer full-time employees and less financial resources.  
Some states commented in the 2006 survey that the state department was 
less effective in offering LEAs technical support than it had been because staff 
had to spend their time monitoring for NCLB compliance and completing federal 
reports. One state wrote, 
The SEA staff spends much more time reporting and negotiating with 
the US Department of Education today compared to ten years ago. 
Ten years ago we had more time to spend assisting education with 
instructional strategies and best practices. Now we must cover all the 
compliance issues and do not have the resources in terms of time and 
staff to address the quality of education. 
 
The roles of the federal program personnel that had been providing instructional 
support changed to a focus on administration of the law and compliance 
monitoring. A couple of states pointed out that the SEA in-house staff was more 
limited to administrative functions that needed less substantive expertise to assist 
LEAs. The responsibilities have grown more specific as NCLB provides scripted 
direction and guidance to education initiatives. As a result, staff is more focused 
on supporting the systems through compliance than in providing information on 
specific issues that emerged from local schools and districts.  
Many SEAs managed the downsized staff by contracting out eliminated 
positions and loaning district staff or external contract consultants. The contracts 
were able to accomplish the work but were more economical in the long run 
because they were task-based. A State9 official explained the situation this way, 
So the jobs have gone up and we have dealt with it by maintaining 
the same number of [employees], but then hiring in contractuals, … 
[and] a number of people in what we call reimbursables or educators 
121 
 
on loan from local school system. So they‘ll maintain their local 
standing in the local system, but then we would pay their full salaries 
and benefits package. So money that we might have had as 
operational money for programs is now used instead to buy the 
expertise. 
 
The staffing change is not simply a story of downsizing, but also the 
change of staff composition and responsibilities. In light of NCLB, some SEAs 
had a decrease of administrative staff and an increase of staff for the data 
collection, reporting and information technology development and maintenance. 
State6, for example, doubled the staff at its data center while its overall staff size 
decreased.  
Facing increasing data system and management needs in the 
accountability system, many states had to use contracted consultants to fill in 
these positions. A State3 official explained as follows: 
… we‘ve got a student information system. And then we‘ve got other 
systems we‘re working on that deal with like a knowledge 
management portal that is an instructional tool for teachers. So we‘ve 
had to use some vendors for certain larger projects… and then we 
also contract with some folks to help us because the reality is, people 
who are really savvy with technology market as such that you can‘t 
afford them on state government salary schedules.  
 
The state data systems continue to expand as SEAs integrated more technology in 
their work, but the availability of competent staff is often hard to find at the state 
salary scale. The challenges to find expertise lead SEAs to contract out for 
staffing to help build data systems as well as conduct massive training projects in 
the local districts on how to use the data.  
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SEA Data System 
When it came to organizational changes within SEAs, the setup of 
statewide data systems oftentimes was the first thing state officials talked about. It 
became a major focus of the state to analyze the ramifications of data related to 
school performance and student achievement. The increasing focus on technical 
assistance also called for developments in technology and the building of 
comprehensive student information systems. The availability of more student-
level data allowed SEAs to provide a greater level of technical assistant to schools.  
The data systems vary greatly across states in terms of their history, focus 
and structure. Some states have had data systems since the 1980s and 1990s; some 
started building state systems as a response to NCLB in 2002. For the latter states, 
there were more struggles in changing the organizational technology and keeping 
abreast with other states in fulfilling the federal requirements. For states that have 
had a history of standards, assessments, and accountability, their data systems also 
went through technology and content upgrades to meet the requirements for data 
dissemination and use or to align with the newly developed academic standards, 
assessment regimen, accountability and teacher quality indicators as well as the 
state funding schemes. For example, a State6 official described their old data 
system this way: 
All of the data that we used to collect was done by hand. In other 
words, they [schools/districts] had to send us the data then we‘d have 
to enter it into a data system. You couldn‘t manipulate it; whatever 
form it came in was the form you had to use it in. Ninety percent of it 




While NCLB required SEAs to beef up these data system, even more data 
were collected. State6 upgraded its data system and set up a student record system 
so that schools were able to enter the student records for SEAs to aggregate 
reports.  
The electronic data system allowed the department to define and 
standardize data collection and to easily share it with schools. A State10 official 
gave an example of how electronic data made a difference in his department: 
…basic state aid input data are done electronically and not on a paper 
basis. If you complete a college preparation program for a teaching 
license, your records are transferred electronically and your license 
comes back in a day or two. You can, as a parent, check to see if your 
child‘s teacher is certified. You can reregister for your professional 
license with a credit card. We have very good supply and demand 
data for teachers and in various regions of the state, so we know 
where there are shortages and where are surpluses.  
 
While the electronic and unified data systems enables SEAs to collect data more 
efficiently, SEAs still heavily relied on schools and districts for data quality and 
accuracy because coding and data entry were completed at local levels. Whether 
common definitions were used for data coding and entering may directly impact 
the quality of state data. A study by Reidenberg and Debelak (2009) warns that 
the information transfer process from local to state agencies needs more actions to 
safeguard sensitive information in student records and follow federal privacy laws.  
Since the passage of NCLB, all states have set up data systems to report 
on student performance, but the systems often have different scopes and levels of 
sophistication. SEAs continue to make changes to improve the effectiveness of 
their system through student identifiers, teacher identifiers that link to student data, 
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and p-16 data systems. State2 officials described the growth of their data system 
as follows: 
We used to only use the data that the department had and that‘s what 
we reported. Now we have our schools give us much more 
information and we report much more comprehensive data, but we do 
have a statewide data system. We have a pupil counting system. We 
have educator data. We have a little bit of financial data, a lot of 
information about our schools in our district as well as the 
department. 
 
In particular, the student identification system caught SEAs‘ attention because it 
has the potential to help SEAs address issues related to graduation rate, student 
mobility, and long-term trends in student achievement. As of 2009, data systems 
in all but two states had student identifiers to measure academic growth across 
years and different databases (Data Quality Campaign, 2009). The report 
showcases the improvement states made to their data systems particularly in 
respect to their longitudinal measures and suggests one catalyst for the recent 
change in state data systems is the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
which requires states to track student achievement longitudinally to be eligible for 
receiving the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund. The report also shows that only 24 
states were able to match students with their teachers through teacher identifiers. 
As the federal funding through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
continues, more states are taking actions to link the K-12 and postsecondary 
education system. According to a survey by Data Quality Campaign (2009), the 
number of states reporting the ability to match student records between P-12 and 
postsecondary systems to measure college readiness increased from 12 in 2005 to 
31 in 2009.  
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SEAs also changed their way of disseminating and using data. State data 
have become more publicly available for analysis and the ownership of the data 
has moved from a handful of SEA staff to a wider range of users within and 
outside of SEAs. SEAs now have greater ownership of the data as well as a 
stronger understanding of how important it is to apply the data in thinking, 
planning and measuring outcomes. Given limited resources, however, SEAs 
sometimes prioritize resources for collecting certain data, such as data involved 
with assessing low performance schools. At the time of the interviews for this 
study, some states were still struggling to build a robust system to organize data in 
an easily accessible way. ―They [local schools and districts] have to sort of hunt 
and find.‖ said a State4 official, ―We collect huge amounts of data, but we don‘t 
turn around and make it useful… it‘s absolutely a shortage of resources.‖ Even 
states with a history of collecting data did not necessarily do a lot with the data 
either within the department or with the districts and schools. A study by the U.S. 
Department of Education (2009) shows that state data systems are not informative 
to classroom instruction as district systems and ―the hoped-for efficiencies to be 
gained from integrating data system at the state, district and school levels are not 
apparent from the vantage point of schools and districts‖ (p. 45). According to a 
survey by Data Quality Campaign (2010), only 10 states were actively sharing 
progress reports on student record with teachers and only 17 states provide 




Changes in External Function and Relations 
Kaagan and Usdan‘s (1993) characterized the tension between SEA and 
other state and local entities as follows: 
 …it is politically fashionable ("correct'') and all too common for 
elected officials in states to "bash'' state education agencies, while 
at the same time not committing the resources necessary to 
improve them. 
 …legislators are traditionally very loath to put dollars into 
"bureaucracy'' when there is the option of putting them into local 
aid to directly benefit local constituents. 
 …almost universally state-government practices in the areas of 
personnel and budgeting severely disadvantage a state education 
agency bent on supporting innovation in schools and communities. 
To be blunt, these practices routinely deprive state education 
agencies of the ability to recruit and retain highly talented people 
with strong substantive backgrounds in areas like research, 
planning, and evaluation. 
 …the funding of many state education agencies comes in large 
part from the federal government, not state governments, with 
some ratios hovering at 90 percent federal, 10 percent state. 
 …the danger of "no win'' internecine conflict between local- and 
state-based educators in some jurisdictions is real, with the former, 
particularly those from affluent, politically influential suburban 
districts, especially resentful of the intrusiveness of what they 
perceive to be less competent state-agency officials. (para. 10) 
 
The list gives a glimpse of how SEAs struggled and competed for power and 
resources in the early 1990s while serving as intermediate organizations.  The 
changing policy and institutional environment toward SBA have highlighted the 
leadership role of SEAs. Some states in this study reported that it was particularly 
tricky seeking a balance between being a helping hand for school improvement 
and a heavy hand to implement state and federal regulations. In this section, I take 
a closer look at the changing relationship between SEAs and local school districts, 
other branches of state government as well as the U.S. Department of Education. 
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Internal organizational changes discussed previously are, for the most part, 
expansions built upon existing organizational conditions. In comparison, the 
widespread change in SEA‘s provision of technical assistance features a new 
external function of SEAs that were not in existence before the SBA era. When 
working with districts, SEAs shifted the focus of their functions from the 
administrative aspects of school district finance to school operation and student 
academic performance. Compared to state intervention in the ‗90s when SEAs 
were more likely to take over school districts for disarrayed financial and 
management situations (Education Week, 1988), they are now more likely to take 
over districts for academic reasons. A report by Education Week (1999) shows 
that SEAs increasingly intervened in local schools with a focus on academic 
achievement. Even before NCLB, 19 states had mandated low-performing schools 
to receive state assistance and 13 of them had assigned a state staff person to be 
on the assistance team as a way to enhance state oversight. NCLB pushed SEAs 
further to be involved more in the improvement of school performance.  
As the number of schools fail and the pressure to make AYP increases, 
school takeover based on school performance becomes ever more intense. Since 
2002, SEAs have taken more proactive approaches to work with districts to bind 
the central agency and the regional units into one force. For example, some states 
believed that mediating local talent is more effective than direct state intervention. 
In State 10, for instance, the state department of education coordinated an 
assistance team to help high schools with low graduation rates. The SEA selected 
team members from high performing schools that resembled the schools in need 
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of help. The coordinator role allowed the state department to present itself as a 
less intrusive intervener in the relationship with local schools and districts. 
According to the state official, the relationship turned out to be quite successful – 
the list of low-performing high schools decreased from 127 to 100.  
In state 3, state assistance under the state reform initiative before NCLB 
included a school improvement fund grant and highly skilled educators whom the 
SEA would pay extra to be on contract, to go into low-performing districts and 
work full-time in schools. A scholastic audit process was added in 1998 where the 
audit team was made up of members from different interest groups other than 
teachers. The team was trained to evaluate the strengths and improvement areas 
for schools. Under NCLB, school districts that have reached Tier 3 low 
performing status must begin a corrective action process that includes state level 
intervention. As part of the state intervention, the state 3 SEA started an 
assistance team program where each Tier 3 district would receive assistance from 
a team of five members, including the district superintendent as team leader, a 
superintendent mentor from the state association of school superintendents, a 
school board mentor from the state school board association, a highly skilled 
educator from the SEA and a SEA facilitator. Based on the result of the audit 
process, the assistant team meets to develop a plan to implement the audit 
recommendations.  Also as a mediator, State1 contracted with teachers and 
administrators in the districts to reassign them to under-performing schools and 
pay their salary out of state budgets. With the reallocation of resources, the 
department was able to focus on the greatest and most urgent needs. 
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Another aspect of this changing relationship is the involvement of districts 
in SEAs‘ decision-making processes. State 6, for example, implemented an 
adaptive process to work out details of any new rules with local districts before it 
proceeded to a public hearing. The department decided to engage the local 
schools in the policy decision-making process to better address their needs with 
state initiatives:  
We were getting frustrated with creating these rules that we thought 
were wonderful and then go to a hearing and have 25-30 schools 
come in and tell us how stupid we were and waste time and then go 
create another one and have the same thing kind of happen, and it 
would take months and months to go through that process.  
 
The State6 official continued to explain their solution to make the 
department work more efficiently with local districts and schools: 
And we decide that when a new rule drafted or an old rule revised, 
we go out and make a round throughout the state, invite anybody who 
wants to come and talk to us and tell us what‘s wrong with the rule or 
what needs to be changed, and so the first draft of any changes 
actually comes from the field…  
 
The department then made changes based on the local suggestions and 
sent the draft out again; this continued until no significant changes needed to be 
made. The collaborative relation with districts, on the one hand, ensured that the 
draft would meet local needs, and on the other hand, created a community 
consensus around the SEAs‘ role in implementing accountability. In the process, 
the department built a collaborative network and communication channel to listen 
to the local districts and to align the state and the local interests. Together with 
other engagement activities, the State6 department managed to strengthen its 
relationship with districts. Collaboration with districts not only made the draft 
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address local needs but also created a community consensus around SEAs‘ role in 
implementing accountability. Statewide surveys that State6 conducted in 1995, 
1998 and 2001 showed that the SEA had advanced from the last resource districts 
and school turn to for help to the first.  
The change may be illustrated by contrasting some SEA‘s relationships 
with districts in the past. State2 officials gave a vivid account of their relation 
with districts in the past, 
…for a long period of time in the 1980s, we didn't‘ listen to the 
district or other folks. We were very focused; we moved ahead and if 
anybody got in our way, oh well, we ran over them…the way we 
worked was very much in isolation, individuals in isolation, different 
groups in isolation…there was a lot of Lone Rangerism going on 
around here. 
 
A change in leadership in the early ‗90s and a state reform in State2 made the 
Department of Education a cabinet agency that reported directly to the governor, 
instead of being managed through the State Board. This system change allowed 
the department to make independent decisions on how to fulfill its function in the 
state‘s efforts to set up an accountability system. At the beginning, districts were 
not at all interested in working with the SEA and were very resistant to a 
statewide curriculum, which is a key element of the state accountability system. 
Over the years, the department learned to listen to districts and schools and to see 
how issues could be accommodated. In collaboration with teachers and 
administrators, State2 SEA has rolled out a recommended statewide curriculum 
for English language arts and mathematics while several other key content areas 
are in development.  
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As state-district collaboration picks up, the age-old debate of local control 
continues to create friction between SEAs and districts. In 2006, 178 district 
superintendents in Colorado presented a ―white paper‖ to the state commissioner 
of education that called for more inclusion of district leaders in state decision-
making and more state service to districts (McNeil, 2006). The state 
commissioner explained that the SEA had become an intrusive regulatory agency 
under NCLB and that providing services to local districts was not the purpose of 
the federal funds. More recent incidents of massive school closures in Kansas 
City, Cleveland, and Detroit also showcase the tension between SEAs and 
districts (Aarons, 2010). SEAs closed malfunctioning schools and seized control 
of reconstructing these schools as they saw fit. In the case of Kansas City schools, 
similar state attempts at closing schools had been blocked by the school board 
before the recent state proposal won a 5-to-4 majority from the board.  
The changing relationship between state and local education agencies, 
either collaborative or intrusive, is influenced by both state education reform 
mandates and federal requirements through NCLB. However, there are times 
when the two levels of mandates are in conflict with one another. In State3, for 
example, although NCLB imposes additional intervention such as school choice 
and supplemental education services, its SEA has not changed the levels of 
corrective action and restructuring significantly because intervening in local 
schools, replacing school staff and taking over school management are legally 
prohibited by state law. In State6, the SEA did not change much to accommodate 
NCLB‘s emphasis on low-performing schools; instead, it insisted on interacting 
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with districts without directly intervening in schools. The state superintendent 
explained it this way, 
…we have huge philosophical issues with No Child Left 
Behind…we‘re not going to go into a school until they ask us to. … 
We don‘t have any school authority here… it is the school district we 
can do something with, but not that particular school.  
 
Instead, the State6 SEA made recommendations of a continuous 
improvement model that can be used to focus on areas of low performance and to 
meet the requirements of the state accreditation process. Its website, for instance, 
provides resources for schools to set learning goals and improve a particular 
school program. State6‘s disbelief in the ―swat‖ school team approach echoes the 
approach of other states where the state departments of education no longer 
dispatched staff to directly intervene at the school level, but became more 
responsive to districts. Some SEAs may be more involved with schools in big 
urban districts, but building the district capacity is generally considered to be a 
more effective way to improve school performance. 
Lunengburg and Ornstein (2004) categorize state reforms between 1991 
and 2000 into four waves: (1) academic standards, (2) professional policy, (3), 
curriculum development, and (4) assessment and accountability. Waves of state 
reforms in the past have affected the relationship between SEAs and school 
districts over time. However, the trend of collaboration seems to serve SEA 
interests in multiple ways. First, either through state funding, training or other 
forms of support and collaboration, the interaction with districts allows SEAs to 
implement accountability without straining limited in-house resources. SEAs may 
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take advantage of districts‘ expertise and knowledge in curriculum and instruction 
as well as their good relationship with schools to carry out state reform agenda.  
Second, working with districts tends to promote a more sustainable 
environment for school development. State7 had the experience of taking over 
low-performing schools in the first year of NCLB. The state commissioner shared 
the lesson learned from the experience: 
We have given [the school] back to the district…and we did that as 
part of this understanding that I can fix one school but if I came out 
of the school and didn't‘ fix the district, the district would smother the 
school again… it would just back in to the protocols that it was 
existing in. 
 
In addition to its aggressive school intervention and monitoring, this experience 
provides a rationale for State 7 to focus on capacity building at the district level 
and to create a community that promotes school improvement. State 7 
commissioner emphasized community building in the SEA‘s leadership role, 
which he argued was unfortunately lacking in the policy environment but was an 
important part of state intervention to school restructuring and sustainable 
improvement. ―Building community here is hard work,‖ he said,  
… for me to be selling that this is a community interest for every 
child to make it, is clearly not public policy yet. … And I would 
argue to send me on a mission of all kids to standard and tell me that 
the quality of the future of this country depends on it, but in order to 
do it I have to overcome all of that without anybody agreeing to that 
but I‘m gonna do it in the schools alone, is a fool‘s errand. 
 
The collaborative relationship with districts shows SEAs‘ continuing 
efforts to listen and invite the involvement of local school districts and 
communities in their decision-making. These efforts are reflected in the various 
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infrastructures where SEAs bring educators and administrators as well as 
representatives from professional organizations to build the state system of 
support. Accountability roundtables and state support teams are common for 
SEAs to use to extend their network of partnership. In State1, for instance, the 
accountability roundtable represents all sections in the SEA that work with 
schools in any capacity and regional in-service centers; the state support team in 
2006 consisted of 11 regional school improvement coaches, 13 peer mentors who 
were master teachers placed in multiple schools, and representatives from state 
initiative programs and LEA regional specialists in special education and federal 
programs. The state department organized these two networks to provide 
technical assistance and support to low-performing schools.  
In the recent competition for the Race to the Top grants, some state 
proposals featured district flexibility to gain local support for winning the federal 
funds. Illinois, for instance, featured in its proposal 12 ―super LEAs‖ where 
district superintendents and union leaders agreed to waive collective bargaining to 
pave the way for implementing new evaluation systems. For states that took a 
more prescriptive approach, their grant proposals were more likely to encounter 
resistance from the districts and, therefore, reduce the feasibility of the proposed 
reform (Sawchuk & Maxwell, 2010).  
The SEAs‘ relationship with the state legislature and governor also has 
changed on a state-by-state basis. As part of state government, one of the SEAs‘ 
main responsibilities is to advocate for particular issues in public education and 
solicit appropriate state funding. Some informants for this study have worked with 
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multiple governors during their terms because they and the governors are on 
staggered terms; therefore, SEAs constantly face the challenge of negotiating with 
state governors who have different political agendas and political affiliations 
(Johnston, 1999). State leadership is an important factor that drives organizational 
change in SEAs, especially for states with elected state superintendents and state 
board members who bring different perspectives and visions to the job. Any 
discrepancy between the two levels of governance may bring complications for 
SEAs.  
The increasing attention to education in the public forum has drawn 
growing interest from the state government (Johnston & Sandham, 1999). In 
State9, for example, the state legislature became more involved in education to 
prevent state intervention with low performing schools. State9 official explained 
as follows, 
They [the state legislators] are much more active in paying attention 
to the education arena than before, and that‘s a direct result of NCLB 
and a lack of clarity in the federal law in terms of what state 
expectations are for these low performing schools. 
 
The SEA official in State9 noticed that there had been more bills about education 
in 2007 than ever before, and the legislature was much more involved in blocking 
the state board from intervening in low-performing schools. McDonnell (2008) 
synthesizes motivation for governors‘ involvement in state education policy as 
―their framing of a strong connection between improved education quality and 
economic development, especially in Southern states; a desire for greater 
accountability over the increasing state share of public education expenditures; 
and their general discontent with SEAs‘ fiscal and administrative autonomy as a 
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result of federal funding‖ (p. 4). Indeed, the increasing political attention sheds 
more light on SEAs under the watch of state government, but does not necessarily 
bring in more state funding in public education. The increasing number of schools 
being identified under NCLB made it particularly hard for SEAs to show positive 
results of previous state funding. Without evidence to show returns on the state‘s 
previous investment in public schools, SEAs found themselves in an awkward 
position to request additional state budget for the coming year. The increasing 
attention from state government and the little evidence of school improvement 
challenge the status of SEAs and further complicate the relationship between 
SEAs and the other branches of state government (Maxwell, 2008).  
NCLB has strengthened SEA‘s policy positions in many cases, shouldered 
the blame for some of the less popular policies, and provided a contrast for 
individual state‘s interpretation of effective school systems. However, the law‘s 
lack of clarity in terms of what state expectations are for low-performing schools 
makes some state governments concerned about the power SEAs have gained 
through NCLB as well as the state accountability system.  
SEAs have increased their contracts with the private sector to expand their 
capacity. Take the state assessment system, for example. As the state data systems 
become increasingly complicated, SEAs have to use vendors to design and 
administer state tests. Experts with skills to set up data systems are too expensive 
for state government salary scales. The contractual arrangements still have high 
price tags but then allow work to be done at a relatively low state budget. 
Partnerships with business communities have increased as they are often closely 
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linked with state standard setting, professional development policy, curriculum 
development, assessment and accountability (Lunenburg & Ornstein, 2004; 
Waddock, 1995). The expanding network of service providers posted another 
challenge to SEAs – the responsibilities to look for providers, determine their 
capacity and evaluate the provision of services. 
The extended partnership with the private sector, however, does not 
necessarily overshadow the SEA‘s leadership role as intermediate government 
agencies. A State7 official illustrated his thinking this way: 
…they [business communities] somehow think their model is the 
answer. I don't see any evidence. … in the capitalist system as I know 
it, somebody does lose; … But you‘ve told me you don‘t want 
anybody at the bottom end; you want everybody to standard. There‘s 




And by the way, why do you keep thinking that the open market is 
the answer in a global place…[where] we‘re competing with 
[countries] that are doing better than us are not using that strategy. If 
you go to Finland and Denmark, if you go to Singapore or Taipei, it‘s 
public policy that all kids are gonna get this.  
 
This statement illustrates well the faith in the SEAs‘ leadership role that is 
commonly expressed by interviewed state officials. Despite the widely reported 
shortage in resources and capacity, when asked, interviewed state officials 
generally agreed that SEAs are the logical candidates to lead the SBA reform. A 
report by the Institute for Educational Leadership (Usdan et al., 2001) endorses 
SEAs‘ pivotal roles in leading education reform with a comparison to other 
players, such as governors, legislators, state boards and the business community. 
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The report claims, however, that SEAs are ―almost too lean‖ to exercise their 
potential in full (p. 10).  
Last but not least, the partnership among states has become particularly 
valuable to many SEAs after NCLB. For example, the number of states that 
mandated assessments for districts to measure the language proficiency of English 
learners increased from 32 in 2003 to 41 in 2004. Of the 41 states, 13 reported 
that they relied on state consortiums to develop assessments for English language 
learners. The state membership to the World-class Instructional Design and 
Assessment (WIDA) consortium increased to 24 in 2010. The consortium was 
initially a collaborative effort among three states in 2002 to design and implement 
accountability systems for English language learners. Another example for state 
partnership is the New English Common Assessment Program (NECAP). New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont form the NECAP partnership because 
none of them was prepared to administer annual testing as required by NCLB on 
its own (McNeil, 2010). The State7 commissioner described the changing 
relationship among states this way: 
When I was first a chief, the chief‘s meeting was a show and tell. 
These are the wonderful things going on in my state, and there‘s not 
kink in the armor. Now when you go to a summer institute or a policy 
forum, the chiefs are going ―Is anybody getting any traction on this 
one here?‖ There‘s awful lot more, almost on demand sharing of 
strategies, of information system… I would say of all the things that I 
feel supported by is actually the chiefs‘ network. 
 
State2 officials heavily emphasized the state collaboration through 
organizations such as the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) to fill 
in the knowledge and resource gap in their department. CCSSO has strengthened 
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its technical assistant to states since the early 1990s when system reform became 
the catch phrase in anticipation of the Goals 2000: Educate America Act 
(Education Week, 1993). As more schools and districts were undergoing 
sanctions, either corrective action or restructuring, the SEAs became increasingly 
concerned about their capacity to be able to support the locals effectively, not 
only financially but also the knowledge base of what works in turning around 
underperforming districts. CEP‘s 2003 survey shows that, in the 2002-2003 
school year, 25 states reported that they did not have the expertise to provide 
technical assistance to identified districts and schools, and the number of states 
increased to 32 in 2004 and 2006. The chiefs‘ network provides a reference for 
SEAs to share struggles, learn from others‘ experience, and build a repertoire of 
strategies that is proven to work in other states. 
A few SEA officials mentioned their working relationship with the U.S. 
Department of Education mostly in the context of federal monitoring and the 
inflexibility of NCLB. NCLB has been assailed as an encroachment on states‘ 
authority over K-12 education.  Murphy (1991) uses Title I programs as an 
example to argue that one problem with federal mandates having little impact on 
improving education lies in the resistance from state staff to fully comply with the 
federal mandates; the top-down approach to regulate school systems is in conflict 
with the view of state staff who see themselves as professional educators. The 
pushback from SEAs is most evident in a comment by State6 Superintendent on 
the responsibility of compliance with NCLB: 
… it is their (the U.S. Department‘s) responsibility to make it 
possible for us to be in compliance with No Child Left Behind 
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although we‘re going to have some differences of opinion about what 
that compliance means, but it‘s their job not ours … the whole 
relationship between the U.S. Department of Education and the state 
education agency is not a partnership, and they don‘t know how to 
create a partnership, it‘s got to be an equal partnership and if there is 
to be a senior partner it has to be the state not the feds. They should 
do a lot more listening to what it is that we think needs to be done 
instead of them worrying about the absolute compliance of the letter 
of the law. … I don‘t see any change in the relationships or the 
culture that goes across our two agencies. 
 
State2, State4 and State9 officials also reported the lack of support, 
feedback and partnership from the U.S. Department of Education. They were not 
particularly optimistic that under the working culture at the state or the federal 
level the partnership was going to be a reality. The State 7 commissioner 
commented, 
My commissionership is dedicated to the states being responsible. So 
I‘m a complete advocate for the pressure that the feds are bringing to 
the states, but I don‘t think they have accepted the fact that if you 
understand that and that states weren‘t doing that and they don't‘ have 
the habits of organization to do it then don‘t assume just by saying it 
louder I‘m gonna do it. I need a little help here. 
 
A recent report by the National Conference of State Legislatures (2010) warned 
that the education agenda under the Obama administration is equally prescriptive, 
compliance-driven and intrusive. In many cases, states had to change their laws to 
get an edge in the competition for the Race to the Top grant. On one hand, such 
compliance reflects what McDonnell (2008) calls parallel institutional histories 
where the policy histories of the federal and the state government showed similar 
institutional phases and policy goals. On the other hand, such compliance does not 
necessarily generate the commitment and passion that is needed for SEAs to take 
care of schools and students. It becomes an end in and of itself and would fail the 
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purpose of SBA if SEAs meet the regulations without making contributions to 
develop a system-wide infrastructure to help the growth of students.  
Motivation for Change 
The change in SEAs is mainly driven and shaped by three sources of 
demands – the policy environment, peer pressure and local competition. The first 
and foremost motivation for change is the demand from state and federal 
mandates accompanied by flat funding and reduction in staffing and resources. 
The concepts of state accountability and alignment to state standards raise the 
age-old dilemma and debate of local control in American public education. 
Especially for states with a tradition of strong local control where people are 
fiercely protective of their local decision-making, SEAs have had to make 
changes in their role, function, structure and partnership with districts and other 
organizations in order to fulfill what state and federal laws have required them to 
do. In the meantime, the funding for SEAs to lead the change has been inadequate. 
The number of states reporting hiring freezes or funding cutbacks increased from 
30 in 2003 to 37 in 2004. During the restructuring of identified schools, SEAs 
employed a series of strategies such as organizing school support teams, 
identifying distinguished teachers, giving special grants to districts, mentoring or 
coaching principals and teachers, and providing educational or management 
consultants and additional full-time school-based staff to support activities. Figure 
7 shows the funding streams for SEAs to carry out these strategies as reported in 
2006. It showcases SEA‘s heavy reliance on federal funding to play its leadership 
role under NCLB. For instance, federal Title I money was the only financial 
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resource available for school support teams in 23 states and for special grants to 
districts in 25 states.  
 
Figure 7. Number of states reporting funding sources for state programs. 
  
 The 2006 survey also showed that only ten states found the federal Title I school 
improvement funds sufficient to improve student achievement in identified 
schools, and almost half of the states (23) did not have state-funded programs to 
assist low-performing schools. SEAs had to work with flat federal funding but, at 
the same time, respond to the increasing number of identified schools to fulfill its 
responsibilities under NCLB. In many cases, it was not optional but imperative 








































Many SEAs that experienced state budget deficits also faced personnel 
cuts and programmatic challenges. One SEA noted on the survey that the State 
faced such a fiscal impasse that the education budget passed six months late, 
requiring school districts to borrow or use reserves to maintain programs. The 
situation seemed to get better in 2006 as the number of states reporting fiscal 
problems dropped from 30 in 2003 to 21.  
Although the current public debate about education accountability was 
mostly triggered by the enactment of NCLB in 2002, many SEAs initiated their 
state data and accountability efforts under the influence of state education reform 
initiatives prior to NCLB. In State4, the state‘s Education Reform Act had the 
SEA reorganize its program to respond to the state law‘s call for improving public 
education. State5‘s School Improvement Programs also started in early 1990s and 
established a much more comprehensive accountability system over time. State7 
has had its state accountability system as a response to its reform law in 1997 for 
standards, testing, intervention, accountability, public report cards, and 
disaggregation. State8 and State9 also started state testing for accountability 
purposes under the influence of state initiatives.  
The increasing demands from state and federal SBA policies not only 
redefined the SEAs‘ function, but also gave SEAs new sources of power. In 
State3, for instance, after the state‘s Education Reform Act was enacted in 1990, 
the state legislature made a $1 billion tax increase to support the reform, and the 
money went to state organizations such as teachers‘ unions that were then willing 
to make some compromise for the new financial resource. According to the 
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interviewed SEA official, the buying effects did not last long before some of the 
organizations pushed back on changes in the governance structure in education, 
but the political turf battle eventually settled down as the department‘s leadership 
role was institutionalized over time. It took the State3 department six years to roll 
out all the components of the state accountability system and even more years for 
implementation. By the time NCLB came to be effective, SEA‘s leadership role in 
State3 was already established and its partnership was also well formed.  
With the increasing number of identified schools, the leveling off of 
student achievement and the persistent achievement gaps, SEAs continued to 
adjust because they were not getting the results they anticipated. Even for states 
with a history of state testing and accountability systems, organization-wide 
changes are still needed to integrate systems and improve operations to meet the 
pressing expectations of SBA. The institutional shift to SBA intensified SEAs‘ 
work and forced them to make adjustments to be more efficient with the available 
resources. For example, State2 officials described their experience under NCLB 
as follows: 
… with the responsibilities that we now have because of NCLB, we 
have had to insist that our staff maintain a very strong focus on the 
supports …for our districts and charter schools. As opposed to 
something… that would be nice to do, but not necessarily a have to 
do, and certainly not necessarily something that‘s going to give you 
as much pay off as we need.  … the biggest thing is the timing of 
when things get done. There‘s much greater pressure to get things 
done, but faster with NCLB. 
 
In many ways, NCLB intensified SEAs‘ work and shifted their role to a facilitator 
of change and reform, but it did not cause a total revamping as many state reforms 
had done in the ‗90s. For states that did not have accountability systems before 
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NCLB, the impact of the federal law could be tremendous. However, most of the 
interviewed SEAs, regardless of their history with SBA, are funded mostly by 
their state government, but a significant portion of their work is for NCLB. It may 
be another reason for SEA officials to give credit to state reforms for their 
organizational change.  
The second motivation for change comes from competition and imitation 
among SEAs. One example would be state performance on national tests. Many 
state comparisons are based on the NAEP test results. Pressure can be high for 
states with low test scores on the national tests or if student performance differs 
greatly between state and national tests. The public questioning about the 
reliability of the test scores and validity of the state tests may challenge SEAs‘ 
leadership in raising student achievement as well as their capacity to carry out 
functions such as test administration and school intervention. A State1 
superintendent, whose state performance on NAEP is in the bottom ten, was 
concerned about evaluation of SEAs based on the comparison of student 
performance on national tests and considered a lack of funding a major setback 
for his SEA to make progress on improving student performance.  
SEAs have watched each other make policy decisions. Once a policy lever, 
such as state testing, becomes widely adopted as standard practice, SEAs are 
somewhat pushed to follow suit. States without such practices often have to 
explain their reasons. One of the interviewed SEAs did not have a state test, and 
its department had to constantly defend their assessment system and explain to 
their state legislature that a single state test was not necessarily a valid way to 
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measure learning. ―There are some who think that (a single state test) is the only 
way to do it,‖ the state official said, ―we‘re saying no; that‘s the least valid way to 
measure learning and the tension comes up from time to time between our 
assessment system and what every other state is doing.‖ Instead, the state 
promotes a localized system of academic standards and student assessments. In 
order to convince the other interest groups in the state and the U.S. Department of 
Education, by 2007 the state SEA had trained more than 110 educators to help 
validate the local assessment systems.  
Peer pressure is also illustrated by the integration of standard setting. A 
national survey by Education Week found that states pay close attention to their 
peers‘ policy changes (Robelen, 2010). Among the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia, 16 states were cited as influencing standards of other states and 3 states 
were cited 10 times or more. The study concludes: 
Many states look to their neighbors to inform the writing and 
rewriting of their own academic-content standards. In fact, 30 states 
were cited as influencing the way in which their peers defined 
expectations for student learning and performance in either 
English/language arts or mathematics. The standards of California, 
Indiana, and Massachusetts were most frequently mentioned as 
models, with each cited at least 10 times by other states. 
 
Last but not least, competition with local districts for staff motivates 
organizational change in SEAs. Although SEAs‘ leadership has been highlighted 
in the current policy environment and the local decision power is quickly 
evaporating in some districts, the diminishing resources at the state and federal 
level make SEAs uncompetitive with many local districts in terms of technical 
knowledge and relations with local schools. It is common that SEAs do not have 
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sufficient funds to maintain a competitive edge with the highest paying districts. 
The wage competition directly relates to the staff changes in SEAs. Sometimes 
SEAs cannot get the expertise that they need because of salary issues; sometimes 
SEAs have the expertise and invest in growth but then a district with a higher 
salary structure hires staff away. State4 officials described the external 
competition for high-quality staff this way: 
We‘re not having a problem attracting them. For every job, we get 
plenty of applicants. Being able to actually close the deal and hire 
top-quality people and keep them is a big problem. We lose people 
all the time to either local districts or better-paying jobs elsewhere. 
 
In State5, a math consultant could go out and made about $8,000 to $10,000 more 
in a school district, given credit for their SEA experience. Besides staffing, 
competition with districts also exists between the state and the local data systems. 
A State9 official explained:  
… in any event, however, we put [the teacher identifier and student 
data] together, we‘re never going to be able to match the level of 
utility that local school systems will have out of it because they can 
go far beyond anything that we would be putting in whatever limited 
number of fields we have in the state system… 
 
As some districts are better at attracting staff, SEAs borrow experts from districts 
to provide technical assistance to help improve low-performing schools. Beside 
the competition edge in staff expertise, local districts tend to have stronger ties 
with local schools and better knowledge about the schools. Both technical 
capacity and the local network make districts valuable partners for SEAs to bring 




Previously, I looked at how SEAs changed internally in terms of their 
structure, staffing and data systems. SEAs managed to make these changes 
through two means –networking to expand organizational capacity and 
collaborating across structural levels to improve efficiency. Through extensive 
networking, SEAs were able to fill new positions to meet changing organizational 
needs. The commonly used strategy to borrow expertise from districts changed 
the composition of people working for SEAs. It accommodates limited state 
funding and is an effective solution to handle immediate needs. However, districts 
are less likely to release their key staff to others, especially for a relatively long 
period of time. State5 officials gave the following example: 
…they‘re [districts are] more than willing to come up and attend 
meetings, and committees that we have, but again, that‘s a district 
employee, and some schools are reluctant to release those people for 
a significant amount of time. 
 
Therefore, SEAs had to extend the staffing network beyond public school systems 
for hard-to-staff positions. For example, to fill positions to build the state data 
system, State1 officials sought help from corporations, while State10 officials 
found the right people for three deputy vacancies by making the search in a P16 
framework. The network strategy allows SEAs to adjust for their new roles with 
the appropriate human capital.  
Besides networking for personnel purposes, SEAs have also created new 
relationships across organizational structures to improve operational efficiency. 
The breakdown of organizational hierarchies has not only made internal 
communication less time-consuming but also increased internal collaboration and 
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flexibility to handle the increasing workload from the state and federal mandates. 
A State6 official described their strategy this way: 
…we left the teams intact; I‘m not sure our teams would look any 
different than most others, but it‘s the place where people work out of 
special education or early childhood and so forth. 
 
In other words, although each individual working unit did not experience dramatic 
change, the interaction among staff across units has intensified. The special 
education issues, for example, are not simply the responsibility of the unit in 
charge of special education. They are being solved outside the unit together with 
staff in other units. The strategy is to expand teamwork from within-section to 
cross-section so the organizational responsibilities can be better communicated 
and shared, and the resources can also be shared and utilized more effectively. 
One of the State2 officials recalled that the data unit of the department in the past 
rarely shared data with other units, but now the data ownership has been widely 
distributed not only within the state Department of Education but also with 
districts and schools. There is a greater understanding at both the state and local 
level to make data-informed decisions. A State8 official also witnessed the 
improvement of cross-section collaboration in her department, driven by the goals 
pushed by NCLB for student achievement. She reported that, prior to NCLB, 
certain parts of the agency were silo and not necessarily connected to the 
improvement of student achievement. The federal law‘s emphasis on student 
achievement made cross-divisional and integrated teamwork inevitable so the 
agency could meet the expectations for the achievement of all students. The State 
6 official described the change in the culture of his workplace this way: 
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… No Child Left Behind became everybody‘s job… we do cross-
group work teams and the work gets done in a group. Oftentimes they 
meet and say, ―do we have an agenda?‖, and if they do they meet and 
if they don‘t they go back to their work sites…I don‘t think anybody 
can even remember doing isolated problems… I don‘t think anybody 
can remember doing things like NCLB or integrating a continuous 
progress process by themselves. Nobody sits by themselves anymore. 
 
Cross-section collaboration is also used to reallocate resources externally. 
State6 replaced many of its centralized operations and distributed funding to 
regional centers to build a network of programs at the local level. The 
decentralization of operations not only financed districts to build needed programs 
but also increased the SEA‘s administrative efficiency by expanding the number 
of students the state funding could serve.  
Besides networking and cross-level collaboration as two strategies to 
make internal changes, SEAs also changed their external function with districts 
and schools by investing in local capacity building, including training the trainer, 
reviewing curriculum, using and interpreting data in school planning, and working 
with school districts on effective interventions with low performing schools. 
State1 cites the following example: 
I know XX state had done some growth model work that went back 
to mid-90s, way before the law [NCLB], but most states had not and 
we were in the ―had not‖ category, and it has really caused us to 
spend a lot of time-well worth time but a lot of time – training people 
in the local districts on how to better interpret data that we now can 
provide them. That‘s been a massive training project within itself so 
that‘s time consuming and costly, but then the additional contracts… 
 
NCLB‘s school improvement requirements ask states to use 2% of their 
federal Title I Part A fund for school improvement in 2002 and 2003 and 4% in 
2004 to 2007. Building district capacity is one of the strategies states have used to 
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meet these requirements. That has changed the relationship between SEAs and 
LEAs (McClure, 2005).The following excerpts from comments in the 2004 
survey illustrate how SEAs used district capacity building as a strategy to turn 
around low-performing schools: 
 
―The State Department of Education‘s model for providing 
assistance to schools in need of improvement has completely 
changed to that of providing ―district assistant teams‖ to build a 
district‘s capacity to assist schools. Because of the lack of 
sufficient federal and state funds for technical assistance, the State 
Department of Education does not have the staff to provide 
assistance to a little over 1500 schools. Working with 301 districts 
is possible.‖ 
 
―[The State Department of Education] provides additional financial 
resources to permit districts to expand local improvement 
initiatives and/or access outside technical assistance from the SEA 
or higher education institutions, private non-profit organizations, 
education service centers, or external experts.‖ 
 
―The SEA is meeting with a team from each district to review their 
consequences, requirements and timelines; working with the 
individual district to ensure the set asides; upon request assigning a 
coach to work with the district on developing an improvement plan 
and approving the plan.‖ 
 
―State school improvement funds were made available through 
intermediate districts to fund professional development activities 
for district needing improvement.‖ 
 
―The SEA provided an informational meeting for the districts in 
improvement, informing them of the requirements for Title I 
districts in improvement and the assistance the state will provide. 
After a district on-site audit, the state DOE (Department of 
Education) will develop a technical assistance with each district, if 
requested, designed to meet specific needs of each district. School 
Support Team members are assigned to each of the districts.‖ 
 
―The state has established an accountability model for school 
improvement in partnership with district staff members statewide 
and national experts. The foundation of this accountability model 
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is teacher training and district-level leadership development which 
has student achievement at their core.‖ 
 
The following survey in 2006 shows that 42 states were able to provide technical 
assistance to identified districts to a moderate or great extent. The strategy to beef 
up district capacity through state collaboration redefines SEAs‘ roles in many 
ways, particularly in states with a manageable number of districts. SEAs with 
more districts often have their regional delivery centers implement such a strategy. 
The rationale for this strategy is twofold.  First, the number of identified districts 
is more manageable compared to the number of identified schools. CEP‘s 2003 
and 2004 survey shows that the number of states with identified districts increases 
from 26 in the 2003-03 school year to 36 in 2003-04 school year, not including 11 
states in the process of identifying by the time the 2004 survey was delivered. The 
number of identified districts not making AYP for two or more consecutive years 
ranged from 0 to 81
4
, which is a much more manageable number compared to the 
number of identified schools in these districts. Another attraction of building 
district capacity is the possibility to build upon districts‘ existing capacity and 
make use of it for statewide reforms. As discussed earlier, districts can be more 
resourceful in knowledge, expertise and networks with schools, which SEAs often 
lack. Instead of building SEA‘s capacity, working with districts can make state 
reform more efficient and effective. A State9 official elaborated the rationale for 
the strategy in this way:  
…[we] want to be able to influence at a scale that can make a 
difference with…1,400 schools. So if we can work at the central 
office level and have them deliver the services, then there‘s 
                                                 
4 Some states use spring 2004 to establish baseline data under NCLB. Therefore, no districts were identified 
by SEAs for two consecutive years.  
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somebody there all the time carrying that message out, and there are 
some systems that are excellent and do that quite well.  
 
Neo-institutional theorists argue that the external networking process can be an 
effective strategy for organizations to manipulate the environment and, in the 
meantime, gain legitimacy (Scott, 2008). What the external networking strategy 
does is to build SEAs‘ goals and procedures as institutional rules for the local 
operation of schools.  
Lastly, the strategy of investing in district capacity preserves the power of 
district offices and eases the tension of aggressive state intervention in identified 
schools. The strategy of building district capacity redirects the financial 
distribution of state funding to districts and shapes the allocation of SEA staff and 
SEAs‘ relationships with districts and contract vendors. It augments SEAs‘ 
leadership role without sacrificing too much local control. Less intrusive, SEAs 
soften their roles by coordinating and facilitating learning and exchange of 
experience among districts. A State2 official explained the rationale: 
…[districts] don‘t necessarily do it on their own, but if they come 
together and we‘re able to kind of begin the conversation, it‘s more 
likely that they will share and so forth and work together than 
otherwise. 
 
Before NCLB, 19 states mandated low-performing schools to receive state 
assistance. The number increased to 38 in 2010 (Education Week, 2010). The 
assistance teams often consist of local educators and SEA staff and provide 
workshops to convene educators to share experience (Education Week, 1999; 
Richard, 2005). A State8 official described the work process this way: 
… we brought together educators and citizens and professional 
organization representatives from throughout the state to develop our 
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state system of support. And our state system of support developed 
by this group from the field telling us what really is needed. … it 
consists of an assessment of need and then a peer review so that there 
can be technical assistance given based on that assessment. … from 
that point, we target the funds that are provided under the law to help 
and assist schools identified for improvement. 
 
States adopting this strategy, however, do not necessarily provide 
sufficient investment or deliver the investment as effectively as districts would 
like. Some SEAs do not have needed human and financial resources to build 
district capacity. As shown in CEP‘s 2003 survey, 25 states indicated that they did 
not have sufficient in-house expertise to provide technical assistance to schools 
and districts that had been identified as needing improvement; the number 
increased to 32 in 2004 plus 10 other states that had the capacity in 2004 but 
expressed concerns about the future as NCLB became fully implemented. In the 
2006 survey, 43 states reported that insufficient numbers of staff moderately or 
greatly challenged their capacity to monitor the activities of districts that had 
schools in improvement, corrective action, or restructuring. Inadequate federal 
and state funds were also cited by 39 and 34 states respectively as challenges. 
Similar state reporting is found in regards to challenges to provide technical 
assistance to identified districts. It is not surprising that district complaints about 
lack of state support and guidance may tell the other side of the story. 
Conclusion 
Findings of the study show that SEAs have made multiple organizational 
changes in their internal structure, staffing and technology as well as external 
relations. Specifically, the traditional funding-centered structure of organizational 
hierarchy, illustrated by the relocation of  a Title I office, has broken down, 
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replaced by a new structure centered around accountability tasks, such as 
standards, assessment, accountability and professional development to better 
address the emerging needs for expanded internal collaboration.  
Although SEAs have experienced increasing amounts of responsibilities 
from both state and federal laws, many did not have the corresponding growth in 
their capacity in terms of staffing, expertise and funding. Limited funding made it 
difficult for SEAs to maintain expertise and sufficient numbers of staff. Quite a 
few SEAs have shrunk considerably in size during recent state economic 
downturns. Changes in the institutional environment also changed the nature of 
SEA staff‘s work to be more compliant. In the meantime, the emphasis on 
technology and data systems has pushed SEAs to bring more technical expertise 
in information technology and data management. As a solution to imbalanced 
resource supply and demand, SEAs tend to contract external staff for specific 
projects, which has changed the overall composition of SEA staff.  
The development, the modernization and the expansion of data systems 
signify major changes in the use of technology. Since states have different 
histories with education data systems, the accounts of the changing experience in 
using technology addressed different stages of the change. Consequently, the 
organization-wide changes in data system mean expansion to some SEAs, but to 
others it brought about dramatic change in the infrastructure, building from 
ground zero. However, regardless of differences in experience with data systems, 
the states all went through changes to meet the specific demands of the current 
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federal and state requirements and to more effectively incorporate data in policy 
decision-making.  
Externally, SEAs expanded their partnerships dramatically to carry out 
their changing roles and, at the same time, make up for the limited resources. 
SEAs‘ relationship with districts has shown a collaborative trend, changing SEAs‘ 
role from regulatory oversight to partnership and assistance providers. As the 
private sector was more involved as partners in SEAs‘ external network, 
overseeing private contractors became a new responsibility that challenged many 
SEAs. Last but not least, the network among SEAs provided a valuable resource 
for SEAs‘ development.  
Organizational changes in SEAs have been, in many ways, shaped by the 
increasing institutional demands and decreasing resources, peer pressure to adopt 
the ―standard‖ practice in the field, and the competition from other collaborating 
educational agencies. Particularly, SEAs used networking, cross-level 
collaboration and local capacity building as strategies to bring about 
organizational changes. Through networking, SEAs were able to build a 
consensus with other agencies and expand their capacity to carry out increasing 
responsibilities but with limited personnel. Cross-level collaboration helped SEAs 
make internal changes to improve operational efficiency and make the most use of 
their limited resources. Lastly, building local capacity allowed SEAs to develop 
new relationships with local schools and districts and, in the meantime, take 
advantage of local resources for state accountability.  
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In the following chapter, I will discuss how evidence of changes illustrated 
in this chapter validates the organizational change model proposed in section two. 
I will also discuss implications of the study and directions for future study on 




 Chapter 6: Discussion and Implications 
The analysis in the previous chapter indicates that state education agencies 
(SEAs) have experienced varied degrees and types of change in organizational 
structures, staff composition, technology capacity, and relationships with other 
state and local government entities.   
The motivation for change was multi-faceted. The most salient factors 
identified in this study include 1) the tightening of state budgets and 2) the 
pressure from the state and federal policy change toward standards-based 
accountability (SBA). Competition among states through national assessment also 
played a role but was not a major factor for states.  
State employed three common strategies to bring about change – networking, 
cross-level collaboration, and building upon local capacity. The choice of strategy 
reflects the changing role of SEAs in the state education system; it becomes clear 
to more states that local support and extended partnerships are indispensable to 
their leadership role in the standards-based accountability (SBA) reform. Given 
the limited resources and increasing obligations, SEAs also prioritized the 
optimization of their operations, improving the efficiency of their internal 
communication and the sharing of information.  
The knowledge of organizational changes in SEAs provides two major 
implications. First, based on neo-institutional theories, the proposed theoretical 
framework provides a helpful perspective to understand the adaptive nature and 
the changing patterns of institutionalized organizations, such as SEAs. Second, 
the SBA policy has changed the landscape of the U.S. education system and its 
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impact is not limited to the end receivers of the policies at local schools but 
extends to policy delivery organizations, such as SEAs, on their function, 
structures and partnerships. It redefined the role of educational agencies at the 
federal, state and district levels and, more importantly, relationships across levels. 
Revisiting the Theoretical Framework for Organizational Change 
SBA‘s focus on school improvement and student achievement sheds more 
light on policy than the infrastructure and network of policy delivery 
organizations that make policy initiatives happen. One of the purposes of this 
study was to draw more attention to the overlooked policy delivery organizations 
in the education system and to examine the impact of institutional change on such 
organizations. SEAs were chosen to be the subject of this study because they are 
institutionalized educational organizations that have become the linchpin between 
federal policy and school performance; however, little is known about their 
experience in playing that role. The changes that occurred in SEAs reflect the 
shifting landscape of the education system and the demanding restructuring 
process inside the policy delivery organizations.  
The theoretical framework for this study was derived from concepts in neo-
institutional theories where organization is considered an open system that 
constantly adapts to survive in the institutional environment. The framework 
hypothesizes that institutional changes generate legitimation or competition 
demands that require organizations to change. Legitimation demands encourage 
isomorphism where organizations become similar to one another while 
competition demands tend to lead organizations to become more diffuse. For 
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institutionalized organizations, such as SEAs, legitimation demands are of greater 
interest and, therefore, the focus of the study. Institutionalized organizations can 
achieve isomorphism through change mechanisms such as loose coupling or 
adaptation.  The former tends to lead to symbolic changes while the latter 
generates more substantive changes in organizations. The organizational field can 
be transformed when changes at the organization level reach a certain scale. Such 
field-level change has a collective power to shape or reconstruct the institutional 
environment. The phenomenon of organizational changes in SEAs validates the 
framework in the following aspects: 
1. Changes in institutional environment give rise to legitimation 
demands. 
2. Such legitimation demands encourage isomorphism among 
organizations. 
3. The process of change can be simultaneously substantive and 
symbolic. 
4. The changing field of SEAs has informed the reauthorization of 
federal policies and reshaped the institutional environment. 
Changes in institutional environment give rise to legitimation demands.  
Meyer and colleagues (1980) argue that educational organizations are 
reflections of institutional rules concerning education. These rules create an 
environment through political process, regulations and formal policies. The 
organizational change of SEAs is an example of such influence. Under the 
influence of SBA, state and federal policies shifted the focus on education from 
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governmental input to school outcome, which requires SEAs to do more than 
oversee the distribution of resources. In chapter three, I described the increasing 
institutional orientation toward standards, assessment and accountability in 
education. Federal and state SBA-oriented policies and politics pushed SEAs to 
play leadership roles in setting standards, delivering standardized assessments and 
implementing accountability policies to accelerate school improvement. SEAs are 
expected not only to fulfill the administrative function in channeling federal funds 
but also to monitor school progress. The emphasis on assessment and 
accountability requires SEAs to expand their technical capacity in order to 
establish a comprehensive data system to monitor and evaluate progress in school 
improvement. They are also challenged to provide technical assistance to districts 
and to intervene in schools directly. Last but not least, the entitled leadership role 
in SBA reform sets the expectations for SEAs to be able to work effectively with 
local districts and schools as well as other state constituents as education becomes 
a political priority and power struggle.  
To accommodate the new role, SEAs had to optimize their internal structure, 
adjust composition of their staff and develop new external networks and 
partnerships, as discussed in chapter five. SEAs, as institutionalized organizations, 
are bounded by the regulations and obligations that define the environment in 
which they exist. Changes in the institutional environment in the last two decades 
have pushed SEAs to reorganize themselves. A survey study by CCSSO showed 
that 41 states took actions to reorganize their state education agencies during state 
systemic reforms in the 1990s (Lindsay, 1995). Findings in this study provide 
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evidence of how SEAs have changed to respond to the policy momentum as 
represented by NCLB. The changing definition of what SEAs are supposed to do - 
in other words, what makes SEAs legitimate in the changing institutional 
environment - gives the quintessential rationale for organizational changes in 
SEAs. 
Legitimation demands encourage isomorphism among organizations.  
Driven by institutional rules and mandates, the way organizations change is 
not to diversify but to simulate and standardize. When organizations in a field 
become more similar to one another in their role and structure, organizational 
isomorphism takes place.  In the case of SEAs, a few isomorphic changes have 
been observed. First and foremost is that SEAs are taking on the leadership role in 
school reform. The power struggle between local districts and SEAs has been a 
source of tension in state reforms. With different state histories and cultures, the 
role of SEAs varies greatly from state to state. As SBA reform picked up 
momentum in state and national politics, particularly with the enactment of No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB), SEAs became the designated leaders to orchestrate 
the reform.  
The organization of SEAs was also pushed to resemble some key 
characteristics of their institutional environment. With more policy emphasis on 
market-driven efficiency and output, SEAs showed a general structural pattern 
where main divisions under the state superintendent‘s office were organized 
around assessment, accountability, and professional development. They also used 
similar strategies to achieve organizational efficiency, such as decreasing middle 
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management and staff, increasing communication and collective responsibilities 
across units, and extending the use of technology for information management.  
The last resemblance among SEAs in the process of change is the 
recognition of the importance to build partnerships and network with other 
interest groups and among themselves. It was clear to SEAs that the past tendency 
to do it alone would not serve their new leadership role in SBA reform. On one 
hand, the new leadership role requires SEAs to be able to maneuver and 
coordinate interest groups to implement the reform ideas; on the other hand, SEAs 
need a network of partners to augment their organizational capacity.  
The isomorphic change in SEAs is a combination of regulatory, normative 
and mimetic practices that are used to help establish SEAs‘ legitimacy to play the 
entitled leadership roles. The three isomorphic characteristics are closely 
associated with SEA‘s need to respond to the SBA momentum in education. The 
SBA-inclined policies at both state and federal level put SEAs under pressure to 
impose standards, standardized assessments and accountability systems. To play 
the new roles, SEAs set up new infrastructures to perform the assessment and 
accountability functions and optimize their operation with the limited resources 
that were available to them. The establishment of accountability offices, for 
example, was not an option chosen by SEAs, but a requirement in order for SEAs 
to comply with the coerced state or federal mandates.  
This regulatory change also inspired pressures for normative changes in 
skills expected of SEA staff and the composition of professionals working in 
SEAs. The increasing duties to provide assistance to local schools and districts 
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created greater demands for non-administrative staff who could contribute to the 
organizational knowledge in instruction, curriculum, school management, testing 
and data system management. The increasing staff in these areas is another 
feature of isomorphic change across SEAs.  
Last but not least, facing uncertainties in policy implementation, SEAs also 
developed a sense of community where they learned from each others‘ experience 
in leading school reform and enhancing in-house capacities. The learning process 
resulted in certain resemblance among SEAs, but in most cases it generated new 
hybrids of organizational characteristics, such as SEA‘s structure and approach to 
play their leadership role. For example, under the pressure for regulatory and 
normative changes stated above, the mimetic isomorphism among SEAs is 
particularly apparent in building comprehensive and informative data systems.  
The isomorphic changes summarized above, however, do not mean that 
SEAs are similar or identical to each other. Despite isomorphic changes, SEAs 
remain different in many aspects and follow different paths in pursuing similar 
ends.  For example, along with the isomorphic changes are the diverse approaches 
SEAs took to claim their new role, reorganize themselves, and build and extend 
external relationships. In some states, SEAs historically play leadership roles 
through mandated state assessments and accountability systems; some claimed 
their leadership roles through state initiatives in the 90s and others through the 
federal push in NCLB. States with a history of SBA-oriented leadership had a 
relatively smoother internal restructuring process than states that started changing 
as a response to NCLB. State politics also made both the internal and external 
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reorganization different experiences for SEAs. Some were more aggressive in 
intervening in schools and districts; some took more gentle approaches through 
the mediation of resources and collaboration. Following the proposition in neo-
institutional theories that a competitive environment encourages organizational 
diffusion, the divergence in SEAs‘ approaches to standards-based accountability 
is likely to continue under the current federal strategy of state competition for 
Race to the Top and i3 funds.  
The isomorphic characteristics identified in this study reveal changes 
beneath the diversity among SEAs. First and foremost, the institutional 
expectation on standardized-based accountability from both state and federal 
government is a major force driving the organizational changes in SEAs. Such 
expectation not only required increasing leadership responsibilities to SEAs but 
also redefined what a legitimate SEA should and can do; however, the 
legitimation demands were neither matched with SEAs‘ capacities nor clearly 
defined as to how SEAs could meet the institutional expectation to improve the 
education system through standards-based accountability. The how-to step 
became a black box with no description, and diffusion became inevitable for 
SEAs to do whatever they could to survive the new institutional environment as 
legitimate organizations. In the process, SEAs made similar changes in 
consolidating organizational structures and recomposing staff because these 
changes followed the logic of maximizing organizational capacities to fulfill 
SEAs‘ increasing responsibilities, but with limited resources. SEAs also upgraded 
their information systems as it is part of the institutional expectation. 
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Similarly, since there was no clear description of how to construct an 
effective data system, SEAs ended up with data systems with diverse features. 
SEAs also took different approaches to claim their leadership role and applied 
strategies in their own ways to adapt to the local context. These signs of diffusion 
indicate that legitimation demands lead to organizational diffusion under two 
conditions: 1) when there is no sufficient knowledge as to how to respond to the 
demands and 2) whenever it is possible to localize the demands, i.e., to 
appropriate legitimation demands to the organizational status quo and its local 
context.  As individual SEAs go through the change process where isomorphism 
and diffusion intertwine with each other, the field of SEAs as a whole has grown 
to be a powerful voice in shaping education reform and adjusting institutional 
expectations for education.  
Isomorphic change and diffusion of SEAs are two sides of the same coin; it 
would not be sufficient to tell either side of the story without informing the other.   
SEAs may go through similar processes of change but remain different as a result 
of negotiation and mutual adaptation between an organization‘s existing status 
and the intended change. The neo-institutional theories emphasize convergence 
and isomorphism under the influence of legitimation demands, but the mutual 
adaptation that produced a hybrid of new organizational structures indicates that 
legitimation demands can result in diversity among organizations as well. Some 
recent theoretical and empirical studies argue that legitimation demands may not 
necessarily lead to isomorphism but rather contribute to organizational diffusion 
(Beckert, 2010; Kraatz & Zamac, 1996; Washington & Ventresca, 2004). In the 
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case of SEAs, the process of isomorphic change does not result in an 
organizational prototype. Rather, a hybrid of change and existing organizational 
features is more likely to be created in the end through local adaptation. It is 
particularly true for institutionalized organizations with different histories and 
cultures, such as SEAs, where change is oftentimes conditioned on the existing 
infrastructures that can vary greatly across states.   
The process of change can be simultaneously substantive and symbolic in terms of 
tactics. 
Some believe that the main reason that NCLB gained bipartisan support was 
the fact that state initiatives did not bring school progress as quickly as expected, 
which led to a suspicion that state reforms did not bring substantive change that 
actually contributed to school improvement. For instance, a four-year study on 
state-initiated reforms in graduation requirements showed that such state-level 
reform initiatives were largely symbolic to pacify public dissatisfaction with 
educational outcomes (Wilson & Rossman, 1993). A report by the National 
Governors‘ Association also suggested that the piecemeal type state reform prior 
to the early 1990s did not make comprehensive changes in the education system 
regardless of the policy inclination toward school accountability (National 
Governors Association, 1991). Another example of the dispute over SEAs‘ 
change evolved around the state provision of assistance. All the interviewed states 
and the majority of the survey states reported their states‘ efforts to provide 
assistance to districts, but many research and media reports based on districts‘ 
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reporting tell a different story.  Did SEAs only make symbolic changes to meet 
NCLB‘s requirements? 
Organizational inertia is a driving force behind symbolic change in 
institutionalized organizations. Potential causes of inertia in SEAs can be 
knowledge and skill obsolescence, the bureaucratic organizational structure, and 
limited resources. Under the influence of organizational inertia, it is likely that 
organizations take symbolic change as a strategy to adapt to the new institutional 
environment, without any substantive changes. Symbolic change is also a likely 
result of loose coupling where the autonomy of individual units blocks the impact 
of system-wide change and leaves the functioning and operation of working units 
in an organization untouched.  
Organizational changes through loose coupling and adaptation are often 
portrayed as mutually exclusive. In reality, however, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate the two types of change process and to determine the 
nature of a specific change action to be substantial or symbolic. Two issues pose 
major challenges to differentiate the two forms of change. First, organizational 
changes tend to take place over a relatively long period of time during which 
changes can be easily overlooked. Gradual changes, particularly, tend to leave 
subtle traces in the organization although their cumulative effects over time can 
be significant. Second, even some intended symbolic change may help build up 
the change process and lead to more substantive changes in the organization over 
time. Therefore, instead of distinguishing between symbolic and substantive 
change, I would argue that these two forms of adaptations are not dichotomized 
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and static in the process of organizational change; rather, they may take turns and 
feed each other to allow organizations to respond to institutional environment 
changes in a flexible manner.  
For example, although SEAs that had SBA-oriented reforms in the 1990s 
did not experience changes as dramatic as what happened to them after the 
enactment of NCLB, most of them were better prepared for implementing the 
federal law than states starting from ground zero. Regardless if change under state 
initiatives came at a slower rate or was simply symbolic, it prepared SEAs to 
make substantive changes to quickly respond to the federal push for SBA. Most of 
the interviewed state officials said that their organizational changes were driven 
by state reform initiatives; the federal law only accelerated the changes that were 
already taking place in these states. In this sense, the seemingly slow and minor 
changes under state reform initiatives in the 1990s prepared SEAs to make 
changes swiftly to respond to federal mandates under NCLB.  
Either symbolic change through loose coupling or substantive change 
through adaptation may leave marks on organizations and propel organizational 
changes to respond to new institutional environment. The naming of a complex 
changing process becomes subjective taking into consideration that most of the 
time only certain aspects of change can be perceived and understood at the time of 
change.  
For example, there has been criticism about inefficiency and incapacity in 
communicating within SEAs as well as between SEAs and local districts/schools. 
SEA officials, however, reported quite commonly about their efforts on 
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improving their organizations‘ communication efforts. If we assume that both 
sides are telling the truth about their experience in the SBA reform, what SEAs 
officials perceived as substantive change, such as the increasing awareness of and 
practices in cross-level communication as well as their intensified collaborative 
efforts within SEAs and with external constituents, may be best described as 
symbolic by others.  
In addition to different perspectives on change, time may also redefine the 
nature of a particular organizational change. A symbolic change at one time can 
be the first step to a substantive change; a substantive change perceived at one 
time may only have symbolic meanings in a different institutional environment. 
Organizational changes in SEAs suggest that the forms of change are not an 
either-or; rather, they can be a combination of both symbolic change through 
loose coupling and substantive change through adaptation. 
The changing field of SEAs has informed the reauthorization of federal policies. 
The proposed theoretical framework portrays organizational change as a 
dynamic process. On one hand, the institutional environment generates demands 
for change. On the other hand, massive changes in an organizational field may 
shape the institutional environment that governs the field.  
In the example of SEAs, the legitimation demands to lead SBA reform has 
pushed SEAs to change in many ways. In the meantime, the increasing leadership 
role has also made SEAs a powerful voice in shaping SBA policies. Some 
organization level change led to changes in the institutional rules directly. For 
example, regardless of the scripted federal requirements under NCLB, many 
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states pushed their agenda for meeting these requirements through alternative 
approaches. CEP‘s 2004 survey shows that, in the 2003-04 school year, 48 states 
proposed changes to their NCLB accountability plans to the U.S. Department of 
Education. Many of the proposed changes were concerned with particular 
technical guidance, such as the use of alternate assessments, the classification of 
schools making AYP, and alternative ways to meet NCLB‘s requirements 
especially for English language learners and students with disabilities. The U.S. 
Department of Education approved all proposed changes from 20 states and 
approved some changes from 27 states. One state was still waiting for a decision 
at the time. Based on SEAs‘ responses in the first year of implementing NCLB, 
the U.S. Department of Education adjusted certain regulations related to 
measuring AYP. States were permitted to use alternative achievement standards 
for students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, subject to a cap of 1% 
of all students assessed. States could seek exemptions to the 1% cap if they had a 
larger percentage of students with the most severe cognitive disabilities. Schools 
were not required to give limited English proficient students their states‘ regular 
reading tests if such students had been enrolled in U.S. schools for less than 10 
months prior to the assessment. Also states could count students who had become 
proficient in English within the past two years in their calculations of AYP for the 
limited English proficient subgroup. Additionally, states could average 
participation rates over a two or three year period if a school missed the federal 
threshold of 95% participation in its most recent round of testing (CEP, 2005).  
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These institutional changes were mostly driven by collective bargains from 
the organizational field of SEAs. In 2007, CCSSO, together with National 
Governors Association (NGA) and National Association of State Boards of 
Education (NASBE), made a joint statement on the reauthorization of NCLB. The 
three leading state associations called for more state authority and flexibility in 
designing accountability systems and for broadening the options to allow states to 
determine consequences and interventions. They also demanded sustained 
resources, technical assistance, and other supports for states to develop capacities 
to assist schools.  
SEAs have gained increasing recognition in recent years as an intermediate 
government agency to lead education reform. To fulfill the leadership role, 
however, SEAs need more resources and authority in decision-making. SEAs 
have sent clear messages to the U.S. Department of Education during the past 
eight years of NCLB demanding more resources to comply with the requirements 
of the federal law. The current federal Race to the Top and Innovation grants 
seem to echo SEAs‘ calls for providing more financial support on a competitive 
basis and allowing states to design reform plans within the framework of federal 
interests. With a historic $4 billion of federal money, Race to the Top is aimed at 
advancing state reforms in the areas of adopting standards and assessments, 
building data systems that measure student growth and inform instruction, 
strengthening the teacher and principal workforce, and turning around low-
achieving schools. The federal money has attracted considerable political 
attention to education in state politics when many states face a dire financial 
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outlook. In the process of policy transition to state competition, the importance of 
SEAs as a state government branch has been highlighted and elevated.  
In summary, the proposed theoretical framework based on institutional 
theories provides an informative way to examine SEAs as an executive branch 
that has adjusted itself in many ways to respond to the institutional inclination 
toward SBA reforms. The study of organizational changes of SEAs validates the 
institutional effects on organizations as well as the motivation and process of 
organizational change. It also implies the potential connection between 
legitimation demands and organizational diffusion and suggests the need for 
refinement of the dichotomized view on the symbolic and adaptive forms of 
change. Based on the findings of this study, the original theoretical framework 




Figure 8. Revised theoretical framework for organizational change. 
 
Figure 8 highlights competition demands that were grayed out in Figure 1 to 
address recent policy momentum toward state competition. Competition is not 
traditionally a source of demand for change for institutionalized organizations. 
However, the recent tie between state policy and federal monetary incentives 
brings competition among states to the center of current federal SBA reform 
initiatives. To include the competition demands in the framework not only makes 
the theoretical framework more comprehensive and up-to-date but also suggests 
potential directions for future research. 
Diffusion  
Changes in 




















Federal Policy Transition to Competition 
Besides legitimacy, institutional theories suggest competition to be another 
driving force for organizational change. The institutional effects of competition 
are mostly manifested by production organizations in their constant strive for 
shared resources. Sharing similar but limited resources is the greatest incentive for 
interorganizational competition (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; McPherson, 1983), 
and the performance of production organizations is often closely tied to their 
resources, such as market demands and partnership. For this reason, competition 
is less likely to be a concern for institutionalized organizations, such as 
government offices, because the availability of resources is independent of 
organizational performance.   
The recent competition-based federal programs, the Race to the Top and 
Innovation grants, create a competitive environment where federal funding is 
granted based on specific criteria for state education reform plans. These grants 
are believed to be a trial run for the reauthorization for NCLB (Klein, 2010), and 
proposals from the winning states in these competitions are expected to set the 
example for school reform in other states. The competitive element in the federal 
SBA reforms has shown impact on SEAs‘ role, function and relations with other 
interest groups. For example, a first round competition winner Tennessee 
proposed to establish an ―Achievement School District‖ to serve chronically low-
achieving schools and enlist non-profit providers to help improve them. The 
District is to be operated by the state and managed by the Tennessee Department 
of Education through contracting school services to nationally recognized non-
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profit organizations. To transform the education system from data-rich to data-
driven, Delaware will hire partners where the state needs to develop expertise. 
One example of such partnership is to hire data coaches to work with teachers and 
development coaches to work with principals. The State Secretary of Education 
has also begun reorganizing the Delaware Department of Education (DDOE) to 
expand its role and make it more accountable for results as measured by student 
achievement. The state will establish a Project Management Office (PMO) in the 
DDOE to lead the reform‘s implementation, which consists of three units, 
Performance Management Team, Teacher and Leader Effectiveness Unit, and 
Turnaround Group. The state proposal emphasizes the reform focus on impact not 
compliance, and the state promises to actively support local education agencies in 
the implementation process and build their capacity to deliver results.  
When the federal government announced the Race to the Top grant in 2009, 
many states decided to bypass applying for the first round of competition. One 
concern for states was the change they had to make to the state education policies 
in order to meet the competition guidelines (Robelen, 2010). The U.S. 
Department of Education favored states that allowed for flexible charter school 
growth, used merit-pay programs to evaluate teachers and principals, and 
implemented data systems to improve instruction. States need support from many 
interests groups, such as districts, teachers‘ unions, and the business community 
before making the decision whether to make changes to state policies and to 
participate in the competition.  Local support is also considered a precondition for 
winning the competitive grant, the partnership between SEAs and other interest 
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groups, such as teachers unions, districts and schools, is emphasized more than 
ever before. 
Few states that have won the federal grants have used the financial resource 
to replenish their in-house expertise; instead, they have tended to contract for 
external expertise and implementation services. These contractual services will 
help SEAs to consolidate data infrastructure and relations with local districts and 
schools through local capacity building. However, SEAs may still lack the 
capacity to directly provide technical assistance to districts and schools once the 
federal funding discontinues. It would be more sustainable for SEAs to continue 
optimizing operations and building up their capacities to establish leadership roles, 
but such proposals may not help states to win the grants.  
Race to the Top symbolizes the height of the federal investment in public 
education. It offers states a unique opportunity to gain political traction for 
changes in state education systems and to spur dramatic political will to pass state 
legislation on education reform (Kubach, 2010). Its approach shifts the pivotal 
point of the federal policy from pure compliance to compliance with competitive 
incentives. The new institutional environment, to some extent, is responsive to 
SEAs‘ call for flexibility, authority and federal support. It encourages SEAs to 
develop innovative policy models for school improvement and supports the 
implementation of the winning proposals. Federal programs, such as Race to the 
Top and i3 funds, have pushed state departments of education to move from the 
legitimation framework to competition. Although participation is voluntary, states, 
battling with recession, are lured by federal funding and more susceptible to adapt 
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to such institutional changes. However, the competitive approach has 
shortcomings. For instance, Brill (2010) reported the lack of evidence for vetters‘ 
scores on state proposals. States may have different capacities to develop 
proposals or align state policy and legislature to the federal funding requirements. 
For the winning states, the result of their proposed plans is unpredictable because 
of lack of empirical evidence. It is also unclear how the implementation of the 
winning proposal will be monitored and evaluated. 
Some institutional theorists argue that competition among organizations will 
lead to diffusion of organizational function, structure, operation, culture and other 
characteristics (Haveman, 1994; Swaminathan & Delacroix, 1991). The 
association between organizational diffusion and competition demands has been 
largely overlooked in neo-institutional theories, in contrast to the classical 
Weberian perspectives on competition fostering organizational bureaucracy. 
Empirical evidence in non-institutionalized or production organizations confirms 
the effects of competition on organizational change (Baum & Singh, 1994; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1989; McPherson, 1983). Barnett and Carroll (1995) 
described competition as the forgotten relative in the family – ―no one denies his 
rights on the matter, but then no one invites him to dinner either‖ (p. 223) – 
because competition was then inadequately examined in the study of 
organizational change. The theoretical framework proposed in chapter two 
follows the logic of neo-institutional theories and, therefore, focuses mainly on 
the connection between legitimation demands and isomorphism. Although 
competition was included in the framework, it was not highlighted because 
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competition demand was believed to be less relevant to institutionalized 
organizations, such as SEAs. The recent rise of state competition through the 
federal Race to the Top grant and i3 innovation grant, however, seems to tie 
competition closer to SEAs. This institutional change suggests that the theoretical 
framework needs to be updated to reflect new institutional demands for SEAs to 
lead SBA reform.   
In the recent state competition for federal grants, states presented diverse 
plans for state reform and assigned different functions for SEAs in implementing 
the plans. Some states make teacher and leader effectiveness the main theme 
while some focus on providing direct technical assistance. In addition to the 
priorities identified by the U.S. Department of Education, local support is another 
point strongly emphasized in the competition. Such support is often exemplified 
in a memorandum of understanding where districts and teacher unions agree to 
forfeit collective bargaining on the relevant term of pay and evaluation system for 
the grant money (Sawchuk & Maxwell, 2010). The diversified policy proposals 
may well lead to different paths of re-organization of SEAs in the implementation 
process.  
The federal preference for the competition mode maintains the compliance 
nature of the federal policy, which differentiates the state competition from 
business competition in a free market. The design of the 2009 Race to the Top 
grant seems to respond to the call for more flexibility for SEAs to play leadership 
roles by encouraging states to develop new policy models, but not without 
constraints from federal guidance. The shift of the federal policy to innovation 
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and competition remains compliance-driven. The grant competition follows 
selection criteria that have spurred some policy changes at the state level. Limited 
by the federal emphasis on charter schools and standards, states have to follow the 
federal logic in drafting their proposals for a greater chance of winning (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2009). While the outcome decides the winning 
of organizations in a free market competition, for the competition in an 
institutionalized environment, compliance to institutional rules is equally, if not 
more, important in winning the competition.  
Parallel to the Race to the Top grant competition, common standards 
reemerge as a catch phrase in the national forum. Forty-eight states have signed 
on to the Common Core State Standards Initiatives to better position themselves 
for the Race to the Top grant. Compared to their previous appearance in the early 
1990s, states show more buy-in and willingness to participate (Ravitch, 2010) — 
46 states agreed to join forces to create common academic standards in 
mathematics and English language arts in 2009 and 34 states agreed to adopt 
these standards as of August 6th, 2010 as part of their state policies to substitute 
the revision of states‘ own academic standards (McNeil, 2009; Sawchuk, 2010; 
Zehr, 2009). Although the adoption of common standards is voluntary, it is a 
prerequisite for applying for the federal Race to the Top funds and may well 
determine future Title I funding for states (Finn, 2010). The common standard 
requirement is another example that illustrates the compliance-driven nature of 




The implementation of SBA has not only driven organizational changes in 
SEAs but also shifted the power structure and the bureaucratic accountability in 
the educational system. Bureaucratic accountability refers to the accountability 
with respect to superordinate-subordinate relationships (Lunenburg & Ornstein, 
2004). Schools and districts have become increasingly accountable to SEAs while 
accountability to governors, state legislators, federal and other national 
constituencies drives accountability frameworks. The tension between districts 
and states in the beginning years of NCLB and the ongoing confrontation between 
states and teacher unions on teacher evaluation formulas illustrate the ideology 
collision and power struggle under the influence of SBA.  
Past efforts in education reform suggest that school improvement relies on 
cooperation among interest groups – SEAs, LEAs, teachers and administrators. 
The emphasis on local buy-in in the Race to the Top grant reflects the lessons 
learned from past reforms – to lead the reform, states have to reach consensus 
among interest groups within the states. State partnership has become the main 
theme in the SBA reform, and SEAs‘ leadership role is central no matter if 
partnerships are built on federal investment or through collaboration with LEAs 
and other interest groups.  
The examination of organizational change in SEAs illustrates the impact of 
SBA policy on educational organizations. It echoes research on institutional 
influences, particularly government regulation, contained in organizational fields 
(Edelman, 1992; Dobbin & Sutton, 1998; Edelman et al., 1999). Such impact on 
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policy delivery organizations has not been widely recognized, as research 
attention is often directed to the policy receiving organizations, such as schools 
and districts. The policy impact on the delivery organizations as illustrated in this 
study, however, suggests an additional layer of potential complication and cost of 
policy implementation. Many SEAs took detours and learned the hard way how to 
take on the entitled leadership role in the SBA reform. The frustration of 
implementing top-down policy may hurt SEAs‘ motivation to take action, and 
increase the hidden cost for staff, time and resources, which feed the negative 
public image of SEAs as inefficient, bureaucratic organizations. SEAs‘ 
transformation and struggle in adapting to the changing institutional environment 
provide insights to understand challenges in policy implementation and reveal the 
lack of organizational knowledge in the design of top-down SBA policy.  In the 
meantime, SEAs‘ varied responses to the law has helped construct the 
institutional environment and shaped the standards in the organizational field, 
which further highlights the importance of SEAs as a powerful organizational 
field in steering the political process of SBA institutionalization. If NCLB had 
been better informed about the status quo of SEAs and made corresponding 
adjustments to accommodate their organizational needs, the federal law might 
have encountered less resistance and elicited more commitment from SEAs. The 
RT3 grant has demonstrated a great emphasis on SEA‘s organizational structures, 
such as capacities and relationship with local entities, in determining the 
feasibility of reform plans and the probability of successful implementation. The 
reauthorization of NCLB should be informed by lessons from the past and more 
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consideration of the organizational infrastructure building of the policy delivery 
organizations, such as SEAs. Specifically, the analysis of organizational change in 
SEAs suggests the following recommendations for standards-based reforms: 
1. Develop a capacity measure for policy delivery organizations, such as 
SEAs, to inform policy design and gauge potential challenges for 
implementation. In the early years of implementing NCLB, many SEAs 
were frustrated by their limited capacities to fulfill the increasing federal 
demands. This has been cited as a major contributing factor in the push-
back against the federal law. It suggests the importance of capacity 
building in policy delivery organizations as a strategy for effective 
policy design. 
2. Include organizational change as an important part of policy evaluation 
and implementation analysis. This study suggests that, during policy 
implementation, the impact of standards-based accountability is not only 
at the school level. The intermediate organizations and the infrastructure 
of the country‘s education system may be changed. These macro-level 
changes signify a different aspect of policy impact and may provide 
valuable insights to future policy design.  
3. Provide professional development opportunities to enhance SEAs‘ 
technical capacity; adjust salary scales to attract competent professionals 
to SEAs. The pressing needs for professional staff in teaching, 
technology and management pose great challenges to SEAs‘ legitimacy 
and leadership roles. As contractual employment provides only a short-
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term solution, how to attract and maintain competitive staff remains a 
question to be answered. 
4. Strengthen organizational relationships across bureaucratic hierarchies 
through collaboration and communication. More and more, SEAs realize 
the importance of local collaboration in establishing leadership roles. 
Such cross-level collaborative relationships, however, remain contested 
by many conflicts of interest. How the three tiers of governance in 
education (federal, state and district) work together is key for an 
effective SBA system. 
5. Encourage local innovation to improve organizational productivity with 
results- oriented, rather than compliance-driven education policies. 
Recent federal funding strategy as manifested in RT3 and i3 not only 
encourages innovation in education but also creates the needs for SEAs 
and local districts and schools to work together. With strings attached, 
such a strategy seems to have a better chance to address local needs and 
win local buy-in, which is indispensable for successful policy 
implementation.  
SBA policies at both state and federal levels have re-engineered the 
education system by shifting its power upward. Organizational changes in SEAs 
manifest a system-wide transition in the field of education, and potential sources 
of tension in school reform. Understanding policy delivery organizations is an 
important but often overlooked step in policy design. The competition model in 
current federal programs gives more flexibility to states in forming their own 
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reform plans within the federal framework. The evaluation process takes 
organizational capacity and partnerships into consideration to ensure that 
proposed plans are feasible. Such processes allow states to build consensus with 
other state and local constituents to make sustainable plans for school reform.  
Limitations and Future study 
 This study explores the features of organizational change of SEAs and 
makes an argument that such change is important to our understanding of SBA 
reform and its impact on the education system. Since this is a secondary analysis 
of data, it must involve careful selection of relevant data to address the research 
questions. In this sense, the data sources were limited to elaborate themes in 
greater detail and to provide evidence for some brief but interesting arguments by 
SEAs officials.  The study would have benefited greatly from more in-depth 
single case studies to flesh out details of such changes, particularly in the context 
of organizational history and local politics. Similarly, the survey data can be more 
informative if more questions that directly address the organizational change in 
SEAs were included and repeated over time.  
Additionally, neither the interview protocol nor the survey instrument sets 
specific time stamps; as a result, changes in SEAs reported by the state officials 
reflect different time points at which they witness change and the length of time 
for changes to take place. This, together with the complex state context, makes it 
hard to compare organizational strategies to tell which strategy is more effective 
to bring about change.  
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 The measure of change is by no means comprehensive; many important 
aspects of changes, such as the internal distribution of resources and the 
organizational culture, were not included or addressed fully. Future studies on 
organizational change in SEAs may expand the understanding of SEAs‘ change 
through a different set of organizational characteristics. For instance, in thinking 
of the current trend of competition for federal funding, a comparative case study 
of SEAs winning and not winning the federal grants will give great insight as to 
how the competition trend under Race to the Top impacts the function and 
operation of SEAs in comparison to the legitimization demands under NCLB. The 
outcomes for state education systems may be closely associated with the way 
SEAs organize themselves to work with local districts and schools under two 
different kinds of institutional environments discussed in this study, one based on 
legitimation and the other leaning toward competition.  
Understanding policy delivery organizations, such as SEAs, can be a helpful 
resource for designing studies on organizational effects using multi-level analysis 
techniques. For example, the characteristics of educational organizations may 
help identify organizational variables that influence students‘ school experience.  
Does the collaboration between states and districts have positive effects on 
students‘ learning?  Do states winning the Race to the Top grant show higher rates 
of improvement in school performance than states that did not? Does a state get 
better return on student achievement when hiring external experts to train teachers 
in comparison to local exchange of experience among educators? Answers to 
these questions about the effects of state policies rely on a good understanding of 
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SEAs so that robust variables can be incorporated into the analytic models. 
Additionally, the formulation of competition among states opens the door to 
examining new possible modes of governance in SEAs, tensions, and the structure 
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Common Core of Data, State of the states, Education Vital Signs, 2009, Education Week, 
26 (15), 2006 and Education Week, 26 (17), January 4, 2007.
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Appendix B: Interview Protocols 
 
1. Today, when people, particularly those in Washington D.C., think about SEAs, 
they automatically think of NCLB implementation responsibilities. How 
would you describe SEAs so that people would have a more complete picture 
of what an SEA does? 
2. In what ways are SEAs organized (both in structure and function) differently 
today than when you started at the SEA?  
a. Were any of these changes prompted by NCLB? 
3. In what ways has the relationship between SEAs (in terms of roles and 
responsibilities) and LEAs changed?  
a. How have you organized the SEA to provide assistance to the lowest 
performing schools and districts? 
4. Can you talk about the ways in which systems for collection and use of data 
(including state and federal legislative requirements and capacity issues) have 
changed over the past decade? 
5. Is the way you would characterize your SEA‘s relationship with the state 
legislature and governor (e.g., legislative initiatives) today different from 
when you began? 
6. How have human and financial resources to support staff and programs 
changed? 
a. Do SEAs have sufficient human resources to carry out NCLB? 
b. What are some of the challenges you face in implementing NCLB with 
regard to human resources? 
7. Do you believe your SEA currently has the capacity to carry out NCLB 
effectively? Why or why not? 
8. How does your SEA work with other partners to support implementation of 
NCLB and other state initiative (i.e., Comprehensive Centers, Educational 








Code Code Definition 
Institutional change Set 1. Setting/context: the larger context 
of the case 
Institutional change Def 2. Definition of the situation: 




Pro 3. Process: sequence of events, flow, 
transitions and turning points 
Loose coupling; 
adaptation 
Str 4. Strategies: tactics, methods, 
techniques to accomplish things or 
meet their needs 




Appendix D: Cross-Case Coding 
 










LEG within-case analysis code 1  Across organizational 
level 





COM within-case analysis code 1  Across organizational 
level 






LC within-case analysis code 3, 4, 5  Internal structure  
 Internal procedure 
 External relationship 




ADA within-case analysis code 3, 4, 5  Internal structure 
 Internal procedure 
 External relationship 
 External procedure 
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